Book 7
Two, however, elated by their victory, came up close to them, and were destroyed, one of them being captured with its crew.
After the Syracusans had sunk seven Athenian ships and disabled many more, having taken some of the men prisoners and killed others, they retired, and erected trophies for both the engagements; entertaining now a confident hope that by sea they were very decidedly superior, and thinking that they should conquer the enemy's land forces also. Accordingly they began to prepare for making another attack in both ways.
At this time Demosthenes and Eurymedon arrived with the succours from Athens, consisting of above seventy-three ships (including the foreign ones) and about five thousand heavy-armed of their own and the allies, with dart-men, both Grecian and barbarian, not a few, slingers, bow-men, and the rest of the armament on a large scale.
No slight consternation was produced at the moment amongst the Syracusans and their allies, at the thought that they were to have no final deliverance from their dangers, seeing that there was newly come, none the less for the fortification of Decelea, an armament equal, or nearly so, to the first, and that the power of the Athenians appeared great on all sides; while in the former Athenian forces fresh confidence (considering their late misfortunes) had now sprung up. Demosthenes, on the other hand, seeing how matters stood, thought that it was not possible for him to waste the time, and 'so to experience the fate which Nicias had done.
For although that general spread terror on his first arrival, he was despised, through not immediately attacking Syracuse, but spending the winter at Catana, and Gylippus anticipated his success by arriving with forces from the Peloponnese, which the Syracusans would never have sent for at all if he had immediately attacked them; for while fancying themselves a match for him, they would at once have discovered their inferiority, and have been invested; so that, even if they had stat for them, they would not then have dune them the same service. Reviewing these things, then, and thinking that he himself too was decidedly most formidable to the adversary at the present time, even the very first day, Demosthenes wished, as quickly as possible, to avail himself to the utmost of the present dismay of their forces.
And seeing that the counter-wall of the Syracusans, by which they had prevented the Athenians from circumvallating them, was but a single one, and that if any one had carried the ascent to Epipolae, and then the camp on it, the work might easily be taken, (for no one at all would so much as wait his attack,) he was in a hurry to make the attempt.
And this he thought was his shortest way of bringing the war to a conclusion; for he would either gain possession of Syracuse by succeeding in his design, or lead back the armament, and not exhaust for no purpose both the Athenians who joined the expedition and the whole state.
In the first place, then, the Athenians went out and ravaged a part of the Syracusan territory, about the Anapus, and were superior in force, as they had originally been, both by land and by sea: (for in neither way did the Syracusans come out against them, except with their cavalry and dart-men from the Olympieum.)
Afterwards, Demosthenes resolved first to make an attempt on the counter-work with engines. But when the engines, after he had brought them up, were burnt by the enemy who were making a defence from the wall, and they were beaten back when charging at many points with the rest of his forces, he determined to delay no longer; but having gained the assent of Nicias and the rest of his colleagues, according to the plan he had formed, he proceeded to the attempt on Epipolae.
Now, in the day-time it seemed to be impossible for them to approach and make the ascent unobserved. But having issued orders for five days' provisions, and taken all the stone-masons and carpenters, with all the other apparatus besides, both arrows and every thing else that was necessary for them, should they succeed, to have while they were building, he himself, with Eurymedon and Menander, took the whole force, after the first watch of the night, and advanced against Epipolae, Nicias being left behind in the lines.
When they had come up to the hill on the side of Euryelus, the same way that the former army also had in the first instance made the ascent, they escaped the observation of the Syracusan guard, and having gone to the fort of the Syracusans which was there, they took it, and put part of the garrison to the sword.
But the greater part fled immediately to the camps, (of which there were three on Epipolae, in outworks, one composed of the Syracusans, one of the other Siceliots, and one of their allies,) and informed them of the attack, and told it to the six hundred Syracusans who had formed the original guard at this part of Epipolae.
They immediately went against them; and Demosthenes and the Athenians falling in with them, routed them, though they made a spirited resistance. They then immediately pressed on, that they might not be retarded in their present eagerness for accomplishing the objects they had come for: while others of them proceeded, as their first measure, to take the counter-wall of the Syracusans, and pull down its battlements.
The Syracusans and their allies, as well as Gylippus and his division, went to the rescue from the outworks; and as they had had this daring attack made on them in the night, they engaged the Athenians in some dismay, and were at first compelled to retreat.
But when the Athenians were now advancing in greater confusion, as having gained the victory, and were anxious to pass as quickly as possible through the whole force of the enemy which had not yet been engaged, that they might not rally again through their relaxing in the attack; the Boeotians were the first to oppose them, and both broke them by their charge, and put them to flight.
Now the Athenians were by this time in much disorder and perplexity; but on this subject it was not easy for me to ascertain from either side, in what way each event occurred. For in the day-time the parties engaged have, indeed, a clearer knowledge, though not a perfect one even then, for each man barely knows what happens in his own part of the field. But in a night engagement, (and this was the only one which occurred between great armies during this war,) how could any one have a distinct knowledge of any thing?
For though there was a bright moon, they only saw one another (as was natural they should by moonlight) so as to discern the form of the body before them, but to mistrust their knowledge of its being that of a friend. And there were no few heavy-armed on each side moving in a narrow space.
Thus on the side of the Athenians some were even now being defeated, and others coming up unconquered for their first attack. A large part, too, of the rest of their forces had only just ascended, and others were still ascending; so that they did not know on what point to advance. For in consequence of the rout which had taken place, every thing in front was now in confusion, and it was difficult to distinguish orders through the uproar.
For the Syracusans and their allies, on gaining the advantage, were cheering each other with no little shouting, (it being impossible during the night to express themselves in any other way,) and at the same time were receiving the charge of their assailants: and the Athenians were in search of one another, and thought that whoever met them was a foe, even though he might be a friend, belonging to those who were now flying back. And by their frequently asking for the watchword, because they could not by any other means distinguish them, they both caused great confusion on their own side by all asking at once, and made it known to the enemy;
while theirs, on the other hand, they did not so easily discover, because, as they were victorious and not dispersed, they were better recognised by each other. So that if they fell in with any of the enemy with the advantage of numbers en their own side, the Syracusans escaped from them, inasmuch as they knew the Athenian watchword;
but if they themselves [in such a case] did not answer, they were put to the sword. But what especially and in the greatest degree hurt them, was the singing of their hymns; for as it was very similar on each side, it occasioned perplexity. For the Argives, the Corcyraeans, and all of the Dorian race that were with the Athenians, struck terror into them whenever they raised their paean;
and so did the enemy likewise. Thus having at last, when once they were thrown into disorder, come into collision with each other in different parts of the army, friends with friends, and countrymen with countrymen, they were not only full of fear, but even closed in battle with each other, and were with difficulty parted.
And now, as they were being pursued, the greater part threw themselves down the cliffs, and perished; as the way down again from Epipolae was narrow. And when those who escaped from the heights had reached the plain, though many of them, especially such as belonged to the former armament, through their greater acquaintance with the localities escaped safely to the camp, some of those who had lately arrived lost their way, and wandered about the country; and these, when it was day, the Syracusan horse intercepted, and put to the sword.
The next day the Syracusans erected two trophies, one on Epipolae, where the enemy's approaches had been made, and the other on the spot where the Boeotians first withstood them; while the Athenians recovered their dead under truce.
No few were killed, both of themselves and their allies, though still more arms were taken than in proportion to the number of the dead: for of those who were compelled to leap down the cliffs unencumbered by their shields, though some perished, yet others escaped with their lives.
After this, the Syracusans being again, as before, restored to confidence on the strength of such unexpected good fortune, despatched Sicanus with fifteen ships to Acragas, which was torn by factions, to induce the city to join them, if he could: while Gylippus again went by land to the other parts of Sicily to bring more forces, being in hope of even taking the Athenian lines by storm, since the affair on Epipolae had turned out as it did.
The Athenian commanders, in the mean time, consulted on the disaster which had befallen them, and on the want of vigour which at present on all accounts prevailed in their camp; seeing that they were both unsuccessful in their attempts, and that the soldiers were annoyed by their stay in the country.
For they were suffering with sickness from two different causes, both because this was the season of the year at which men are most liable to disease, and at the same time, too, because the position in which they were encamped was marshy and unfavourable; while they were also distressed because every thing else appeared hopeless to them. Demosthenes then, was of opinion that they ought not to stay any longer;
but, according to the plan with which he had hazarded the attack on Epipolae, since that had failed, he gave his vote for departing, and not wasting the time, while the sea might yet be crossed, and while, as regarded forces, they might command the superiority with the squadron that had lately joined them, at any rate.
He said, too, that it would be more beneficial to the state to carry on the war against those who were building fortresses for their annoyance in their own country, than against the Syracusans, whom it was no longer easy to subdue: nor, again, was it right for them to waste large sums of money to no purpose by continuing the siege. Such, then, was the view entertained by Demosthenes.
Nicias, however, though he too considered their circumstances to be bad, yet did not wish to display their weak. ness by words, nor that they should become a laughing-stock to their enemies by voting for the retreat openly, and in μετὰ πολλῶν,] i. e. with the Taxiarchs and Trierarchs, who attended when a regular council of war was held. Compare ch. 50. 3. conjunction with many; for so they would far less elude their observation in executing it, whenever they might wish.
To a certain extent also the affairs of the enemy, judging from what he, more than others, knew of them, still afforded some hope that they would be worse than their own, should they persist in carrying on the siege; for so they would exhaust them by want of funds; especially, too, as they had now, with their present fleet, a more extensive command of the sea. A party in Syracuse also, which wished to surrender the city to the Athenians, was sending messengers to him, and urging him not to raise the siege. Knowing these things, then, he was in fact waiting because he was still inclined both ways, and wished to see his course more clearly;
but in the speech openly made by him on that occasion he said, that he refused to withdraw the forces; for he well knew that the Athenians would not put up with such a step on the part of the generals—their returning, he meant, without a vote from themselves to authorize it. Besides, those who would vote in their case, would not give their verdict from seeing the facts, as they themselves had done, instead of hearing them from the invectives of others; but whatever calumnies any clever speaker threw upon them, by those would they be persuaded. Many too, nay, even the greater part of the soldiers present on the spot, who were now clamouring about their perilous condition, would, he said, on arriving there, raise the very contrary clamour, namely, that their generals had utterly betrayed them for money, when they returned.
For himself, then, he did not wish (knowing as he did the Athenian character and temper) to die under a dishonourable charge and by an unjust sentence at the hands of the Athenians, rather than run the risk, in his own individual case, of meeting his fate at the hands of the enemy, if it must be so. As for the affairs of the Syracusans, however, he knew that they were in a still worse condition than their own.
For supporting mercenaries as they had to do with their funds, and at the same time spending them on guard-posts, and maintaining, moreover, a large navy, as they had now done for more than a year, they were in some respects ill provided, and in others would be still more at a loss, as they had already expended two hundred talents, and still owed many more; and should they lose any part whatever of their present forces through not giving them supplies, their cause would be ruined, as it was supported by voluntary aid, rather than by compulsory exertions, like theirs.
He maintained, therefore, that they must continue to carry on the siege, and not go away defeated in point of money, wherein they were decidedly superior.
Such were the views which Nicias was positive in stating, from having gained an accurate acquaintance with the state of affairs in Syracuse, and their want of money; and because there were some who were desirous that the state should fall into the hands of the Athenians, and were sending messages to him not to abandon the siege; and at the same time, θαρσήσει κρατηθείς.] I have given what appears to me the only sense that this participle can bear, though different from any that has been attributed to it by others. Compare the somewhat similar use of the verb ἡσσῶμαι, in the sense of yielding, or giving way to, e. g. III. 38. 5, ἡδονῆ ἡσσώμενοι; and with a genitive, IV. 37. 1, ἡσσηθεῖεν τοῦ παρόντοςδεινοῦ. If, however, it should be thought that neither this meaning, nor (to use the words of Arnold) any other, can be fairly extracted from the text as it now stands, I should be disposed to adopt a rather bolder emendation than the mere substitution of κρατυνθείς, which Bauer and so many others after him have admitted, but which, as Poppo observes, leaves the passage scarcely less strange in its phraseology than before. From the fact that six MSS. have γ᾽ ἂν, instead of γοῦν, it seems probable that an infinitive mood originally formed part of the sentence; and I venture therefore to propose the following correction: καὶ ἅμα ταῖς γοῦν (or γ᾽ ἂν, whichever may be preferred) ναυσὶν ἢ πρότεσρον θαρσήσας κρατήσειν, taking κρατήσειν in the same absolute sense as κρατεῖν has already borne in a very similar passage, ch. 47. 3. If the objections urged by Göller against understanding μᾶλλον before ἢ be thought valid, his correction ᾖ may be admitted; from feeling confident that they should at any rate have the advantage at sea, as they had formerly; i. e. before their recent defeat in the naval engagement. because he was influenced by confidence in his fleet, at any rate more than before.
Demosthenes, however, would not at all listen to the proposal for continuing the siege; but if it were necessary for them not to withdraw the forces without a decree from the Athenians, but to remain in the country, he said that they should either remove to Thapsus and do so, or to Catana, where they could overrun with their troops a large part of the country, and support themselves by ravaging their enemies' property, and so might injure them; while at the same time with their fleet they would fight their battles on the open deep, and not in a confined space, which was more in favour of the enemy, but rather with spacious sea-room, where their skill would be of service to them, and they would have an opportunity of retreating and advancing in no narrow and circumscribed space, both on putting out and coming to land.
In a word, he did not, he said, at all approve of remaining in their present position, but of removing immediately without delay. Eurymedon also supported him in this view.
But as Nicias objected to it, a degree of diffidence and hesitation was produced in them, and a suspicion also that Nicias might be so positive from knowing something more than he expressed. The Athenians, then, in this way lingered on, and remained where they were.