Thesauros Literature Philosophy Θεαίτητος

Θεαίτητος

Θεαίτητος Plato

159–160

Socrates
SOC. Therefore the union of the Socrates who is ill and the draught of wine produces other results: in the tongue the sensation or perception of bitterness, and in the wine—a bitterness which is engendered there and passes over into the other; the wine is made, not bitterness, but bitter, and I am made, not perception, but perceptive.
Theaetetus
THEAET. Certainly.
Socrates
SOC. Then I shall never have this perception of any other thing; for a perception of another thing is another perception, and makes the percipient different and other: nor can that which acts on me ever by union with another produce the same result or become the same in kind; for by producing another result from another passive element it will become different in kind.
Theaetetus
THEAET. That is true.
Socrates
SOC. And neither shall I, furthermore, ever again become the same as I am, nor will that ever become the same as it is.
Theaetetus
THEAET. No.
Socrates
SOC. And yet, when I become percipient, I must necessarily become percipient of something, for it is impossible to become percipient and perceive nothing; and that which is perceived must become so to someone, when it becomes sweet or bitter or the like; for to become sweet, but sweet to no one, is impossible. 5
Theaetetus
THEAET. Perfectly true.

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