34
Socrates
Soc. And again when the soul has lost the memory of a perception or of something it has learned and then alone by itself regains this, we call everything of that kind recollection.
15
Protarchus
Pro. You are right.
Socrates
Soc. Now my reason for saying all this is—
Socrates
Soc. That henceforth we may comprehend as completely and clearly as possible the pleasure of the soul, and likewise its desire, apart from the body; for both of these appear to be made plain by what has been said about memory and recollection.
Protarchus
Pro. Let us, then, Socrates, discuss the next point.
20
Socrates
Soc. We must, it seems, consider many things in relation to the origin and general aspect of pleasure; but now I think our first task is to take up the nature and origin of desire.
Protarchus
Pro. Then let us examine that; for we shall not lose anything.
Socrates
Soc. Oh yes, Protarchus, we shall lose a great deal! When we find what we are seeking we shall lose our perplexity about these very questions.
Protarchus
Pro. That is a fair counter; but let us try to take up the next point.
Socrates
Soc. Did we not say just now that hunger, thirst, and the like were desires?
25
Protarchus
Pro. They are, decidedly.
Socrates
Soc. What sort of identity have we in view when we call these, which are so different, by one name?
Protarchus
Pro. By Zeus, Socrates, that question may not be easy to answer, yet it must be answered.
Socrates
Soc. Let us, then, begin again at that point with the same examples.
Protarchus
Pro. At what point?
30
Socrates
Soc. We say of a thing on any particular occasion, it’s thirsty, do we not?
Protarchus
Pro. Of course.
Socrates
Soc. And that means being empty?
