Book 6
As for Mnasippus, while he was unable to aid the troops which were hard pressed, because the enemy was attacking him in front, he was left with an ever smaller number of men. Finally, all of the enemy massed themselves together and charged upon Mnasippus and his troops, which were by this time very few. And the citizens, seeing what was going on, came out to join in the attack.
Then after they had killed Mnasippus, all straightway joined in the pursuit. And they probably would have captured the very camp, along with its stockade, had not the pursuers turned back upon seeing the crowd of camp-followers, of attendants, and of slaves, imagining that there was some fighting ability in them.
At this time, accordingly, the Corcyraeans set up a trophy and gave back the bodies of the dead under a truce. And after this the people in the city were stouter of heart, while those outside were in the utmost despondency. For there was not only a report that Iphicrates was already practically at hand, but the Corcyraeans were in fact also manning ships.
Then Hypermenes, who chanced to be vice-admiral under373 B.C. Mnasippus, manned fully the entire fleet which he had there, and after sailing round to the stockade and filling all his transports with the slaves and the captured property, sent them off; he himself, however, with his marines and such of the soldiers as had been left alive, kept guard over the stockade;
but finally they, too, embarked upon the triremes in great confusion and went sailing off, leaving behind them a great deal of corn, much wine, and many slaves and sick soldiers; for they were exceedingly afraid that they would be caught on the island by the Athenians. And so they reached Leucas in safety.
As for Iphicrates, when he began his voyage around Peloponnesus he went on with all needful preparations for a naval battle as he sailed; for at the outset he had left his large sails behind him at Athens, since he expected to fight, and now, further, he made but slight use of his smaller sails, even if the wind was favourable; by making his voyage, then, with the oar, he kept his men in better condition of body and caused the ships to go faster.
Furthermore, whenever the expedition was going to take the noonday or the evening meal at any particular spot, he would often draw back the head of the column from the shore opposite the place in question; then he would turn the line around again, cause the triremes to head toward the land, and start them off at a signal to race to the shore. It was counted a great prize of victory to be the first to get water or anything else they needed, and the first to get their meal. On the other hand, those who reached the shore last incurred a great penalty in that they came off worse in all these points, and in373 B.C. the fact that they had to put to sea again at the same time as the rest when the signal was given; for the result was that those who came in first did everything at their leisure, while those who came in last had to hurry.
Again, in setting watches, if he chanced to be taking the midday meal in a hostile country, he posted some on the land, as is proper, but besides he hoisted the masts on the ships and had men keep watch from their tops. These men, therefore, could see much farther, from their higher point of view, than those on the level. Further, wherever he dined or slept, he would not have a fire inside the camp during the night, but kept a light burning in front of his forces, so that no one could approach unobserved. Frequently, however, if it was good weather, he would put to sea again immediately after dining; and if there was a favourable breeze, they sailed and rested at the same time, while if it was necessary to row, he rested the sailors by turns.
Again, when he sailed by day, he would lead the fleet, by signals, at one time in column and at another in line of battle; so that, while still pursuing their voyage, they had at the same time practised and become skilled in all the manoeuvres of battle before they reached the sea which, as they supposed, was held by the enemy. And although for the most part they took both their noonday and their evening meals in the enemy’s country, nevertheless, by doing only the necessary things, he always got to sea before the enemy’s forces arrived to repel him and speedily got under way again.
At the time of Mnasippus’ death Iphicrates chanced to be near the Sphagiae. Islands situated off Pylos in Laconia. Then, after reaching Elis and sailing past the mouth of the373 B.C. Alpheus, he anchored beneath the promontory called Ichthys. From there he put to sea on the following day for Cephallenia, having his fleet in such order and making the voyage in such a way that, if it should be necessary to fight, he should be ready in all essential respects to do so. For he had not heard the news of Mnasippus’ death from any eyewitness, but suspected that it was told to deceive him, and hence was on his guard; when he arrived at Cephallenia, however, he there got definite information, and so rested his forces.
Now I am aware that all these matters of practice and training are customary whenever men expect to engage in a battle by sea, but that which I commend in Iphicrates is this, that when it was incumbent upon him to arrive speedily at the place where he supposed he should fight with the enemy, he discovered a way to keep his men from being either, by reason of the voyage they had made, unskilled in the tactics of fighting at sea, or, by reason of their having been trained in such tactics, any the more tardy in arriving at their destination.
After subduing the cities in Cephallenia he sailed to Corcyra. There, upon hearing that ten triremes were sailing thither from Dionysius to aid the Lacedaemonians, he first went in person and looked over the ground to find a point from which any who approached the island could be seen and the men stationed there to send signals to the city would be visible; he then stationed his watchers at that point.
He also agreed with them as to how they were to signal when the enemy were approaching and when they were at anchor. Then he gave his orders to twenty of the captains, whose duty it should be to373 B.C. follow him when the herald gave the word; and in case anyone failed to follow, he warned him that he would not have occasion to find fault with his punishment. Now when the signal came that the triremes were approaching, and when the word was given by the herald, the ardour of all was a sight worth seeing; for there was no one among those who were to sail who did not run to get aboard his ship.
When Iphicrates had reached the place where the enemy’s triremes were, he found the crews of all save one already disembarked on the shore, but Melanippus, the Rhodian, had not only advised the others not to remain there, but had manned his own ship and was sailing out to sea. Now although he met the ships of Iphicrates, he nevertheless escaped, but all the ships from Syracuse were captured, along with their crews.
Thereupon Iphicrates cut off the beaks and towed the triremes into the harbour of Corcyra; as for the crews, he concluded an agreement that each man should pay a fixed ransom, with the exception of Crinippus the commander, whom he kept under guard, intending either to exact a very large ransom or to sell him. Crinippus, however, was so mortified that he died by a self-inflicted death, and Iphicrates let the rest go, accepting Corcyraeans as sureties for the ransoms.
Now he maintained his sailors for the most part by having them work for the Corcyraeans on their lands; the peltasts, however, and the hoplites from his ships he took with him and crossed over to Acarnania. There he gave aid to the cities which were friendly, in case any of them needed aid, and made war upon the Thyrians, who were very valiant men and were in possession of a very strong fortress.
Furthermore,372 B.C. he took over the fleet which was at Corcyra, and with almost ninety The fleet of the Corcyraeans (cp. 24 above) having been added to Iphicrates’ original seventy (14) ships. The text, however, appears to be faulty. ships first sailed to Cephallenia and collected money, in some cases with the consent of the people, in other cases against their will. Then he made preparations to inflict damage upon the territory of the Lacedaemonians, and to bring over to his side such of the other hostile states in that region as were willing and to make war upon such as would not yield.
Now for my part I not only commend this campaign in particular among all the campaigns of Iphicrates, but I commend, further, his directing the Athenians to choose as his colleagues Callistratus, the popular orator, who was not very favourably inclined toward him, and Chabrias, who was regarded as a very good general. For if he thought them to be able men and hence wished to take them as advisers, he seems to me to have done a wise thing, while on the other hand if he believed them to be his adversaries and wished in so bold a way to prove that he was neither remiss nor neglectful in any point, this seems to me to be the act of a man possessed of great confidence in himself. He, then, was occupied with these things.
Meanwhile the Athenians, seeing that the371 B.C. Plataeans, who were their friends, had been expelled from Boeotia and had fled to them for refuge, and that the Thespians were beseeching them not to allow them to be left without a city, no longer commended the Thebans, but, on the contrary, while they were partly ashamed to make war upon371 B.C. them and partly reckoned it to be inexpedient, they nevertheless refused any longer to take part with them in what they were doing, inasmuch as they saw that they were campaigning against the Phocians, who were old friends of the Athenians, and were annihilating cities which had been faithful in the war against the barbarian The Plataeans and Thespians had, in fact, won especial distinction in the Persian wars. and were friendly to Athens.
For these reasons the Athenian people voted to make peace, and in the first place sent ambassadors to Thebes to invite the Thebans to go with them to Lacedaemon to treat for peace if they so desired; then they sent ambassadors to Lacedaemon themselves. Among those who were chosen were Callias, the son of Hipponicus; Autocles, the son of Strombichides; Demostratus, the son of Aristophon; Aristocles, Cephisodotus, Melanopus, and Lycaethus.
Callistratus, the popular orator, also went with the embassy; for he had promised Iphicrates that if he would let him go home, he would either send money for the fleet or bring about peace, and consequently he had been at Athens and engaged in efforts to secure peace; and when the ambassadors came before the assembly of the Lacedaemonians and the representatives of their allies, the first of them who spoke was Callias, the torch-bearer. Of the Eleusinian mysteries.cp. II. iv. 20. He was the sort of man to enjoy no less being praised by himself than by others, and on this occasion he began in about the following words:
Men of Lacedaemon, as regards the position I hold as your diplomatic agent, I am not the only member of our family who has held it, but my father’s father received it from his father and handed371 B.C. it on to his descendants; and I also wish to make clear to you how highly esteemed we have been by our own state. For whenever there is war she chooses us as generals, and whenever she becomes desirous of tranquillity she sends us out as peacemakers. I, for example, have twice before now come here to treat for a termination of war, and on both these embassies I succeeded in achieving peace both for you and for ourselves; now for a third time I am come, and it is now, I believe, that with greater justice than ever before I should obtain a reconciliation between us.
For I see that you do not think one way and we another, but that you as well as we are distressed over the destruction of Plataea and Thespiae. How, then, is it not fitting that men who hold the same views should be friends of one another rather than enemies? Again, it is certainly the part of wise men not to undertake war even if they should have differences, if they be slight; but if, in fact, we should actually find ourselves in complete agreement, should we not be astounding fools not to make peace?
The right course, indeed, would have been for us not to take up arms against one another in the beginning, since the tradition is that the first strangers to whom Triptolemus,Triptolemus of Eleusis had, according to the legend, carried from Attica throughout Greece both the cult of Demeter and the knowledge of her art — agriculture. Heracles was the traditional ancestor of the Spartan kings (cp. III. iii.) while the Dioscuri, Castor and Pollux, were putative sons of Tyndareus of Sparta. our ancestor, revealed the mystic rites of Demeter and Core were Heracles, your state’s founder, and the Dioscuri, your citizens; and, further, that it was upon Peloponnesus that he first bestowed the seed of Demeter’s fruit. How, then, can it be right,371 B.C. either that you should ever come to destroy the fruit of those very men from whom you received the seed, or that we should not desire those very men, to whom we gave the seed, to obtain the greatest possible abundance of food? But if it is indeed ordered of the gods that wars should come among men, then we ought to begin war as tardily as we can, and, when it has come, to bring it to an end as speedily as possible.
After him Autocles, who had the reputation of being a very incisive orator, spoke as follows: Men of Lacedaemon, that what I am about to say will not be said to your pleasure, I am not unaware; but it seems to me that men who desire the friendship which they may establish to endure for the longest possible time, ought to point out to one another the causes of their wars. Now you always say, The cities must be independent, but you are yourselves the greatest obstacle in the way of their independence. For the first stipulation you make with your allied cities is this, that they follow wherever you may lead. And yet how is this consistent with independence?
And you make for yourselves enemies without taking counsel with your allies, and against those enemies you lead them; so that frequently they who are said to be independent are compelled to take the field against men most friendly to themselves. Furthermore — and there can be nothing in the world more opposed to independence — you establish governments of ten here and governments of thirty there; and in the case of these rulers your care is, not that they shall rule according to law, but that they shall be able to hold possession of their cities by force. So that you manifestly take pleasure in despotisms rather371 B.C. than in free governments.
Again, when the King directed that the cities be independent, you showed yourselves strongly of the opinion that if the Thebans did not allow each one of their cities, not only to rule itself, but also to live under whatever laws it chose, they would not be acting in accordance with the King’s writing; but when you had seized the Cadmea, you did not permit even the Thebans themselves to be independent. The right thing, however, is that those who are going to be friends should not insist upon obtaining their full rights from others, and then show themselves disposed to grasp the most they can.
By these words he caused silence on the part of all, while at the same time he gave pleasure to those who were angry with the Lacedaemonians. After him Callistratus said: Men of Lacedaemon, that mistakes have not been made, both on our side and on yours, I for one do not think I could assert; but I do not hold to the opinion that one ought never again to have any dealings with people who make mistakes. For I see that no one in the world remains always free from error. And it seems to me that through making mistakes men sometimes become even easier to deal with, especially if they have incurred punishment in consequence of their mistakes, as we have.
In your own case, also, I see that sometimes many reverses result from the things you have done with too little judgment, among which was, in fact, the seizure of the Cadmea in Thebes; now, at any rate, the cities which you were eager to make independent have all, in consequence of the wrong done to the Thebans, fallen again under their power. Hence I hope that now, when we have been371 B.C. taught that to seek selfish advantage is unprofitable, we shall again be reasonable in our friendship with each other.
Now touching the slanderous allegations of certain people who wish to defeat the peace, to the effect that we have come here, not because we desire friendship, but rather because we fear that Antalcidas may arrive with money from the King, consider how foolishly they are talking. For the King directed, as you know, that all the cities in Greece were to be independent; why then should we, who agree with the King in both word and deed, be afraid of him? Or does anyone imagine that the King prefers to spend money and make others great, rather than, without expense, to have those things accomplished for him which he judged to be best?
So much for that. Why, then, have we come? That it surely is not because we are in straits, you could discover, if you please, by looking at the situation by sea or, if you please, at the situation by land at the present time. What, then, is the reason? Manifestly that some of our allies are doing what is not pleasing to us. And perhaps we also should like to show you the gratitude we rightly conceived toward you because you preserved us. At the close of the Peloponnesian war the Lacedaemonians rejected the proposal urged by many of their allies, that Athens should be destroyed.cp. II. ii. 19, 20.
Furthermore, to mention also the matter of expediency, there are, of course, among all the cities of Greece, some that take your side and others that take ours, and in each single city some people favour the Lacedaemonians and others the Athenians. If, therefore, we should become friends, from what quarter could371 B.C. we with reason expect any trouble? For who could prove strong enough to vex us by land if you were our friends? And who could do you any harm by sea if we were favourably inclined toward you?
Moreover, we all know that wars are forever breaking out and being concluded, and that we — if not now, still at some future time — shall desire peace again. Why, then, should we wait for the time when we shall have become exhausted by a multitude of ills, and not rather conclude peace as quickly as possible before anything irremediable happens?
Again, I for my part do not commend those men who, when they have become competitors in the games and have already been victorious many times and enjoy fame, are so fond of contest that they do not stop until they are defeated and so end their athletic training; nor on the other hand do I commend those dicers who, if they win one success, throw for double stakes, for I see that the majority of such people become utterly impoverished.
We, then, seeing these things, ought never to engage in a contest of such a sort that we shall either win all or lose all, but ought rather to become friends of one another while we are still strong and successful. For thus we through you, and you through us, could play even a greater part in Greece than in times gone by.
Since these men were adjudged to have spoken rightly, the Lacedaemonians voted to accept the peace, with the provision that all should withdraw their governors from the cities, disband their armaments both on sea and on land, and leave the cities independent. And if any state should act in violation of this agreement, it was provided that any which so desired might aid the injured cities, but that any371 B.C. which did not so desire was not under oath to be the ally of those who were injured.
On these terms the Lacedaemonians took the oath for themselves and their allies, while the Athenians and their allies took the oath severally, city by city. The Thebans also signed their names among the cities which had sworn, but on the following day their ambassadors came in again and demanded that the writing be changed to read that the Boeotians instead of the Thebans had sworn. i.e., insisting upon their claim to headship in Boeotia. Agesilaus, however, replied that he would change no part of what they had sworn to and signed in the first place; but if they did not wish to be included in the treaty, he said that he would strike out their names if they so directed.
When, accordingly, under these circumstances the others had concluded peace, while the only controversy was with the Thebans, the Athenians were of the opinion that now there was hope that the Thebans would be decimated, as the common saying puts it, and as for the Thebans themselves, they went home utterly despondent.
After this the Athenians, on their side, proceeded to withdraw their garrisons from the cities and to send after Iphicrates and his ships, and they compelled him to give back everything which he had captured after the time when the oaths were taken at Lacedaemon.
But the Lacedaemonians, on the other hand, while they withdrew both their governors and their garrisons from all the other cities, did not follow this course in the case of Cleombrotus, who was at the head of the army in Phocis and now asked the authorities at home what he should do. Prothous did indeed say that it seemed to him they371 B.C. ought first to disband the army in accordance with their oaths and send round word to the various cities to make contributions, as large as each city chose to make, to the temple of Apollo, i.e., for a war fund. and afterwards, in case anyone tried to prevent the cities from being independent, to call together again at that time all who wished to support the cause of independence and lead them against those who opposed it; for he thought, he continued, that in this way the gods would be most favourably inclined toward them and the cities would be least annoyed.