229–230
Friend
Fr. It would seem, then, Socrates, either that you do not regard me as your friend, or if you do, that you do not obey Hipparchus. For that you are not deceiving me—though I cannot tell how you contrive it—in your talk, is more than I can believe.
Socrates
Soc. Well now, as though we were playing draughts, I am willing to let you revoke, as you please, anything you have said in carrying on the discussion, in order that you may not think you are being deceived. So tell me, shall I revoke for you the statement that all men desire good things?
Friend
Fr. No, thank you.
Socrates
Soc. Well, that suffering loss, or loss, is an evil?
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Friend
Fr. No, thank you.
Socrates
Soc. Well, that gain, or making gain, is the opposite of loss, or suffering loss?
Friend
Fr. Nor that either.
Socrates
Soc. Well, that making gain, as the opposite of evil, is a good?
Friend
Fr. Nothing of all this do I bid you revoke for me.
Socrates
Soc. You think, then, it seems, that some gain is good, and some evil.
Socrates
Soc. Well then, I revoke so much for you; so let us assume that some gain is good, and some other gain evil. But the good sort is no more gain than the evil sort, is it?
Friend
Fr. What do you mean by this question?
Socrates
Soc. I will explain. Is there both good and evil food?
Socrates
Soc. And is the one sort more food than the other, or are they both similarly this same thing, food, and in this respect does the one differ no wise from the other, in being food, but only in the fact of the one being good and the other evil?
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