262–263
Socrates
Socrates. And by some special good fortune, as it seems, the two discourses contain an example of the way in which one who knows the truth may lead his hearers on with sportive words; and I, Phaedrus, think the divinities of the place are the cause thereof; and perhaps too, the prophets of the Muses, who are singing above our heads, may have granted this boon to us by inspiration; at any rate, I possess no art of speaking.
Phaedrus
Phaedrus. So be it; only make your meaning clear.
Socrates
Socrates. Read me the beginning of Lysias’ discourse.
Phaedrus
Phaedrus. You know what my condition is, and you have heard how I think it is to our advantage to arrange these matters. And I claim that I ought not to be refused what I ask because I am not your lover. For lovers repent of—
Socrates
Socrates. Stop. Now we must tell what there is in this that is faulty and lacks art, must we not?
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Socrates
Socrates. It is clear to everyone that we are in accord about some matters of this kind and at variance about others, is it not?
Phaedrus
Phaedrus. I think I understand your meaning, but express it still more clearly.
Socrates
Socrates. When one says iron or silver, we all understand the same thing, do we not?
Phaedrus
Phaedrus. Surely.
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Socrates
Socrates. What if he says justice or goodness? Do we not part company, and disagree with each other and with ourselves?
Phaedrus
Phaedrus. Certainly.
Socrates
Socrates. Then in some things we agree and in others we do not.
Socrates
Socrates. Then in which of the two are we more easy to deceive, and in which has rhetoric the greater power?
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