Φίληβος

Bölümler

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İngilizce Yunanca

32–33

Socrates

Soc. You are right. I think that in these two kinds, both of which are, in my opinion, pure, and not formed by mixture of pain and pleasure, the truth about pleasure will be made manifest, whether the entire class is to be desired or such desirability is rather to be attributed to some other class among those we have mentioned, whereas pleasure and pain, like heat, cold, and other such things, are sometimes desirable and sometimes undesirable, because they are not good themselves, though some of them sometimes admit on occasion the nature of the good.

Protarchus

Pro. You are quite right in saying that we must track our quarry on this trail. 10

Socrates

Soc. First, then, let us agree on this point: If it is true, as we said, that destruction is pain and restoration is pleasure, let us consider the case of living beings in which neither destruction nor restoration is going on, and what their state is under such conditions. Fix your mind on my question: Must not every living being under those conditions necessarily be devoid of any feeling of pain or pleasure, great or small?

Protarchus

Pro. Yes, necessarily.

Socrates

Soc. Have we, then, a third condition, besides those of feeling pleasure and pain?

Protarchus

Pro. Certainly.

Socrates

Soc. Well then, do your best to bear it in mind; for remembering or forgetting it will make a great difference in our judgement of pleasure. And I should like, if you do not object, to speak briefly about it.

Protarchus

Pro. Pray do so.