Book 9
33.9
was after they had been appointed that the people ordered the measure to become law, and the last order of the people was law for the time being, nevertheless, neither he nor any of the censors subsequently appointed could be bound by it because all succeeding censors had been appointed by the order of the people and the last order of the people was the law for the time being. Appius' argument is this: The Aemilian Law only restricted the censorship of Furius and Geganius, because whilst their election was tantamount to one “order of the people” the Aemilian Law was a second “order of the people” superseding the first. But in all subsequent elections there was only one “order of the people,” viz. the election itself, and therefore the original law which fixed the duration of the office at five years resumed its validity.
34.1
This quibble on the part of Appius convinced no one. Sempronius then addressed the Assembly in the following language: “Quirites, here you have the progeny of that Appius who, after being appointed decemvir for one year, appointed himself for a second year, and then, without going through any form of appointment either at his own hands or at any one
34.2
else's, retained the fasces and the supreme authority for a third year, and persisted in retaining them until the power which he gained by foul means, exercised by foul means, and retained by foul means, proved his ruin.
