Thesauros Literature Philosophy Φίληβος

Φίληβος

Φίληβος Plato

33

Socrates
Soc. You know that there is nothing to hinder a man from living the life of wisdom in this manner. 5
Protarchus
Pro. You mean without feeling pleasure or pain?
Socrates
Soc. Yes, for it was said, you know, in our comparison of the lives that he who chose the life of mind and wisdom was to have no feeling of pleasure, great or small.
Protarchus
Pro. Yes, surely, that was said.
Socrates
Soc. Such a man, then, would have such a life; and perhaps it is not unreasonable, if that is the most divine of lives.
Protarchus
Pro. Certainly it is not likely that gods feel either joy or its opposite. 10
Socrates
Soc. No, it is very unlikely; for either is unseemly for them. But let us reserve the discussion of that point for another time, if it is appropriate, and we will give mind credit for it in contending for the second place, if we cannot count it for the first.
Protarchus
Pro. Quite right.
Socrates
Soc. Now the other class of pleasure, which we said was an affair of the soul alone, originates entirely in memory.
Protarchus
Pro. How is that?
Socrates
Soc. We must, apparently, first take up memory, and perception even before memory, if these matters are to be made clear to us properly. 15
Protarchus
Pro. What do you mean?
Socrates
Soc. Assume that some of the affections of our body are extinguished in the body before they reach the soul, leaving the soul unaffected, and that other affections permeate both body and soul and cause a vibration in both conjointly and in each individually.
Protarchus
Pro. Let us assume that.

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