163–164
Socrates
SOC. Am I crazy, then? Look here. Do you not say that seeing is perceiving and that sight is perception?
Socrates
SOC. Then, according to what we have just said, the man who has seen a thing has acquired knowledge of that which he has seen?
Theaetetus
THEAET. Yes.
15
Socrates
SOC. Well, then, do you not admit that there is such a thing as memory?
Socrates
SOC. Memory of nothing or of something?
Theaetetus
THEAET. Of something, surely.
Socrates
SOC. Of things he has learned and perceived—that sort of things?
20
Theaetetus
THEAET. Of course.
Socrates
SOC. A man sometimes remembers what he has seen, does he not?
Theaetetus
THEAET. He does.
Socrates
SOC. Even when he shuts his eyes, or does he forget if he does that?
Theaetetus
THEAET. It would be absurd to say that, Socrates.
25
Socrates
SOC. We must, though, if we are to maintain our previous argument; otherwise, it is all up with it.
Theaetetus
THEAET. I too, by Zeus, have my suspicions, but I don’t fully understand you. Tell me how it is.
Socrates
SOC. This is how it is: he who sees has acquired knowledge, we say, of that which he has seen; for it is agreed that sight and perception and knowledge are all the same.
Theaetetus
THEAET. Certainly.
Socrates
SOC. But he who has seen and has acquired knowledge of what he saw, if he shuts his eyes, remembers it, but does not see it. Is that right?
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