263–264
Stranger
Str. And if there is no subject, it would not be a sentence at all; for we showed that a sentence without a subject is impossible.
Theaetetus
Theaet. Quite right.
Stranger
Str. Now when things are said about you, but things other are said as the same and things that are not as things that are, it appears that when such a combination is formed of verbs and nouns we have really and truly false discourse.
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Theaetetus
Theaet. Yes, very truly.
Stranger
Str. Is it, then, not already plain that the three classes, thought, opinion, and fancy, all arise in our minds as both false and true?
Theaetetus
Theaet. How is it plain?
Stranger
Str. You will understand more easily if you first grap their natures and the several differences between them.
Theaetetus
Theaet. Give me an opportunity.
35
Stranger
Str. Well, then, thought and speech are the same; only the former, which is a silent inner conversation of the soul with itself, has been given the special name of thought. Is not that true?
Theaetetus
Theaet. Certainly.
Stranger
Str. But the stream that flows from the soul in vocal utterance through the mouth has the name of speech?
Stranger
Str. And in speech we know there is just—
40
Stranger
Str. Affirmation and negation
Theaetetus
Theaet. Yes, we know that.
Stranger
Str. Now when this arises in the soul silently by way of thought, can you give it any other name than opinion?
Theaetetus
Theaet. Certainly not.
Stranger
Str. And when such a condition is brought about in anyone, not independently, but through sensation, can it properly be called anything but seeming, or fancy?
