Ἀλκιβιάδης αʹ

Bölümler

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İngilizce Yunanca

133

Socrates

Soc. Then an eye viewing another eye, and looking at the most perfect part of it, the thing wherewith it sees, will thus see itself.

Alcibiades

Alc. Apparently.

Socrates

Soc. But if it looks at any other thing in man or at anything in nature but what resembles this, i.e. it must look at the pupil of a man’s eye, or at what is comparable to that perfect part in other things. it will not see itself. 5

Alcibiades

Alc. That is true.

Socrates

Soc. Then if an eye is to see itself, it must look at an eye, and at that region of the eye in which the virtue of an eye is found to occur; and this, I presume, is sight.

Alcibiades

Alc. That is so.

Socrates

Soc. And if the soul too, my dear Alcibiades, is to know herself, she must surely look at a soul, and especially at that region of it in which occurs the virtue of a soul—wisdom, and at any other part of a soul which resembles this?

Alcibiades

Alc. I agree, Socrates. 10

Socrates

Soc. And can we find any part of the soul that we can call more divine than this, which is the seat of knowledge and thought?

Alcibiades

Alc. We cannot.

Socrates

Soc. Then this part of her resembles God, and whoever looks at this, and comes to know all that is divine, will gain thereby the best knowledge of himself.

Alcibiades

Alc. Apparently.

Socrates

Soc. And self-knowledge we admitted to be temperance. Above, Plat. Alc. 1.131b. 15

Alcibiades

Alc. To be sure.

Socrates

Soc. So if we have no knowledge of ourselves and no temperance, shall we be able to know our own belongings, good or evil?

Alcibiades

Alc. How can that be, Socrates?