Book 3
32
But, since indeed all goodness involves purposive choice (it has been said before what we mean by this—goodness makes a man choose everything for the sake of some object, and that object is what is fine), it is clear that courage being a form of goodness will make a man face formidable things for some object, so that he does not do it through ignorance (for it rather makes him judge correctly), nor yet for pleasure, but because it is fine, since in a case where it is not fine but insane he will not face them, for then it would be base to do so.
33
We have now given an account that is fairly adequate for our present procedure of the kind of things in relation to which Courage is a middle state, and between what vices and for what reason it is this, and what is the power that formidable things exercise.
1
We must next attempt to decide about Temperance and Profligacy. The term profligate (unchaste) has a variety of meanings. It means the man who has not been (as it were) chastised or cured, just as undivided means one that has not been divided; and these terms include both one capable of the process and one not capable of it: undivided means both that which cannot be divided and that which though it can be has not been;
