188
Socrates
SOC. But surely a man does not think that the things he knows are the things he does not know, or again that the things he does not know are the things he knows.
Theaetetus
THEAET. That would be a monstrous absurdity.
Socrates
SOC. Then how could he still form false opinions? For inasmuch as all things are either known or unknown to us, it is impossible, I imagine, to form opinions outside of these alternatives, and within them it is clear that there is no place for fake opinion.
Theaetetus
THEAET. Very true.
Socrates
SOC. Had we, then, better look for what we are seeking, not by this method of knowing and not knowing, but by that of being and not being?
15
Theaetetus
THEAET. What do you mean?
Socrates
SOC. We may simply assert that he who on any subject holds opinions which are not, will certainly think falsely, no matter what the condition of his mind may be in other respects.
Theaetetus
THEAET. That, again, is likely, Socrates.
Socrates
SOC. Well then, what shall we say, Theaetetus, if anyone asks us, Is that which is assumed in common speech possible at all, and can any human being hold an opinion which is not, whether it be concerned with any of the things which are, or be entirely independent of them? We, I fancy, shall reply, Yes, when, in thinking, he thinks what is not true, shall we not?
Theaetetus
THEAET. Yes.
20
Socrates
SOC. And is the same sort of thing possible in any other field?
Theaetetus
THEAET. What sort of thing?
Socrates
SOC. For instance, that a man sees something, but sees nothing.
Theaetetus
THEAET. How can he?
