186
Socrates
SOC. But their essential nature and the fact that they exist, and their opposition to one another, and, in turn, the essential nature of this opposition, the soul itself tries to determine for us by reverting to them and comparing them with one another.
10
Theaetetus
THEAET. Certainly.
Socrates
SOC. Is it not true, then, that all sensations which reach the soul through the body, can be perceived by human beings, and also by animals, from the moment of birth; whereas reflections about these, with reference to their being and usefulness, are acquired, if at all, with difficulty and slowly, through many troubles, in other words, through education?
Theaetetus
THEAET. Assuredly.
Socrates
SOC. Is it, then, possible for one to attain truth who cannot even get as far as being?
Theaetetus
THEAET. No.
15
Socrates
SOC. And will a man ever have knowledge of anything the truth of which he fails to attain?
Theaetetus
THEAET. How can he, Socrates?
Socrates
SOC. Then knowledge is not in the sensations, but in the process of reasoning about them; for it is possible, apparently, to apprehend being and truth by reasoning, but not by sensation.
Theaetetus
THEAET. So it seems.
Socrates
SOC. Then will you call the two by the same name, when there are so great differences between them?
20
Theaetetus
THEAET. No, that would certainly not be right.
Socrates
SOC. What name will you give, then, to the one which includes seeing, hearing, smelling, being cold, and being hot?
Theaetetus
THEAET. Perceiving. What other name can I give it?
Socrates
SOC. Collectively you call it, then, perception?
Theaetetus
THEAET. Of course.
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