36
Socrates
Soc. Because of his condition, he is suffering, but he remembers the pleasures the coming of which would bring him an end of his pain; as yet, however, he does not possess them. Well then, shall we say that he is between the affections, or not?
Protarchus
Pro. Let us say so.
Socrates
Soc. Shall we say that he is wholly pained or wholly pleased?
Protarchus
Pro. No, by Zeus, but he is afflicted with a twofold pain; he suffers in body from his sensation, and in soul from expectation and longing.
Socrates
Soc. How could you, Protarchus, speak of twofold pain? Is not an empty man sometimes possessed of a sure hope of being filled, and sometimes, on the contrary, quite hopeless?
5
Protarchus
Pro. Certainly.
Socrates
Soc. And do you not think that when he has a hope of being filled he takes pleasure in his memory, and yet at the same time, since he is at the moment empty, suffers pain?
Protarchus
Pro. It cannot be otherwise.
Socrates
Soc. At such a time, then, a man, or any other animal, has both pain and pleasure at once.
Protarchus
Pro. Yes, I suppose so.
10
Socrates
Soc. And when an empty man is without hope of being filled, what then? Is not that the time when the twofold feeling of pain would arise, which you just now observed and thought the pain simply was twofold?
Protarchus
Pro. Very true, Socrates.
Socrates
Soc. Let us make use of our examination of those affections for a particular purpose.
Protarchus
Pro. For what purpose?
Socrates
Soc. Shall we say that those pleasures and pains are true or false, or that some are true and others not so?
15
Protarchus
Pro. But, Socrates, how can there be false pleasures or pains?
