60–61
Socrates
Soc. And if we made any mistake at that time, let any one now take up the question again. Assuming that memory, wisdom, knowledge, and true opinion belong to the same class, let him ask whether anyone would wish to have or acquire anything whatsoever without these not to speak of pleasure, be it never so abundant or intense, if he could have no true opinion that he is pleased, no knowledge whatsoever of what he has felt, and not even the slightest memory of the feeling. And let him ask in the same way about wisdom, whether anyone would wish to have wisdom without any, even the slightest, pleasure rather than with some pleasures, or all pleasures without wisdom rather than with some wisdom.
Protarchus
Pro. That is impossible, Socrates; it is useless to ask the same question over and over again.
Socrates
Soc. Then the perfect, that which is to be desired by all and is altogether good, is neither of these?
Protarchus
Pro. Certainly not.
Socrates
Soc. We must, then, gain a clear conception of the good, or at least an outline of it, that we may, as we said, know to what the second place is to be assigned.
Protarchus
Pro. Quite right.
Socrates
Soc. And have we not found a road which leads to the good?
5
Protarchus
Pro. What road?
Socrates
Soc. If you were looking for a particular man and first found out correctly where he lived, you would have made great progress towards finding him whom you sought.
Protarchus
Pro. Yes, certainly.
Socrates
Soc. And just now we received an indication, as we did in the beginning, that we must seek the good, not in the unmixed, but in the mixed life.
