258
Stranger
Str. Hence the not-great must be said to be no less truly than the great?
Theaetetus
Theaet. No less truly.
Stranger
Str. And so we must recognize the same relation between the just and the not-just, in so far as neither has any more being than the other?
Theaetetus
Theaet. Of course.
Stranger
Str. And we shall, then, say the same of other things, since the nature of the other is proved to possess real being; and if it has being, we must necessarily ascribe being in no less degree to its parts also.
5
Theaetetus
Theaet. Of course.
Stranger
Str. Then, as it seems, the opposition of the nature of a part of the other, and of the nature of being, when they are opposed to one another, is no less truly existence than is being itself, if it is not wrong for me to say so, for it signifies not the opposite of being, but only the other of being, and nothing more.
Theaetetus
Theaet. That is perfectly clear.
Stranger
Str. Then what shall we call this?
Theaetetus
Theaet. Evidently this is precisely not-being, which we were looking for because of the sophist.
10
Stranger
Str. And is this, as you were saying, as fully endowed with being as anything else, and shall we henceforth say with confidence that not-being has an assured existence and a nature of its own? Just as we found that the great was great and the beautiful was beautiful, the not-great was not-great and the not-beautiful was not-beautiful, shall we in the same way say that not-being was and is not-being, to be counted as one class among the many classes of being? Or have we, Theaetetus, any remaining distrust about the matter?