422–423
Socrates
Socrates. Well, then, how can the earliest names, which are not as yet based upon any others, make clear to us the nature of things, so far as that is possible, which they must do if they are to be names at all? Answer me this question: If we had no voice or tongue, and wished to make things clear to one another, should we not try, as dumb people actually do, to make signs with our hands and head and person generally?
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Hermogenes
Hermogenes. Yes. What other method is there, Socrates?
Socrates
Socrates. If we wished to designate that which is above and is light, we should, I fancy, raise our hand towards heaven in imitation of the nature of the thing in question; but if the things to be designated were below or heavy, we should extend our hands towards the ground; and if we wished to mention a galloping horse or any other animal, we should, of course, make our bodily attitudes as much like theirs as possible.
Hermogenes
Hermogenes. I think you are quite right; there is no other way.
Socrates
Socrates. For the expression of anything, I fancy, would be accomplished by bodily imitation of that which was to be expressed.
Hermogenes
Hermogenes. Yes.
Socrates
Socrates. And when we wish to express anything by voice or tongue or mouth, will not our expression by these means be accomplished in any given instance when an imitation of something is accomplished by them?
5
Hermogenes
Hermogenes. I think that is inevitable.
Socrates
Socrates. A name, then, it appears, is a vocal imitation of that which is imitated, and he who imitates with his voice names that which he imitates.
