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İngilizce Yunanca

38

Socrates

Soc. Then this is the way I lead.

Protarchus

Pro. What way?

Socrates

Soc. Do we agree that there is such a thing as false opinion and also as true opinion? 10

Protarchus

Pro. There is.

Socrates

Soc. And, as we were saying just now, pleasure and pain often follow them—I mean true and false opinion.

Protarchus

Pro. Certainly.

Socrates

Soc. And do not opinion and the power of forming an opinion always come to us from memory and perception?

Protarchus

Pro. Certainly. 15

Socrates

Soc. Do we, then, believe that our relation to these faculties is somewhat as follows?

Protarchus

Pro. How?

Socrates

Soc. Would you say that often when a man sees things at a distance and not very clearly, he wishes to distinguish between the things which he sees?

Protarchus

Pro. Yes, I should say so.

Socrates

Soc. Next, then, would he not ask himself— 20

Protarchus

Pro. What?

Socrates

Soc. What is that which is visible standing beside the rock under a tree? Do you not think a man might ask himself such a question if he saw such objects presented to his view?

Protarchus

Pro. To be sure.

Socrates

Soc. And after that our gazer might reply to himself correctly It is a man?

Protarchus

Pro. Certainly. 25

Socrates

Soc. Or, again, perhaps he might be misled into the belief that it was a work of some shepherds, and then he would call the thing which he saw an image.

Protarchus

Pro. Yes, indeed.