Book 2
22
But we will speak about this in our examination of justice.Not in Eud. Eth., but cf. Aristot. Nic. Eth. 1135a 16ff. As to purposive choice, it is clear that it is not absolutely identical with wish nor with opinion, but is opinion plus appetition when these follow as a conclusion from deliberation.
22
But since one who deliberates always deliberates for the sake of some object, and a man deliberating always has some aim in view with reference to which he considers what is expedient, nobody deliberates about his End, but this is a starting-point or assumption,
23
like the postulates in the theoretic sciences (we have spoken about this briefly at the beginning of this discourse, and in detail in AnalyticsSee Aristot. Eud. Eth. 1214b 6ff., and Aristot. Anal. Post. 72a 20 and context.); whereas with all men deliberation whether technical or untechnical is about the means that lead to their End, e.g. when they deliberate about whether to go to war or not to go to war with a given person.
24
And the question of means will depend rather on a prior question, that is, the question of object, for instance wealth or pleasure or something else of that kind which happens to be our object. For one who deliberates deliberates if he has considered, from the standpoint of the End, either what tends to enable him to bring the End to himself or how he can himself go to the End.i.e. he works back in thought from his intended End to some means to its attainment that is already within his power.
