Book 8
and should they come to terms of peace, they shall both do so in common.
——Whatever troops shall be in the king's country in consequence of the king's having sent for them, the king shall pay their expenses.——Should any of the states which have concluded this convention with the king proceed against the king's country, the rest shall prevent it, and assist the king to the utmost of their power. And should any of those in the king's country, or in all his dominions, proceed against the country of the Lacedaemonians, or of their allies, the king shall prevent it, and assist them to the utmost of his power.
After this convention Theramenes gave up the fleet to Astyochus, and sailing away in a small boat was ἀφανίζεται.] Or, as others render it, disappeared from the scene of action: but Bishop Thirlwall's interpretation of the word seems undoubtedly the correct one. lost at sea.
The Athenians, having now crossed over from Lesbos to Chios with their army, and commanding both land and sea, proceeded to fortify Delphinium, a place that was both naturally strong on the land side, contained several harbours, and was not far from the city of Chios.
Now the Chians having been beaten in several previous engagements, and not being on very good terms amongst themselves, but regarding each other with suspicion, because Tydeus, son of Ion, and his party had already been executed by Pedaritus on the charge of Atticism, and the rest of the city was by compulsion reduced to an oligarchy; in consequence of these things they kept quiet, and thought neither themselves nor the mercenaries under Pedaritus to be a match for the enemy.
They sent, however, to Miletus, urging Astyochus to come to their aid: and when he did not listen to them, Pedaritus sent a letter to Lacedaemon, representing him as being guilty of a misdemeanor.
On this footing stood the affairs of the Athenians at Chios: while from Samos their ships kept sailing out against those at Miletus, and when they did not advance to meet them, they returned again to Samos, and remained quiet.
The same winter, the seven and thirty ships which had been equipped by the Lacedaemonians for Pharnabazus, through the instrumentality of Calligitus the Megarean and Timagoras the Cyzicene, put out from the Peloponnese, and sailed for Ionia, about the period of the solstice, Antisthenes a Spartan being on board in command of them.
The Lacedaemonians also sent eleven Spartans as assistant counsellors for Astyochus, one of whom was Lichas, the son of Arcesilaus. They were instructed on their arrival at Miletus to co-operate in the arrangement of all other affairs, as should be best, and to despatch these vessels—either just the number, more, or fewer—to the Hellespont to join Pharnabazus, should they think proper, appointing to the command of them Clearchus the son of Ramphias, who sailed out with them; and also, if the eleven commissioners deemed fit, to depose Astyochus from the office of admiral, and appoint Antisthenes; for they were suspicious of him in consequence of the letters from Pedaritus.
Sailing therefore from Malea across the open sea the squadron touched at Melos, and there falling in with ten Athenian ships took three of them empty, and burnt them. After this, being afraid that those of the Athenian vessels which had escaped from Melos might (as was the case) give information of their approach to those at Samos, they sailed to Crete, and having made their voyage longer by taking this precaution, they made the land at Caunus, in Asia;
from which place, considering themselves to be now in safety, they sent a message to the ships at Miletus, in order to be convoyed by them along the coast.
At this same time the Chians and Pedaritus sent messengers to Astyochus, notwithstanding his holding back, and begged him to succour them in their siege with all his fleet, and not to permit the largest of the allied cities in Ionia to be both excluded from the use of the sea, and wasted by forays on the land.
For the slaves of the Chians being numerous, and indeed forming the largest body there was in any one city, except that of the Lacedaemonians, and at the same time being, in consequence of their great numbers, punished more severely than usual in cases of offence, when the Athenian army appeared to be firmly established, with the advantage of a fortified position, the greater part deserted to them; and these did the most mischief to the country, through their acquaintance with it.
The Chians therefore represented, that while there was still a hope and possibility of stopping them, while Delphinium was still being fortified, and not yet completed, and a higher wall was being erected round their camp and the ships, it was incumbent on him to assist them. And although Astyochus, because of his threat on the occasion already mentioned, had not intended to do it, when he saw that the allies also were anxious for their relief, he set out to succour them.
In the mean time tidings came from Caunus that the seven and twenty ships, with the Lacedaemonian counsellors. were come. And thinking every thing else of secondary importance, compared with his convoying so large a number of ships, in order that they might more entirely command the sea, and with the safe passage of the Lacedaemonians who had come to observe his conduct, he immediately gave up going to the relief of Chios, and sailed to Caunus.
Having landed, as he coasted along, at κῶν τὴν μεροπίδα.] According to the old mythical language, 'Cos first settled by the hero Merops.' See Stephan., Byzant., Hesychius, etc. According to the interpretation now given to this language, 'Cos first settled by the people called Meropes.' —Arnold. Cos Meropis, which was unfortified, and in ruins in consequence of an earthquake which they had experienced—the most violent one which I ever remember—he sacked the town, the men having fled to the mountains, and by incursions made spoil of the country, excepting the free population, whom he released.
Having come from Cos to Cnidus by night, he was constrained by the advice of the Cnidians not to land his seamen, but to sail, just as he was, straightway against the twenty Athenian ships with which Charminus, one of the generals at Samos, was on the look-out for those seven and twenty ships that were approaching from the Peloponnese, and to join which Astyochus also was coasting along.
For those at Samos had heard from Melcs of their approach, and Charminus was watching for them about Syme, Chalce, Rhodes, and Lycia; as by this time he was aware of their being at Caunus.
Astyochus therefore sailed immediately to Syme, before he was heard of, on the chance of finding the ships some where out at sea. But the rain and the cloudy state of the atmosphere which he encountered caused the dispersion of his ships during the dark, and threw them into confusion.
In the morning, when his fleet had been separated, and the left wing was now in sight of the Athenians, while the rest of it was still dispersed around the island, Charminus and the Athenians put out against it with all speed, with fewer than their twenty ships, thinking that these were the vessels they were watching for, namely, those from Caunus.
Having attacked them therefore immediately, they sank three, and severely damaged some others, and had the advantage in the action, until the larger division of the fleet unexpectedly came in sight, and they were surrounded on every side.
Then they took to flight, and having lost six ships, fled for refuge with the rest to the island of Teutlussa, and thence to Halicarnassus. After this the Peloponnesians put into Cnidus, and the seven and twenty ships from Caunus having effected a junction with them, they sailed with the whole number, and erected a trophy on Syme, and then came to anchor again at Cnidus.
The Athenians, on hearing the particulars of the engagement, having sailed with all their ships from Samos to Syme, made no attack on the fleet at Cnidus, or that on them, but took their τὰ σκεύη, κ. τ. λ.] i. e. the masts and sails of Charminus' squadron, which, according to custom, had been left on shore at Syme, when the ships put to sea suddenly to attack the fleet of Astyochus. See chap. 42. 2. — Arnold. naval stores, which were at Syme, and after touching at Lorymi on the continent, sailed back to Samos. And now all the Peloponnesian ships at Cnidus were refitted, so far as they required it;
and the eleven Lacedaemonian commissioners held a conference with Tissaphernes, (for he had come to meet them,) both respecting what had already been done, if there was aught that did not please them, and with reference to future hostilities, in what way they might be conducted most to the benefit and advantage of both parties.
Lichas, more especially, kept an eye on the transactions, and said, that neither of the two treaties was properly drawn up, Neither that of Chalcideus, nor that of Theramenes, but it was a shameful thing that the king should even now claim to be master of all the country over which he and his ancestors had formerly had dominion. For in that was involved the re-subjugation of all the islands, with Thessaly, Locris, and as far as Boeotia; and so, instead of freedom, the Lacedaemonians would be putting the Median yoke on the Greeks. He told them therefore to conclude another and a better treaty, or at any rate they would not act according to this;
nor did they want any of his supplies on these terms. But Tissaphernes, being offended at this, went away from them in a rage, and without settling any thing.
They, in consequence of communications from some of the most powerful men there, were disposed to sail to Rhodes; hoping to bring over to their side an island which was strong both in its number of seamen and its land forces; and moreover thinking that they should themselves be able to maintain their fleet from their own confederacy, without asking Tissaphernes for money.
Having sailed therefore immediately, that same winter, from Cnidus, and having first put in with ninety-four ships to Camirus in the Rhodian territory, they frightened away most of the inhabitants, who were not aware of their intentions, and therefore fled, especially as the town was unfortified. Then, having assembled both these and the people from the two other towns, Lindus and Ialysus, the Lacedaemonians prevailed on the Rhodians to revolt from the Athenians.
And so Rhodes joined the Peloponnesian confederacy. The Athenians, having got notice of it, sailed at this time with their ships from Samos, wishing to anticipate them, and came within sight of the island as they lay out at sea; but being a little too late, they sailed back in the first instance to Chalce, thence to Samos, and afterwards carried on the war against Rhodes by attacks from Chalce, Cos, and Samos.
The Peloponnesians levied money from the Rhodians to the amount of two and thirty talents; but in other respects lay still for eighty days, having drawn up the ships on shore.
In the mean time, and at even a still earlier period, before they removed to Rhodes, the following negotiations were being carried on. Alcibiades being suspected by the Peloponnesians after the death of Chalcideus and the battle of Miletus, and instructions having been sent by them from Lacedaemon to Astyochus to put him to death, (for he was a personal enemy of Agis, and in other ways appeared to be unworthy of trust,) he first retired in alarm to the court of Tissaphernes, and then did the greatest harm he could to the cause of the Peloponnesians with him.
Being his adviser on all points, he cut down the pay, so that instead of an Attic drachma three oboli were given, and that not regularly; telling Tissaphernes to represent to them, that the Athenians, who for a longer time had had experience in naval matters, gave their men but three oboli; not so much from poverty, as that their seamen might not grow insolent from abundance, and either be less able-bodied, through spending money on such things as produce weakness, or desert their ships by means of leaving their arrears of pay as a ἐς ὁμηρείαν.] That is, that the larger pay was considered as a security for the men's returning to their post, when summoned, and therefore as a reason for greater indulgence in granting leave of absence than was proved by the result to be consistent with the interests of the service. security for them.
He also gave him such instructions, that by giving money he persuaded the trierarchs and generals of the different states to concede these points to him; excepting the Syracusans; but of these Hermocrates alone opposed him on behalf of the whole confederacy.
The states, too, which applied for money he dismissed with an answer from himself, on the part of Tissaphernes, alleging by way of refusal, that the Chians were shameless, who, though the wealthiest of the Greeks, and being protected as they were by the aid they were receiving, expected others to risk both their persons and their purses for their liberty.
With regard to the rest of the states, which used before their revolt to lavish their money on the Athenians, he said that they were wrong if they would not now also contribute as much, or even more, for their own interests.
He also represented that Tissaphernes was naturally sparing at present, inasmuch as he was carrying on the war with his own resources; but that if supplies should ever come down from the king, he would give them their full pay, and afford the states all proper relief.
He likewise advised Tissaphernes not to be in too great a hurry to bring the war to a conclusion; nor to be anxious, by either bringing the Phoenician fleet which he was equipping, or giving pay to a larger body of Greeks, to confer on the same party the command both of land and sea; but to let them each hold a divided sway, and so leave the king the power at all times to lead the one party or the other against those who were annoying him.
If, on the contrary, the command both by land and sea were united, he would be at a loss for any party to assist in overthrowing the stronger; unless he should himself ever choose to arise and carry out the contest with them at a great expense and hazard. It was a cheaper risk to wear down the Greeks against each other, at a trifling share of the expense, and at the same time with security to himself.
And the Athenians, he said, were a more desirable people to share the empire with him; for they were less desirous of possessions on shore, and carried on the war with both a profession and a practice most advantageous to him; as they would unite with him in subjugating, as far as the sea was concerned, to themselves and to him all the Greeks who lived in the king's country; while the other party, on the contrary, had come to liberate them. Nor was it likely that the Lacedaemonians should at the present time be liberating the Greeks from men of their own Grecian race, and should omit to liberate them from those who were barbarians; ἢν μή ποτε αὐτούς, κ. τ. λ.] I have followed Haack's and Poppo's interpretation of this passage, nisi si quando eos (Athenienses) non everterint, rather than Herman's, who supposes that the word μή only increases the force of the negative: nisi hi barbari Graecos, quos sub ditione suâ tonerent, etiam delevissent unless they should ever fail in reducing the Athenians.
He urged them therefore to wear them both out at first, and after cutting off as much as possible from the power of the Athenians, then to get rid of the Peloponnesians from his country.