248–249
Theaetetus
Theaet. And is there not something in that?
Stranger
Str. Yes, something to which we must reply that we still need to learn more clearly from them whether they agree that the soul knows and that being is known.
Theaetetus
Theaet. They certainly assent to that.
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Stranger
Str. Well then, do you say that knowing or being known is an active or passive condition, or both? Or that one is passive and the other active? Or that neither has any share at all in either of the two?
Theaetetus
Theaet. Clearly they would say that neither has any share in either; for otherwise they would be contradicting themselves.
Stranger
Str. I understand; this at least is true, that if to know is active, to be known must in turn be passive. Now being, since it is, according to this theory, known by the intelligence, in so far as it is known, is moved, since it is acted upon, which we say cannot be the case with that which is in a state of rest.
Theaetetus
Theaet. Right.
Stranger
Str. But for heaven’s sake, shall we let ourselves easily be persuaded that motion and life and soul and mind are really not present to absolute being, that it neither lives nor thinks, but awful and holy, devoid of mind, is fixed and immovable?
Theaetetus
Theaet. That would be a shocking admission to make, Stranger.
Stranger
Str. But shall we say that it has mind, but not life?
Theaetetus
Theaet. How can we?
Stranger
Str. But do we say that both of these exist in it, and yet go on to say that it does not possess them in a soul?
5
Theaetetus
Theaet. But how else can it possess them?
