Book 3
1
It has then been stated in general terms that there are middle states in the virtues and that these are purposive, and also that the opposite dispositions are vices and what these are. But let us take them separately and discuss them seriatim. And first let us speak about Courage.
2
Now almost everybody holds that the brave man is concerned with fears, and that courage is one of the virtues. And in our schedule Aristot. Eud. Eth. 1220b 39, Aristot. Eud. Eth. 1221a 17-19. previously we distinguished daring and fear as contraries, for they are indeed in a manner opposed to one another.
3
It is clear, therefore, that the persons named after these states of character will also be similarly opposed to each other—that is, the coward (for that is the term that denotes being more afraid than is proper and less daring than is proper) and the daring man (for that denotes the characteristic of being less afraid than is proper and more daring than is proper—and from this the name is derived, as the word daring is cognate with the word dare).
