244–245
Stranger
Str. Because he who asserts that the name is other than the thing, says that there are two entities.
Theaetetus
Theaet. Yes.
20
Stranger
Str. And further, if he asserts that the name is the same as the thing, he will be obliged to say that it is the name of nothing, or if he says it is the name of something, the name will turn out to be the name of a name merely and of nothing else.
Stranger
Str. And the one will turn out to be the name of one and also the one of the name. In other words, one, considered as a word, will be the name of unity, but considered as a reality, it will be the unity of which the word one is the name. The sentence is made somewhat difficult of comprehension, doubtless for the purpose of indicating the confusion caused by the identification of the name wlth the thing.
Theaetetus
Theaet. Necessarily.
Stranger
Str. And will they say that the whole is other than the one which exists or the same with it?
25
Theaetetus
Theaet. Of course they will and do say it is the same.
Stranger
Str. If then the whole is, as Parmenides says,On all sides like the mass of a well-rounded sphere, equally weighted in every direction from the middle; for neither greater nor less must needs be on this or that,Parmenides Fr. 8.43then being, being such as he describes it, has a center and extremes, and, having these, must certainly have parts, must it not?
Theaetetus
Theaet. Certainly.
Stranger
Str. But yet nothing hinders that which has parts from possessing the attribute of unity in all its parts and being in this way one, since it is all and whole.
Theaetetus
Theaet. Very true.
