Σοφιστής

Bölümler

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İngilizce Yunanca

260

Stranger

Str. Perhaps the easiest way for you to understand is by following this line of argument. 5

Theaetetus

Theaet. What line?

Stranger

Str. We found that not-being was one of the classes of being, permeating all being.

Theaetetus

Theaet. Yes.

Stranger

Str. So the next thing is to inquire whether it mingles with opinion and speech.

Theaetetus

Theaet. Why? 10

Stranger

Str. If it does not mingle with them, the necessary result is that all things are true, but if it does, then false opinion and false discourse come into being; for to think or say what is not—that is, I suppose, falsehood arising in mind or in words.

Theaetetus

Theaet. So it is.

Stranger

Str. But if falsehood exists, deceit exists.

Theaetetus

Theaet. Yes.

Stranger

Str. And if deceit exists, all things must be henceforth full of images and likenesses and fancies. 15

Theaetetus

Theaet. Of course.

Stranger

Str. But we said that the sophist had taken refuge in this region and had absolutely denied the existence of falsehood: for he said that not-being could be neither conceived nor uttered, since not-being did not in any way participate in being.

Theaetetus

Theaet. Yes, so it was.