197
Socrates
SOC. Not at all, being the man I am; but I might if I were a real reasoner; if such a man were present at this moment he would tell us to refrain from these terms, and would criticize my talk scathingly. But since we are poor creatures, shall I venture to say what the nature of knowing is? For it seems to me that would be of some advantage.
Theaetetus
THEAET. Venture it then, by Zeus. You shall have full pardon for not refraining from those terms.
Socrates
SOC. Have you heard what they say nowadays that knowing is?
Theaetetus
THEAET. Perhaps; however, I don’t remember just at this moment.
Socrates
SOC. They say it is having knowledge.
5
Socrates
SOC. Let us make a slight change and say possessing knowledge.
Theaetetus
THEAET. Why, how will you claim that the one differs from the other?
Socrates
SOC. Perhaps it doesn’t; but first hear how it seems to me to differ, and then help me to test my view.
Theaetetus
THEAET. I will if I can.
10
Socrates
SOC. Well, then, having does not seem to me the same as possessing. For instance, if a man bought a cloak and had it under his control, but did not wear it, we should certainly say, not that he had it, but that he possessed it.
Theaetetus
THEAET. And rightly.
Socrates
SOC. Now see whether it is possible in the same way for one who possesses knowledge not to have it, as, for instance, if a man should catch wild birds—pigeons or the like—and should arrange an aviary at home and keep them in it, we might in a way assert that he always has them because he possesses them, might we not?
