146–147
Socrates
SOC. And when you say carpentry? Do you mean anything else than the art of making wooden furnishings?
Theaetetus
THEAET. Nothing else by that, either.
Socrates
SOC. Then in both cases you define that to which each form of knowledge belongs?
Socrates
SOC. But the question, Theaetetus, was not to what knowledge belongs, nor how many the forms of knowledge are; for we did not wish to number them, but to find out what knowledge itself really is. Or is there nothing in what I say?
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Theaetetus
THEAET. Nay, you are quite right.
Socrates
SOC. Take this example. If anyone should ask us about some common everyday thing, for instance, what clay is, and we should reply that it is the potters’ clay and the oven makers’ clay and the brickmakers’ clay, should we not be ridiculous?
Theaetetus
THEAET. Perhaps.
Socrates
SOC. Yes in the first place for assuming that the questioner can understand from our answer what clay is, when we say clay, no matter whether we add the image-makers’ or any other craftsmen’s. Or does anyone, do you think, understand the name of anything when he does not know what the thing is?
Theaetetus
THEAET. By no means.
Socrates
SOC. Then he does not understand knowledge of shoes if he does not know knowledge.
5
Socrates
SOC. Then he who is ignorant of knowledge does not understand cobblery or any other art.
Theaetetus
THEAET. That is true.
Socrates
SOC. Then it is a ridiculous answer to the question what is knowledge? when we give the name of some art; for we give in our answer something that knowledge belongs to, when that was not what we were asked.
Theaetetus
THEAET. So it seems.
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