Book 7
Thus there were manned in all about a hundred and ten ships; on board which they embarked a large number of bow-men and dart-men, taken from the Acarnanian and other mercenaries, and provided every thing else, as far as it was possible for them, when acting upon a plan which necessity alone dictated, such as the present.
When most things were in readiness, Nicias, seeing the soldiers disheartened by their decided defeat at sea, and wishing, in consequence of the scarcity of provisions, to hazard a final battle as speedily as possible, assembled them, and on that παρεκελεύσατο τότε πρῶτον.] I have retained the old reading τότε, though all the editors have changed it into τε because I think it is by no means inexpressive, if taken with πρῶτον; the two words being intended, in my opinion, to make a marked distinction between the speech addressed by Nicias on that first occasion, to all the troops together, and that which he afterwards addressed to the trierarchs by themselves. See ch. 69. 2, αὖθις τῶν τριηράρχων ἕνα ἕκαστον ἀνεκάλει, κ. τ. λ. occasion addressed them all together first, and spoke as follows:
"Soldiers of the Athenians, and of the other allies, the coming struggle will be common alike to all—for the safety and country of each of us, no less than of the enemy; since if we now gain a victory with our fleet, each one may see his native city again, wherever it may be.
Nor should you be disheartened, or feel like the most inexperienced of men, who, after failing in their first attempts, ever after have the anticipation of their fear taking the colour of their disasters.
But as many of you here as are Athenians, having already had experience in many wars, and all the allies who have ever joined us in our expeditions, remember the unexpected results that occur in warfare; and make your preparations with a hope that fortune may at length side with us, and with a determination to renew the conflict in a manner worthy of your numbers, which you see yourselves to be so great.
"Now whatever we saw likely to be serviceable against the confined space of the harbour, with reference to the crowd of ships that there will be, and the enemy's troops upon their decks, from which we suffered before, every thing has now been looked to and prepared by us also, as far as present circumstances would allow, with the co-operation of the masters of our vessels.
For great numbers of bow-men and dart-men will go on board, and a multitude such as we should not have used, had we been fighting in the open sea, as it would have interfered with the display of our skill through the weight of our ships; but in the present land-fight which we are compelled to make on board our ships, these things will be of service.
We have also ascertained the different ways in which we must adapt the structure of our vessels for opposing theirs, and especially, against the stoutness of their cheeks, from which we received most damage, we have provided grappling irons, which will prevent the ship's retiring τὴν πάλιν ἀνάκρυσιν,] i. e. retiring in order to gain the momentum required for a fresh attack. See note on ch. 36. again after it has once charged, if the soldiers on board then do their duty.
For to this necessity are we reduced, that we must maintain a land-fight on board our fleet; and it seems to be our interest neither to retire ourselves, nor to suffer them to do it; especially as the shore, except so far as our troops occupy it, is in possession of the enemy.
"Remembering this, then, you must fight on as long as you can, and not be driven to land, but determine, when one ship has closed with another, not to separate before you have swept off the soldiers from your enemy's deck.
And this exhortation I offer to the soldiers not less than to the sailors, inasmuch as this work belongs more to those upon deck. And we have still even now a general superiority with our troops.
On the other hand, I advise the seamen, and entreat them too at the same time, not to be too much dismayed by their misfortunes, as we have now superior resources on our decks, and a larger number of ships. Consider, too, how well worth preserving is that pleasure enjoyed by those of you, who, being hitherto considered as Athenians, even though you are not, from your knowledge of our language and your imitation of our customs, were respected through Greece, and enjoyed no less a share of our empire as regarded the benefits you derived from it, and a far greater share as regards being feared by our subjects, and being secured from injuries.
Since then you alone, as free men, share our empire with us, abstain, as just men, from now utterly betraying it. And with contempt for Corinthians, whom you have often conquered, and for Siceliots, none of whom presumed, while our fleet was in fine condition, so much as to stand up against us, repel them, and show that, even when attended by weakness and misfortunes, your skill is superior to the fortunate strength of any others.
Those of you, again, who are Athenians, I must remind of this also, that you left behind you no more such ships in your docks, nor so fine a body of heavy-armed troops; and that if any thing else befall you but victory, your enemies here will immediately sail thither, and those of our countrymen who are left behind there will be unable to defend themselves against both their opponents on the spot and those who will join them; and thus at the same time you who are here will be at the mercy of the Syracusans, (and you know with what feelings you came against them,) and those who are there at home at that of the Lacedaemonians.
Being brought then to this one struggle for both parties, fight bravely now, if you ever did; and reflect, both individually and collectively, that those of you who will now be on board your ships represent both the army and the navy of the Athenians, all that is left of your country, and the great name of Athens: in behalf of which, whatever be the point in which one man excels another, either in science or courage, on no other occasion could he better display it, so as both to benefit himself and to contribute to the preservation of all.
Nicias delivered this exhortation to them, and immediately commanded them to man the ships. Gylippus and the Syracusans, on the other hand, were able to perceive, from the sight of their very preparations, that the Athenians were about to engage them at sea, and the device of throwing the grappling irons had also been previously reported to them.
They prepared themselves therefore on all other points severally, and on this also; for they covered over with hides their prows and a considerable space of the upper part of the vessel, so that the grapple, when thrown, might slip off, and not obtain any hold on them.
And now, when every thing was ready, their generals, together with Gylippus, exhorted them by speaking as follows:
"That our former achievements have been glorious ones, Syracusans and allies, and that this struggle will be for glorious results in future, most of you seem to us to be aware, (for you would not else have devoted yourselves so eagerly to it,) and if any one is not as sensible of it as he ought to be, we will prove it to him.
For when the Athenians had come to this country, for the subjugation of Sicily in the first place, and then, if they succeeded, for that of the Peloponnese also, and the rest of Greece; and when they possessed the largest empire enjoyed hitherto, either by Greeks of former times or of the present, you were the first men in the world who withstood their navy, with which they had borne down every thing, and have already conquered them in some sea-fights, and will now, in all probability, conquer them in this.
For when men have been put down in that in which they claim to excel, their opinion of themselves in future is far lower than if they had never entertained such an idea at first; and failing through the disappointment of their boasting, they give way even beyond the degree of their power. And such, probably, is now the feeling of the Athenians.
"But in our case, both the opinion we entertained before, and with which, even while we were yet unskilful, we were full of daring, has now been confirmed; and from the addition to it of the thought that we must be the best seamen in the world, since we have conquered the best, each man's hope is doubled. And, generally speaking, it is the greatest hope that supplies also the greatest spirit for undertakings.
Again, those points in which they are imitating our equipments are familiar to our habits, and we shall not be ἀνάρμοστοι,] or, as others take it, unprepared against each of them. awkward at each of them: whereas, on their side, when many soldiers are on their decks contrary to their custom, and many dart-men, mere χερσαῖοι.] I have ventured to use a rather slang term, because the qualifying expression, ὡς εἰπεῖν, which is added in the original, seems to imply that χερσαῖοι was employed by him with a similar meaning of reproach. The meaning of σφάλλω, as used just below, seems borrowed from the unsteady reeling motion of an intoxicated person; the simile used by the Psalmist with reference to mariners tossed in the storm, they reel to and fro, and stagger like a drunken man, and are at their wits' end. Or it may mean to embarrass. land-lubbers, (so to speak,) Acarnanians and others, have gone on board their ships, who will not so much as know how to discharge their weapons while stationary, how can they avoid swaying the ships, and falling all into confusion amongst themselves, by not moving according to their own fashion?
For neither will they derive any benefit from the superior number of their ships, (if any of you be afraid of this, I mean the idea of his not going to fight them with an equal number;) for many ships in a small space will be less effective for executing any of the movements they may wish, while they are most liable to he injured by our preparations. On the contrary, be assured of this, which is most true, according to the certain information which we believe we have received.
It is through the excess of their miseries, and from being forced to it by their present distress, that they are induced to make a desperate effort; not so much from confidence in their resources, as from hazarding a chance, in whatever way they can, that they may either force their passage and sail out, or afterwards retreat by land; since, at any rate, they could not fare worse than at present.
To avail yourselves then of such confusion, and of the very fortune of our bitterest enemies, which has betrayed itself, let us close with them in wrath, and consider that the feeling of those men is most lawful, with regard to their enemies, who determine, when taking vengeance on their aggressor, to glut the animosity of their heart: and that we too shall have an opportunity of avenging ourselves on our foes—the very thing which is every where said to be most sweet.
For that they are our foes, and our bitterest foes, you all know; inasmuch as they came against our country to enslave it, and if they had succeeded, would have imposed on our men all that was most painful; on our children and wives, all that is most dishonourable; and on our whole country, the title which is most degrading.
Wherefore no one ought to relent, or deem it gain that they should merely go away without danger to us. For that they will do just the same, even if they gain the victory. But that, through our succeeding (as we probably shall do) in our wishes, these men should be punished, and should leave a more secure liberty for the whole of Sicily, which even before enjoyed that blessing; this is a glorious object to contend for. And of all hazards those are most rare, which, while they cause least harm by failure, confer most advantage by success.
The Syracusan commanders and Gylippus having in their turn thus exhorted their men, immediately manned the ships on their side also, since they saw that the Athenians were doing it.
Nicias, on the other hand, being dismayed at the present circumstances of himself and his colleagues, and seeing how great and how close at hand now their peril was, since they were all but on the point of putting out; considering, too, (as men usually feel in great emergencies,) that in deed every thing fell short of what they would have it, while in word enough had not yet been said by them; again called to him each one of the Trierarchs, addressing them severally by their father's name, their own, and that of their tribe; begging each one who enjoyed any previous distinction, from personal considerations not to sacrifice it, nor to obscure those hereditary virtues for which his forefathers were illustrious; reminding them too of their country—the most free one in the world—and the power, subject to no man's dictation, which all enjoyed in it with regard to their mode of life; mentioning other things also, such as men would say at a time now so critical, not guarding against being thought by any one to bring forward old and hackneyed topics, and such as are advanced in all cases alike, about men's wives and children and country's gods, but loudly appealing to them, because they think they may be of service in the present consternation.
Thus he, thinking that he had addressed to them an exhortation which was not so much a satisfactory one, as one that he was compelled to be content with, went away from them, and led the troops down to the beach, and ranged them over as large a space as he could, that the greatest possible assistance might be given to those on board towards keeping up their spirits.
Demosthenes, Menander, and Euthydemus, who went on board the Athenian fleet to take the command, put out from their own station, and immediately sailed to the bar at the mouth of the harbour, and the passage through it which had been τὸν παραλειφθέντα διέκπουν As some correction of this reading seems necessary, I have preferred that which is adopted by Arnold, καταληφθέντα, to that which Bekker proposes, περιλειφθέντα: because it seems far more probable from the next chapter that no passage at all was left by the Syracusans. If there had been, why should the Athenians, when they had defeated the squadron at the harbour's mouth, have attempted to break the fastenings of the vessels which formed the bar, (sec. 2,) instead of sailing out at once, as some of them probably would have done, under their present circumstances, if the passage had been open for them. Bloomfield indeed thinks that the mere fact of a Syracusan squadron having been posted near the mouth of the harbour proves that there must have been an opening left. But surely this is a very weak proof: for knowing as they did that the Athenians would break down the bar if they possibly could, it was a very natural precaution to defend it with a division of their fleet. closed up, wishing to force their way to the outside.
The Syracusans and their allies, having previously put out with pretty nearly the same number of ships as before, proceeded to keep guard with part of them at the passage out, and also round the circumference of the whole harbour, that they might fall upon the Athenians on all sides at once, while their troops also at the same time came to their aid at whatever part their vessels might put in to shore. The commanders of the Syracusan fleet were Sicanus and Agatharchus, each occupying a wing of the whole force, with Pythen and the Corinthians in the centre.
When the Athenians came up to the bar, in the first rush with which they charged they got the better of the ships posted at it, and endeavoured to break the fastenings. Afterwards, when the Syracusans and their allies bore down upon them from all quarters, the engagement was going on no longer at the bar alone, but over the harbour also; and an obstinate one it was, such as none of the previous ones had been. For great eagerness for the attack was exhibited by the seamen on both sides, when the command was given;
and there was much counter-manoeuvring on the part of the masters, and rivalry with each other; while the soldiers on board exerted themselves, when vessel came in collision with vessel, that the operations on deck might not fall short of the skill shown by others. Indeed every one, whatever the duty assigned him, made every effort that he might himself in each case appear the best man.
And as a great number of ships were engaged in a small compass, (for indeed they were the largest fleets fighting in the narrowest space that had ever been known, since both of them together fell little short of two hundred,) the attacks made with the beaks were few, as there were no means of backing water, or cutting through the enemy's line; but chance collisions were more frequent, just as one ship might happen to run into another, either in flying from or attacking a second.
So long as a vessel was coming up to the charge, those on her decks plied their javelins, arrows, and stones in abundance against her; but when they came to close quarters, the heavy-armed marines, fighting hand to hand, endeavoured to board each others ships.
In many cases too it happened, through want of room, that on one side they were charging an enemy, and on the other were being charged themselves, and that two ships, and sometimes even more, were by compulsion eutangled round one. And thus the masters had to guard against some, and to concert measures against others—not one thing at a time, but many things on every side—while the great din from such a number of ships coming into collision both spread dismay and prevented their hearing what the boatswains said.
For many were the orders given and the shouts raised by those officers on each side, both in the discharge of their duty, and from their present eagerness for the battle: while they cried out to the Athenians, to force the passage, and now, if ever they meant to do it hereafter, to exert themselves heartily for a safe return to their country; and to the Syracusans and their allies, that it would be a glorious achievement for them to prevent the enemy's escape, and by gaining the victory to confer honour on their respective countries.
The commanders, moreover, on each side, if they saw any captain in any part unnecessarily rowing astern, called out on him by name and asked him, on the side of the Athenians, whether they were retreating because they considered the land, which was in the possession of their bitterest enemies, as more their own than the sea, which had been won with no small trouble? on that of the Syracusans, whether they were themselves flying from the flying Athenians, whom they knew for certain to be anxious to escape from them in any way whatever?