Book 7
GYLIPPUS and Pythen, after refitting their ships, sailed along the coast from Tarentum to Locri Epizephyrii. And now, on receiving more correct information, namely, that Syracuse was not yet entirely invested, but that it was still possible for a party coming with troops to enter it on the side of Epipole, they deliberated whether they should keep Sicily on their right hand, and so run the risk of sailing into it; or whether, keeping it on the left hand, they should first sail to Himera, and take with them both the people there, and any other forces that they might prevail on to join them, and so proceed by land.
They determined, then, to sail for Himera, especially as the four Athenian ships had not yet arrived at Rhegium, which Nicias, on hearing of their being at Locri, notwithstanding his contempt for them, had sent out. Having anticipated therefore this guard-squadron, they crossed over the strait, and after touching at Rhegium and Messana, arrived at Himera.
While they were there, they persuaded the Himeraeans to join them in the war, and both themselves to accompany them, and to furnish arms for such of the seamen from their ships as had none, (for they had drawn up their ships on shore at Himera.) They also sent and desired the Selinuntines to meet them at a certain place with all their forces.
That people promised to send them a force of no inconsiderable amount, as did the Geloans also, and some of the. Sicels, who were ready to join them with much greater forwardness, both in consequence of the recent death of Archonidas, who, being king over some of the Sicels in that part, and a man of considerable influence, was a friend of the Athenians, and because Gylippus was thought to have come from Lacedaemon in a spirited manner.
Thus Gylippus took with him those of his own seamen and Epibatae who were provided with arms, about seven hundred in number, the Himeraean heavy and light troops, together mustering about a thousand, with a hundred horse, some light-armed and horse of the Selinuntines, a few Geloans, and a thousand Sicels in all, and so advanced against Syracuse.
The Corinthians, meanwhile, were coming to their assistance from Leucas with their other ships as quickly as they could, and Gongylus, one of the Corinthian commanders, who had put to sea last of all with a single vessel, arrived first at Syracuse, though but a little before Gylippus. Finding them on the point of holding an assembly to consult on bringing the war to a conclusion, he prevented their doing so, and reassured:
them by saying that there were other ships still sailing up, and Gylippus, son of Cleandridas, sent by the Lacedaemonians in command of them. Upon this the Syracusans were reassured, and immediately went out in full force for the purpose of meeting Gylippus;
for by this time they perceived him actually near at hand. He, having taken on his passage Jetae, a fortress of the Sicels, and having formed his men for battle, arrived at Epipolae; after mounting which, on the side by Euryelus, where the Athenians also had ascended at first, he advanced in company with the Syracusans against the Athenian lines.
He happened to have come at so critical a time, that a double wall of seven or eight stades length had already been completed by the Athenians, extending to the great harbour, except for a short distance near the sea, which they were still building. For the rest of their lines, to Trogilus on the other sea, stones had already been laid for the greater part of the distance, and some points were left half finished, while others were entirely completed. To such extreme danger had Syracuse been reduced.
The Athenians, though thrown into consternation at first by the sudden attack made upon them by Gylippus and the Syracusans, quickly drew up for battle. Gylippus halted near them, and sent on a herald to tell them, that if they chose to depart from Sicily within five days, taking what belonged to them, he was ready to make a truce to that effect.
They, however, paid no attention to him, and sent him back again without giving any answer. After this, they made their preparations against each other.
And Gylippus, seeing the Syracusans in disorder and not easily falling into line, drew off his forces more into the open ground; while Nicias did not lead the Athenians against them, but remained still near his own wall. When Gylippus found that they were not advancing, he withdrew his army to what is called the citadel of Temenites, and there they stationed themselves for the night.
The next day he took the greater part of his forces, and drew them up near the walls of the Athenians, to prevent their going to the relief of any other quarter, while he sent a detachment to the fort of Labdalum, and took it, and put to the sword all the men he found in it; the place not being within sight of the Athenians.
On the same day, too, a trireme of the Athenians, moored off the harbour, was taken by the Syracusans.
After this, the Syracusans and their allies, commencing at the city, began to build upwards along Epipolae a single wall in a cross direction, that the Athenians, if they could not stop their progress, might no longer be able to invest them.
The Athenians had by this time gone up to the heights, after completing their wall down to the sea; and there being one weak part in the Athenian wall, Gylippus took his forces by night and made an attack upon it. When the Athenians were aware of his approach, (for they happened to be bivouacking outside,) they advanced to meet him;
on observing which, he led back the troops on his side as quickly as he could. The Athenians having then raised it higher, themselves kept guard at this point, and now disposed the other allies along the rest of the works as they were severally to man them.
Nicias determined also to fortify what is called Plemyrium, a headland opposite the city, which runs out beyond the great harbour, and narrows its mouth. If this were fortified, he thought that the introduction of provisions would be more easily effected; as they would carry on their blockade from a less distance, near i. e. the lesser port, as it was called, to distinguish it from the greater, in which the Athenian fleet now lay. the port occupied by the Syracusans, and would not, as now, put out against them from the bottom of the great harbour, in case of their stirring at all with their fleet. And he now paid more attention to the maritime operations of the war, seeing that their affairs by land were more hopeless since the arrival of Gylippus.
Having, therefore, crossed over with a body of troops and his ships, he completed the building of three forts; in which were deposited the greater part of the stores; the larger boats and the fast-sailing ships being now also moored there. And in consequence of this, it was chiefly at that title that the wasting of the crews first began.
For as they had but a scanty supply of water, and that not close at hand; and, moreover, as the sailors from time to time went out to gather firewood, they were cut off by the Syracusan horse, which had the command of the country. For a third part of their cavalry had been posted by the Syracusans in the small town in the Olympieum, with an eye to the troops on Plemyrium, to prevent their marching out to commit ravages.
Meanwhile Nicias learned that the rest of the Corinthian ships also were sailing to the island, and sent twenty vessels to watch for them, with orders to be on the look-out for them about Locri, Rhegium, and the approaches to Sicily.
Gylippus, on the other hand, was at once building the wall across Epipolae—making use of the stones which the Athenians before had thrown down along the line for their own use—and leading out continually the Syracusans and their allies, and drawing them up before the works; while the Athenians formed their line against them.
When Gylippus thought it a favourable opportunity, he commenced the attack; and, having closed in battle, they fought in the space between the works, where the cavalry of the Syracusans was of no use.
When the Syracusans and their allies had thus been defeated, and had taken up their dead under truce, and after the Athenians had erected a trophy, Gylippus called his army together, and said, that the fault was not theirs, but his own; for he had deprived them of the benefit of their cavalry and dart-men by his arrangements for the battle, which he had made too far within the works: wherefore he would now lead them again to the charge.
And he begged them to make up their minds to this view of the case-that they would not have the worse as regarded forces, and that with respect to resolution, it would be intolerable if they should not determine, Pelopolnnesians and Dorians as they were, to get the better of Ionians, and islanders, and a mixed rabble of men, and to drive them out of their country.
After this, when a favourable opportunity presented itself; he led them a second time against the enemy. Now Nicias and the Athenians thought, that even if the Syracusane should not wish to commence an engagement, it was necessary for themselves not to permit their wall to be carried past their own: for by this time the enemy's work had all but passed the termination of the Athenian lines; and if it went on any further, it was at once all the same to them, whether they were continually fighting and victorious, or did not fight at all;
and therefore they advanced to meet the Syracusans. Gylippus led his heavy-armed further beyond the fortifications of the two parties than before, and so engaged them, posting his cavalry and dart-men on the flank of the Athenians, in the open space where the works connected with both walls terminated.
During the battle, the cavalry charged the left wing of the Athenians which was opposed to them, and routed it; and in consequence of this the rest of the army also was defeated by the Syracusans, and driven within their lines.
The following night they had time to build up to the Athenian works, and to pass them; so that now they could no longer be stopped by the enemy, while they deprived them, even if victorious, of all chance of investing the city in future.
After this, the remaining twelve vessels of the Corinthians, Ambraciots, and Leucadians, having eluded the observation of the Athenian guard-force, sailed into harbour, under the command of Erasinides, a Corinthian, and joined the Syracusans in completing the remainder of their works up to the cross ξυνετείχισαν τὸ λοιπόν, κ. τ. λ.] Göller and Bishop Thirlwall understand this of the completion of the Syracusan counter-work, which they suppose to have been before left in an imperfect state, at some points where the position was naturally stronger than at others, but to have been now carried to an uniform height up to the Athenian wall, here called τοῦ ἐγκαρσίου τείχους as running at right angles to the counter-work. This, however, appears to be an exceedingly doubtful interpretation of the passage, like every other that has been proposed. For the supposition of the counterwork having been left in an imperfect state has nothing whatever to support it in our author's description of it in the preceding chapters, which would naturally, I think, lead one to just the opposite conclusion. Nor does the description of the actual surface of Epipole, as given in Arnold's Memoir, make it probable that there would be, in the course of the wall, any points of such natural strength as to have encouraged them to dispense, even for a time, with the ordinary means of securing their work; as it does not appear probable that it passed over any of the four decided slopes of rock, by which alone the gradual and almost imperceptible ascent is broken. And although ἐγκάρσιον as a mere relative expression, might be applied to either of the two works whose relative position it describes, it is surely most improbable, that after using it as our author undoubtedly, I think, does in every other passage with reference to the work of the Syracusans, he should in this single instance employ it in the very contrary manner. Or these grounds I think that Arnold's hypothesis is, on the whole, more probable; viz. that he alludes to some additional work carried out by the whole force of the Syracusans from the city wall, to join, and so strengthen, the counterwall. Or, if this should be thought inconsistent with the terms in which the counter-wall is afterwards described, ch. 42. 4, the joint operations here spoken of, may perhaps refer more generally to the building of out-works, extending at intervals up to it; especially as three such προτειχίσματα are actually mentioned as existing there, (ch. 43. 4,) though we are not expressly told when they were raised.—With regard to the verb ξυνετείχισαν being used with reference to the nominative αἱ νῆες, I cannot agree with Arnold that this is not the way in which Thucydides commonly writes; or suppose, for this reason at least, that something has dropped out of the text. The other conclusion mentioned by him seems much more probable, viz. that the whole passage was written carelessly. There would seem to be no abstract reason why actions should not be attributed to ships, which could only have been performed by the men in them; in the same way as they are continually attributed by our author to countries, cities, etc. And the following passages, amongst others which might be quoted, appear to prove that this is the way in which Thucydides writes, at least not unfrequently:—–I. 116. 1, ἔτυχον γὰρ αἱ μὲν (i. e. τῶν νεῶν) ἐπὶ καρίας ἐς προσκοπὴν τῶν φοινισσῶν νεῶν οἰχόμεναι, αἱ δ᾽ ἐπὶ χίου καὶ λέσβου περιαγγέλουσαι βοηθεῖν. II. 69. 1, ἑτέρας δ᾽ ἕξ ἐπὶ καρίας καὶ λυκίας καὶ μελήσανδρον στρατηγόν, ὅπως ταῦτά τε ἀργυρολογῶσι καὶ τὸ ληστικὸν τῶν πελοποννησίων μὴ ἐῶσιν, κ. τ. λ. III. 33. 1, 3, ὠφθη γὰρ ὑπὸ τῆς σαλαμινιάς καὶ παράλου ἔτι περὶ κλάρον ὁρμῶν, ... αὐτάγγελοι δ᾽ αὐτὸν ἰδοῦσαι ἐν τῇ κλάρῳ ἥ τε πάραλος καὶ ἡ σαλαμινία ἔφρασαν.—Bloomfield most strangely misrepresents the meaning both of Thucydides and of Bishop Thirlwall, by giving in his note, as the translation of μέχρι τοῦ ἐγκαρσίου τείχους the words, beyond the interval where the two walls converged towards each other; which are evidently intended by the historian thus misquoted to be explanatory of ἔξω τῶν τειχῶν, ch. 6, 2. wall.
And now Gylippus went away into the rest of Sicily for forces, intending to raise them both for sea and land service; and at the same time to bring over any of the cities that was either not hearty in the cause, or had hitherto stood entirely aloof from the war.
Other ambassadors of the Syracusans and Corinthians were also sent to Lacedaemon and Corinth, in order that a fresh force might be sent over to them, in whatever way might answer best, whether in merchantmen, or boats, or any how else; since the Athenians too were sending for reinforcements.
Moreover, the Syracusans proceeded to man and practise a fleet, for the purpose of making an attempt in that way also, and were in other respects much more full of confidence.
Nicias observing this, and seeing that the enemy's strength and their own difficulties were every day increasing, sent, on his side also, to Athens; having, indeed, on many other occasions sent messengers at the time of their several operations, but doing so then especially, because he thought that they were in a perilous condition, and that unless those at home recalled them as quickly as possible, or sent out no small reinforcement, there was no hope of preservation for them.
Fearing, however, that those who were sent by him, either through incapacity for speaking, or through being deficient γνώμης.] In corroboration of Arnold's argument for this reading in preference to μνήμης, compare the three requisite qualifications of an orator, mentioned II. 60. 5, ὃς οὐδενὸς οἴομαι ἥσσων, εἶναι γνῶναι τε τὰ δέοντα καὶ ἑρμηνεῦσαι ταῦτα, φιλόπολίς τε καὶ χρημάτων κρείσσων, κ. τ. λ. in sense, or from a wish to say something to please the multitude, should not report the real facts of the case, he wrote a letter, thinking that by this means, more than any other, the Athenians would learn his own sentiments, without their being at all obscured by the messenger, and so would deliberate on the true state of the case.
Accordingly, those whom he sent departed with the letter and all that they were to say; while he himself attended to the affairs of the armament, being engaged now in precautionary measures, rather than in perils voluntarily incurred.
At the close of the same summer, Evetion, an Athenian general, having in concert with Perdiccas marched against Amphipolis with a numerous body of Thracians, did not take the city, but after bringing round some triremes into the Strymon, blockaded it from the river, making his approaches from Himeraeum. And thus the summer ended.
The following winter, the messengers of Nicias arrived at Athens, where they stated by word of mouth what had been told them, answered whatever further question any one asked, and delivered the letter; which the secretary of state came forward and read to the Athenians, being to the following purport:
"With our former operations, Athenians, you have been made acquainted by many other letters; but at present, it is especially seasonable that you should deliberate with a knowledge of the position we are in.
When, then, we had in many engagements defeated the Syracusans, against whom we were sent, and had built the walls in which we are now lying, Gylippus, the Lacedaemonian, came with an army from the Peloponnese and some of the cities in Sicily. And though in the first battle he was beaten by us, in the one fought the next day we were driven from the field by numerous cavalry and dart-men, and retired within our walls.