158–159
Socrates
SOC. Listen, then, while I tell you what would be said about them by those who maintain that what appears at any time is true for him to whom it appears. They begin, I imagine, by asking this question: Theaetetus, can that which is wholly other have in any way the same quality as its alternative? And we must not assume that the thing in question is partially the same and partially other, but wholly other.
Theaetetus
THEAET. It is impossible for it to be the same in anything, either in quality or in any other respect whatsoever, when it is wholly other.
Socrates
SOC. Must we not, then, necessarily agree that such a thing is also unlike?
Theaetetus
THEAET. It seems so to me.
Socrates
SOC. Then if anything happens to become like or unlike anything—either itself or anything else—we shall say that when it becomes like it becomes the same, and when it becomes unlike it becomes other?
Theaetetus
THEAET. We must.
5
Socrates
SOC. Well, we said before, did we not, that the active elements were many—infinite in fact—and likewise the passive elements?
Socrates
SOC. And furthermore, that any given element, by uniting at different times with different partners, will beget, not the same, but other results?
Theaetetus
THEAET. Certainly.
Socrates
SOC. Well, then, let us take me, or you, or anything else at hand, and apply the same principle—say Socrates in health and Socrates in illness. Shall we say the one is like the other, or unlike?
10
Theaetetus
THEAET. When you say Socrates in illness do you mean to compare that Socrates as a whole with Socrates in health as a whole?
