Book 7
At present, therefore, we have ceased working at our line of circumvallation, in consequence of the enemy's numbers, and are lying still; (for we should not, indeed, be able to avail ourselves of all our force, since the guarding of our lines has exhausted a considerable part of our heavy-armed;) while they, on the other hand, have carried past us a single wall, so that it is no longer possible to invest them, unless one should assault this counter-work with a large force, and take it.
And the consequence is, that we who are thought to be besieging others, are rather being besieged ourselves, as far as operations by land are concerned; for we cannot even go out far into the country because of their horse.
"They have also sent ambassadors to the Peloponnese for fresh troops, and Gylippus is gone to the cities in Sicily, to persuade some of them which are at present neutral to join in the war, and to bring from others, if he can, an additional land force, as well as naval armament.
For they intend, as I hear, at the same time to attempt our walls with their army, and to attack us by sea with their fleet.
And let none of you think it strange that I say by sea also. For although, (as the enemy also are aware,) our fleet was at first in fine condition, as regards both the soundness of the ships and the completeness of their crews, yet now both the ships are leaky, from having already been at sea so long a time, and the crews have been wasted;
it being impossible to haul up and careen the vessels, because those of the enemy, being more than equal in number, are continually causing expectation of their sailing against us.
For they are seen practising, and it rests with them to make the attack [when they please]; and they have greater facility of careening their ships, since they are not engaged in blockading others.
"We, on the other hand, could scarcely enjoy this advantage, though with a great superabundance of ships, and though we were not compelled, as at present, to keep guard with all of them. For if we relax our watching even in a slight degree, we shall have no provisions; since even now we find difficulty in bringing them in past their city.
On this account our crews have been wasted and are still wasting; as some of our seamen, in consequence of their fetching wood, of foraging, and of distant watering, are cut off by their cavalry; while our servants, since we have been reduced to an equal footing, desert from us, and those of the foreigners who went on board as pressed men straightway depart to the several cities; while those, again, who were at first elated by the high pay, and supposed that they were going to make money, rather than to fight, since they have unexpectedly seen both the fleet and every thing else on the side of the enemy offering resistance to us, either leave us on finding some excuse for going over to the enemy, or in whatever way they severally can, ( And, therefore, as he implies, there were so many points of refuge open to them that their escape was easily effected. See Arnold's note. and Sicily is a large country;) while in some instances, by engaging in traffic themselves, after persuading the captains to take Hyccarian slaves on board in their stead, they have destroyed the perfection of our navy.
"For you, to whom I am writing, know that ὅτι βραχεῖα ἀκμὴ πληρώματος.] Or, as others take it, that the bloom of a crew is but of brief duration. But that statement has been already made in the preceding chapter, see 3; and the words which follow are evidently intended to explain this expression. the flower of a crew is limited in number, and that there are but few seamen who will get a ship under weigh, or keep the rowing in time.
But the most distressing of all these things is, that I, their general, have no power to put a stop to these abuses, (for your tempers are difficult to command,) and that we have no means of recruiting our ships' crews, (which the enemy can do from many quarters,) but both what is kept, and what is expended, must be taken from what we brought with us. For the cities which are at present in alliance with us, namely, Naxos and Catana, are powerless.
If, indeed, one additional advantage be still gained by the enemy, I mean, that the places in Italy which supply us with food, seeing the condition we are in, and in case of your not reinforcing us, go over to the enemy, the war will be brought to a conclusion by them without a single battle, through our being ἐπολιορκηθέντων.] Literally, compelled to surrender; but the correctness of Arnold's version, which I have adopted, seems proved by the passage quoted by him from I. 131. 2, ἐξεπολιόρκησαν λιμῷ. starved out.
I might, it is true, have had more agreeable things than these to write to you, but none more useful, if it is necessary for you to deliberate with a clear knowledge of affairs here. And besides, knowing as I do your temper, that you wish, indeed, to receive the most pleasing statements, but find fault afterwards, should any thing in consequence of them turn out different to what you expected, I thought it safer to lay the truth before you.
And now be assured of this, that for the business on which we first came here, neither your troops nor your generals have become inadequate: but since the whole of Sicily is being united together, and a fresh force is expected by them from the Peloponnese, you must now deliberate with a conviction that your troops are not a match even for their present enemies, but that you must either recall these, or send in addition to them another armament not less numerous, both military and naval, and no small sum of money, as well as some one to succeed me, since I am unable to remain at my post in consequence of a nephritic disease.
And I think that I may claim some consideration at your hands; for when I was in health, I did you much service during the periods of my command. But whatever you mean to do, do it at the very commencement of spring, and without any delay; since the enemy will in a short time provide themselves with the succours from Sicily, and though not so quickly with those from the Peloponnese, yet if you do not pay attention to them, in some respects they will elude your observation, as before, and in others will anticipate you.
Such was the purport of Nicias's letter. The Athenians, after hearing it, did not allow him to resign his command, but till the arrival of others who were elected as his colleagues, they joined with him two of those who were there on the spot, Menander and Euthydemus, that he might not in his illness bear the labour alone; while at the same time they voted to send fresh forces, both naval and military, composed of Athenians on the muster-roll, and of their allies.
They also elected as his colleagues, Demosthenes son of Alcisthenes, and Eurymedon son of Thucles; the latter of whom they despatched to Sicily immediately, about the winter solstice, with ten ships, a hundred and twenty talents of silver, and orders to tell the troops there that succours would come to them, and that attention would be paid to their interests.
Demosthenes, in the mean time, stayed behind, and made preparations for the expedition, intending to start as soon as it was spring; while he sent the allies word to levy troops, and got ready at home money, ships, and heavy-armed.
The Athenians also sent twenty ships to cruise round the Peloponnese, and to keep guard that none might cross over from Corinth and the Peloponnese to Sicily.
For the Corinthians, after the ambassadors came to them, and brought a more favourable report of affairs in Sicily, thinking that they had not been unseasonable in sending their former squadron, were now much more encouraged, and prepared, on their part, to despatch heavy-armed troops for Sicily in vessels of burden, as the Lacedaemonians did likewise from the rest of the Peloponnese.
The Corinthians manned also five and twenty triremes, to try the result of a battle with the squadron keeping watch at Naupactus, and that the Athenians there might be less able to prevent their transports from putting out, having to keep an eye upon the Corinthian line of triremes drawn up against them.
The Lacedaemonians prepared, too, for their invasion of Attica, both in accordance with their own previous resolution, and at the instigation of the Syracusans and Corinthians, since they had heard of the reinforcements about to be sent from Athens to Sicily; that they might be stopped by an incursion being made into the country. Alcibiades also kept urgently advising them to fortify Decelea, and not to let the war rest.
But most of all had they gained confidence, because they thought that the Athenians, being engaged in a two-fold war with both themselves and the Siceliots, would be more easily subdued; and also because they considered them to have first broken the truce. For in the former course of hostilities they thought the guilt lay more on their own side, both because the Thebans had entered Plataea during a time of truce; and because, when it had been specified in the former treaty, that none should take up arms against others, if they were willing to submit to a judicial decision, they themselves had not listened to the Athenians when appealing to such a decision. On which account they considered that they were justly unsuccessful, and made both their misfortune at Pylus, and whatever other might have befallen them, a subject of Or, of religious scruple, as in some other passages. serious reflection.
But when the Athenians had set out from Argos with those thirty ships, and ravaged a part of Epidaurus, Prasiae, and some other places, at the same time that they were also ἐλῃστεύοντο.] Or, as Arnold renders it, they, the Lacedaemonians. were continually being plundered; referring to V. 14. 2, ληστευομένης τῆς χώρας ἐκ τῆς πύλου. Poppo prefers the active sense, and is inclined to admit ἐλήστευον as Becker has done on the authority of one MS., the middle form not being used elsewhere. As both the preceding and following verbs refer to the Athenians, the change of subject is certainly very harsh, if ἐληστεύοντο be referred to the Lacedaemonians; even more so, I think, than in that remarkable instance which occurs II. ZZZ. 3. spreading devastation from Pylus; and when they refused to intrust the matter to arbitration, though the Lacedaemonians. as often as differences had arisen concerning any of the debatable points in the treaty, appealed to a judicial decision; then, indeed, the Lacedaemonians thought that the violation of the law, which in the former instance had been committed by themselves, had now, again, come in the same way to attach to the Athenians, and they were, therefore, eager for hostilities.
Accordingly, during this winter they sent round to their allies orders for iron, and were getting all the tools ready for building their fort. At the same time they were themselves raising supplies, and compelling the rest of the Peloponnesians to do so, with a view to despatching in the merchantmen succours to those in Sicily. And so the winter ended, and the eighteenth year of this war, of which Thucydides wrote the history.
The following spring, at its very commencement, the Lacedaemonians and their allies made a very early incursion into Attica, under the command of Agis son of Archidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians. In the first place, then, they ravaged the parts of the country about the plain, and then proceeded to fortify Decelea, dividing the work amongst the contingents of the different states.
The place is distant from the city of Athens about a hundred and twenty stades, and about the same, or not much more, from Boeotia. Now the fortress was raised for the annoyance of the plain and the richest parts of the country, being visible as far as Athens.
Thus, then, the Peloponnesians in Attica, and their allies, were engaged with their building. Those in the Peloponnese, about the same time, were sending off their heavy-armed troops to Sicily in the merchantmen, the Lacedaemonians having picked for the purpose the best of the Helots and Neodamodes, amounting both together to seven hundred, with Eccritus, a Spartan, in command of them, and the Boeotians, three hundred heavy-armed, under the command of Xeno and Nico. Thebans, and Hegesander, a Thespian.
These started amongst the first from Taenarus, in Laconia, and put out into the open sea. Not long after them, the Corinthians despatched five hundred heavy-armed, some from Corinth itself, and some hired from Arcadia besides, having appointed Alexarchus, a Corinthian, to the command of them. The Sicyonians also sent off, at the same time with the Corinthians, two hundred heavy-armed under the command of Sargeus, a Sicyonian.
In the mean time the five and twenty ships of the Corinthians, which had been manned in the winter, were stationed in opposition to the twenty Athenian vessels at Naupactus, till they had got these heavy-armed on board the merchantmen out to sea: for which purpose, indeed, they had been originally manned, that the Athenians might not attend to the merchantmen so much as to the triremes.
Meanwhile the Athenians, at the time of the fortifica tion of Decelea, and at the very commencement of the spring, sent thirty ships to cruise round the Peloponnese, under the command of Charicles son of Apollodorus, who was ordered to go to Argos also, and call for a contingent of their heavy-armed to go on board, according to the terms of their alliance.
Demosthenes, too, they despatched to Sicily, as they had intended, with sixty Athenian ships, and five Chian, twelve hundred Athenian heavy-armed from the muster-roll, and as many islanders as they could possibly raise from the several places; while they also supplied themselves from the other subject allies with whatever they could get in any quarter that would be of service for the war. Moreover, he was instructed, as he sailed round, to join Charicles first in his military measures on the coast of Laconia.
So Demosthenes, after sailing to aegina, waited for any part of the armament that might have been left behind, as well as for Charicles to fetch the Argive troops.
In Sicily, about the same period of this spring, Gylippus came to Syracuse, bringing from the cities which he had persuaded to join him as large a number of troops as he respectively could.
And now, having called the Syracusans together, he said that they ought to man as many ships as possible, and try the experiment of a sea-fight; for that he hoped to produce thereby a result worth the risk, towards the issue of the war.
Hermocrates, too, most earnestly joined him in trying to persuade them, in order that they might not rant courage for attacking the Athenians by sea; observing, that that people had no more than themselves enjoyed an hereditary and perpetual experience at sea, but had become a naval power after being, even more than the Syracusans, an inland one; and only because they were compelled to do so by the Medes. And to men of a daring character, like the Athenians, those who were daring in opposition to them would appear most formidable: for the terror with which that people paralysed their enemies, not, in some cases, by being superior to them in power, but by attacking them with confidence, καὶ σφᾶς, κ. τ. λ.] Or, they (i. e. the Athenians) would themselves also be subject to before their enemies: supposing, as Dobree does, that σφᾶς is here equivalent to ἀυτοὺς ἐκείνους. they, too, would in the same way strike into their opponents.
And he was well assured, he said, that the Syracusans, by unexpectedly daring to offer resistance to the navy of the Athenians, would in a greater degree gain advantage from the surprise of the enemy on that account, than the Athenians by their skill would harm the unskilful Syracusans.
He urged them therefore to proceed to the trial with their fleet, and not to shrink from it. Accordingly the Syracusans, at the persuasion of Gylippus, Hermocrates, and whoever else joined them, resolved on the sea-fight, and proceeded to man their ships.
When Gylippus had prepared the fleet for action, he took the whole army under cover of the night, and himself intended to assault by land the forts on Plemyrium, while at the same time, according to agreement, thirty-five of the Syracusan triremes sailed to the attack from the great harbour, and forty-five sailed round from the lesser, where their arsenal was situated; wishing to effect a junction with those within, and at the same time to sail against Plemyrium, in order that the enemy might be disconcerted by an attack on both sides.
The Athenians, on the other hand, having with all speed manned sixty ships to oppose them, with five and twenty of them engaged the five and thirty of the Syracusans that were in the great harbour, and with the remainder went to meet those that were sailing round from the arsenal. Thus they immediately entered into action before the mouth of the great harbour, and for a long time resisted each other, the one side wishing to force an entrance, the other being anxious to prevent them.