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383–384 384 384–385 385 385–386 386 386–387 387–388 388 388–389 389 389–390 390 391 391 392 392–393 393 393 394 394–395 395 395 396 396–397 397 397–398 398 398 398–399 399–400 400 400–401 401 402 402–403 403 403–404 404 404–405 405 406 406–407 407 407–408 408 408–409 409–410 410 410–411 411 411 412 413 413–414 414 414 415 416 416–417 417 417 417–418 418 419 419 420 420 420–421 421 421–422 422 422–423 423–424 424 424 425 425–426 426 426 427 427–428 428 428–429 429 429–430 430 431 431–432 432 432–433 433 433–434 434 434–435 435 435–436 436 437 437 437–438 438 439 439 439–440 440 440

İngilizce Yunanca

430

Cratylus

Cratylus. Certainly.

Socrates

Socrates. And can we conversely attribute that of the man to the woman, and the woman’s to the man?

Cratylus

Cratylus. That is also possible.

Socrates

Socrates. And are these assignments both correct, or only the former? 15

Cratylus

Cratylus. The former.

Socrates

Socrates. The assignment, in short, which attributes to each that which belongs to it and is like it.

Cratylus

Cratylus. That is my view.

Socrates

Socrates. To put an end to contentious argument between you and me, since we are friends, let me state my position. I call that kind of assignment in the case of both imitations paintings and names—correct, and in the case of names not only correct, but true; and the other kind, which gives and applies the unlike imitation, I call incorrect and, in the case of names, false.

Cratylus

Cratylus. But it may be, Socrates, that this incorrect assignment is possible in the case of paintings, and not in the case of names, which must be always correctly assigned. 20

Socrates

Socrates. What do you mean? What difference is there between the two? Can I not step up to a man and say to him, This is your portrait, and show him perhaps his own likeness or, perhaps, that of a woman? And by show I mean bring before the sense of sight.

Cratylus

Cratylus. Certainly.