Θεαίτητος

Bölümler

142 142–143 143 144 144–145 145 145–146 146 146–147 147 147 147–148 148 149 149–150 150 150 151 151–152 152 152–153 153 153 154 154 154–155 155 155–156 156 156 157 157 157–158 158 158–159 159 159–160 160 160 161 161 161 162 162–163 163 163–164 164 164–165 165 165 166 167 168 168–169 169 169–170 170 170–171 171 171 172 172 172 173 173 174 174 175 175 176 176 176–177 177 177–178 178 178–179 179 179 180 180 180 181 181 181–182 182 182–183 183 184 184 184–185 185 185–186 186 186–187 187 187–188 188 188–189 189 189–190 190 190–191 191 191 192 192–193 193 193 193–194 194 194–195 195 196 196 197 197–198 198 198–199 199 199–200 200 200–201 201 201 202 202 203 203–204 204 204–205 205 205–206 206 206–207 207 207–208 208 208–209 209 209–210 210 210

İngilizce Yunanca

189–190

Socrates

SOC. Now when one’s mind does this, does it not necessarily have a thought either of both things together or of one or the other of them?

Theaetetus

THEAET. Yes, it must; either of both at the same time or in succession. 30

Socrates

SOC. Excellent. And do you define thought as I do?

Theaetetus

THEAET. How do you define it?

Socrates

SOC. As the talk which the soul has with itself about any subjects which it considers. You must not suppose that I know this that I am declaring to you. But the soul, as the image presents itself to me, when it thinks, is merely conversing with itself, asking itself questions and answering, affirming and denying. When it has arrived at a decision, whether slowly or with a sudden bound, and is at last agreed, and is not in doubt, we call that its opinion; and so I define forming opinion as talking and opinion as talk which has been held, not with someone else, nor yet aloud, but in silence with oneself. How do you define it?

Theaetetus

THEAET. In the same way.

Socrates

SOC. Then whenever a man has an opinion that one thing is another, he says to himself, we believe, that the one thing is the other.

Theaetetus

THEAET. Certainly.