37
Socrates
Soc. Then let us analyze still more clearly what we were just now saying about pleasure and opinion. There is a faculty of having an opinion, is there not?
Socrates
Soc. And of feeling pleasure?
5
Socrates
Soc. And there is an object of opinion?
Protarchus
Pro. Of course.
Socrates
Soc. And something by which that which feels pleasure is pleased?
Protarchus
Pro. Certainly.
10
Socrates
Soc. And that which has opinion, whether right or wrong, never loses its function of really having opinion?
Protarchus
Pro. Of course not.
Socrates
Soc. And that which feels pleasure, whether rightly or wrongly, will clearly never lose its function of really feeling pleasure?
Protarchus
Pro. Yes, that is true, too.
Socrates
Soc. Then we must consider how it is that opinion is both true and false and pleasure only true, though the holding of opinion and the feeling of pleasure are equally real.
15
Protarchus
Pro. Yes, so we must.
Socrates
Soc. You mean that we must consider this question because falsehood and truth are added as attributes to opinion, and thereby it becomes not merely opinion, but opinion of a certain quality in each instance?
Socrates
Soc. And furthermore, we must reach an agreement on the question whether, even if some things have qualities, pleasure and pain are not merely what they are, without qualities or attributes.
Protarchus
Pro. Evidently we must.
20
Socrates
Soc. But it is easy enough to see that they have qualities. For we said a long time ago that both pains and pleasures are great and small and intense.
Protarchus
Pro. Yes, certainly.