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İngilizce Yunanca

60

Socrates

Soc. Philebus says that pleasure is the true goal of every living being and that all ought to aim at it, and that therefore this is also the good for all, and the two designations good and pleasant are properly and essentially one; Socrates, however, says that they are not one, but two in fact as in name, that the good and the pleasant differ from one another in nature, and that wisdom’s share in the good is greater than pleasure’s. Is not and was not that what was said, Protarchus? 5

Protarchus

Pro. Yes, certainly.

Socrates

Soc. And furthermore, is not and was not this a point of agreement among us?

Protarchus

Pro. What?

Socrates

Soc. That the nature of the good differs from all else in this respect.

Protarchus

Pro. In what respect? 10

Socrates

Soc. That whatever living being possesses the good always, altogether, and in all ways, has no further need of anything, but is perfectly sufficient. We agreed to that?

Protarchus

Pro. We did.

Socrates

Soc. And then we tried in thought to separate each from the other and apply them to individual lives, pleasure unmixed with wisdom and likewise wisdom which had not the slightest alloy of pleasure?

Protarchus

Pro. Yes.

Socrates

Soc. And did we think then that either of them would be sufficient for any one? 15

Protarchus

Pro. By no means.