111
Socrates
Soc. Well now, do you find that the many differ about the nature of stone or wood? If you ask one of them, do they not agree on the same answer, and make for the same things when they want to get a piece of stone or wood? It is just the same, too, with everything of the sort: for I am pretty nearly right in understanding you to mean just this by knowing how to speak Greek, am I not?
Socrates
Soc. And on these matters, as we stated, they not only agree with each other and with themselves in private, but states also use in public the same terms about them to each other, without any dispute?
Socrates
Soc. Then naturally they will be good teachers of these matters.
Socrates
Soc. And if we should wish to provide anyone with knowledge of them, we should be right in sending him to be taught by the many that you speak of?
20
Alcibiades
Alc. Certainly.
Socrates
Soc. But what if we wished to know not only what men were like or what horses were like, but which of them were good runners or not? Would the many still suffice to teach us this?
Alcibiades
Alc. No, indeed.
Socrates
Soc. And you have ample proof that they do not know this, and are not proficient teachers of it, in their not agreeing about it at all with themselves?
Alcibiades
Alc. I have.
25
Socrates
Soc. And what if we wished to know not only what men were like, but what healthy or diseased men were like? Would the many suffice to teach us?
Alcibiades
Alc. No, indeed.
Socrates
Soc. And you would have proof of their being bad teachers of that, if you saw them differing about it?
Alcibiades
Alc. I should.
