43–44
Socrates
Soc. Now let us assume that we have three things; no matter what they are, but let us use fine names and call one gold, another silver, and the third neither of the two.
Socrates
Soc. Now can that which is neither become either gold or silver?
25
Protarchus
Pro. Certainly not.
Socrates
Soc. Neither can that middle life of which we spoke ever be rightly considered in opinion or called in speech pleasant or painful, at any rate by those who reason correctly.
Protarchus
Pro. No, certainly not.
Socrates
Soc. But surely, my friend, we are aware of persons who call it and consider it so.
Protarchus
Pro. Certainly.
Socrates
Soc. Do they, then, think they feel pleasure whenever they are not in pain?
Protarchus
Pro. That is what they say.
Socrates
Soc. Then they do think they feel pleasure at such times; for otherwise they would not say so.
5
Protarchus
Pro. Most likely.
Socrates
Soc. Certainly, then, they have a false opinion about pleasure, if there is an essential difference between feeling pleasure and not feeling pain.
Protarchus
Pro. And we certainly found that difference.
Socrates
Soc. Then shall we adopt the view that there are, as we said just now, three states, or that there are only two—pain, which is an evil to mankind, and freedom from pain, which is of itself a good and is called pleasure?
Protarchus
Pro. Why do we ask ourselves that question now, Socrates? I do not understand.
10
Socrates
Soc. No, Protarchus, for you certainly do not understand about the enemies of our friend Philebus.
Protarchus
Pro. Whom do you mean?
Socrates
Soc. Certain men who are said to be master thinkers about nature, and who deny the existence of pleasures altogether.
