37–38
Socrates
Soc. And if badness becomes an attribute of any of these, Protarchus, shall we say that the opinion or the pleasure thereby becomes bad?
Protarchus
Pro. Why certainly, Socrates.
Socrates
Soc. And what if rightness or its opposite becomes an attribute of one of them? Shall we not say that the opinion is right, if it has rightness, and the pleasure likewise?
25
Protarchus
Pro. Obviously.
Socrates
Soc. And if that which is opined is mistaken, must we not agree that the opinion, since it is at the moment making a mistake, is not right or rightly opining?
Protarchus
Pro. Of course.
Socrates
Soc. And what if we see a pain or a pleasure making a mistake in respect of that by which the pain or pleasure is caused? Shall we give it the attribute of right or good or any of the words which denote excellence?
Protarchus
Pro. That is impossible if the pleasure is mistaken.
30
Socrates
Soc. And certainly pleasure often seems to come to us in connection with false, not true, opinion.
Protarchus
Pro. Of course it does; and in such a case, Socrates, we call the opinion false; but nobody would ever call the actual pleasure false.
Socrates
Soc. You are an eager advocate of the case of pleasure just now, Protarchus.
Protarchus
Pro. Oh no, I merely say what I hear.
Socrates
Soc. Is there no difference, my friend, between the pleasure which is connected with right opinion and knowledge and that which often comes to each of us with falsehood and ignorance?
Protarchus
Pro. There is likely to be a great difference.
5
Socrates
Soc. Then let us proceed to the contemplation of the difference between them.
Protarchus
Pro. Lead on as you think best.
