Θεαίτητος

Bölümler

142 142–143 143 144 144–145 145 145–146 146 146–147 147 147 147–148 148 149 149–150 150 150 151 151–152 152 152–153 153 153 154 154 154–155 155 155–156 156 156 157 157 157–158 158 158–159 159 159–160 160 160 161 161 161 162 162–163 163 163–164 164 164–165 165 165 166 167 168 168–169 169 169–170 170 170–171 171 171 172 172 172 173 173 174 174 175 175 176 176 176–177 177 177–178 178 178–179 179 179 180 180 180 181 181 181–182 182 182–183 183 184 184 184–185 185 185–186 186 186–187 187 187–188 188 188–189 189 189–190 190 190–191 191 191 192 192–193 193 193 193–194 194 194–195 195 196 196 197 197–198 198 198–199 199 199–200 200 200–201 201 201 202 202 203 203–204 204 204–205 205 205–206 206 206–207 207 207–208 208 208–209 209 209–210 210 210

İngilizce Yunanca

179

Socrates

SOC. Both lawmaking, then, and the advantageous are concerned with the future, and everyone would agree that a state in making laws must often fail to attain the greatest advantage?

Theodorus

THEO. Assuredly.

Socrates

SOC. Then it will be a fair answer if we say to your master that he is obliged to agree that one man is wiser than another, and that such a wise man is a measure, but that I, who am without knowledge, am not in the least obliged to become a measure, as the argument in his behalf just now tried to oblige me to be, whether I would or no. 5

Theodorus

THEO. In that respect, Socrates, I think that the argument is most clearly proved to be wrong, and it is proved wrong in this also, in that it declares the opinions of others to be valid, whereas it was shown that they do not consider his arguments true at all.