203–204
Socrates
SOC. Well then, shall we say that the syllable is the two letters, or, if there be more than two, all of them, or is it a single concept that has arisen from their combination?
Theaetetus
THEAET. I think we mean all the letters it contains.
Socrates
SOC. Now take the case of two, S and O. The two together are the first syllable of my name. He who knows it knows the two letters, does he not?
15
Theaetetus
THEAET. Of course.
Socrates
SOC. He knows, that is, the S and the O.
Socrates
SOC. How is that? He is ignorant of each, and knowing neither of them he knows them both?
Theaetetus
THEAET. That is monstrous and absurd, Socrates.
20
Socrates
SOC. And yet if a knowledge of each letter is necessary before one can know both, he who is ever to know a syllable must certainly know the letters first, and so our fine theory will have run away and vanished!
Theaetetus
THEAET. And very suddenly, too.
Socrates
SOC. Yes, for we are not watching it carefully. Perhaps we ought to have said that the syllable is not the letters, but a single concept that has arisen from them, having a single form of its own, different from the letters.
Theaetetus
THEAET. Certainly; and perhaps that will be better than the other way.
Socrates
SOC. Let us look into that; we must not give up in such unmanly fashion a great and impressive theory.
25
Theaetetus
THEAET. No, we must not.
Socrates
SOC. Let it be, then, as we say now, that the syllable or combination is a single form arising out of the several conjoined elements, and that it is the same in words and in all other things.
Theaetetus
THEAET. Certainly.
Socrates
SOC. Therefore there must be no parts of it.
