Book 6
But if, on the other hand, I appear to any one to speak credibly, let him not be struck with consternation at their boldness and power. For neither will they be able to do us more harm than they receive, nor, because they are coming against us with a great armament, are they on that account without advantage for us; but it is much better with respect to the rest of the Siceliots, (for they will be the more willing, in their consternation, to join our alliance,) and in case of our either defeating them, or repulsing them without their obtaining the objects of their ambition, (for certainly I am not afraid of their gaining what they expect,) it will prove the most glorious achievement for us, and one which, by me at least, is not unexpected.
For few have been the great armaments, either of Greeks or barbarians, which have gone far from home and proved successful. For they come not in greater numbers than the natives of the country and those who live near to it, (since all league together through fear,) and if they fail through want of provisions in a foreign land, even though they fail chiefly through their own fault, they nevertheless leave a proud name to those who were the objects of their attack.
Just as these very Athenians, when the Mede, contrary to expectation, was so signally defeated, grew great on the strength of the report, that it was against Athens that he had come. And there is reason for hoping that in our case the result may be the same.
With good courage, then, let us both make our preparations here, and send to the Sicels, to strengthen the attachment of some of them, and endeavour to enter into friendship and alliance with others; while we despatch envoys to the rest of Sicily, to prove that the danger is common to all; and to Italy, that either we may gain their alliance for ourselves, or they may refuse to receive the Athenians.
I think it better, too, that we should also send to Carthage. For this is nothing unexpected by them; but they are always in fear that they may some time or other find the Athenians coming against their country; and therefore thinking, perhaps, that if they abandoned these places, they would themselves be brought into trouble, they might be willing to assist us; at least secretly, if not openly; or at any rate in some way or other. And they are more able to do it, if they please, than any men of the present day; for they possess most gold and silver; and it is by means of these that war, like every thing else, prospers.
Let us likewise send to Lacedaemon and Corinth, begging them to come hither to our aid as quickly as possible, and to stir up the war there.
And what I think the most expedient course, though you, through your habitual love of quiet, would be least quickly persuaded to adopt it, shall, notwithstanding that, be mentioned. If then we Siceliots—all in one body, if possible; but if not, as many as possible in concert with us—would launch the whole of our present navy, with two months' provisions, and go to meet the Athenians at Tarentum and the Iapygian foreland, and show them that they will not have to fight about Sicily before they have fought for their own passage over the Ionian Sea; we should strike them with the greatest fear, and set them on considering that we are starting from a friendly country as its guardians, (for Tarentum is ready to receive us,) but that for them the tract of open sea is a wide one to cross with all their armament; which would hardly remain in order through so long a voyage, and would be easily attacked by us, while it came on slowly and in small divisions. But supposing, on the other hand, that, having lightened their ships, they should attack us with the better sailing part of their fleet in a more compact body;
then, if they use their oars, we shall fall on them when they are wearied; or if we should not choose to do so, we may also retire to Tarentum: while they, having crossed with few provisions, on purpose for an engagement, would be at a loss what to do in uninhabited regions; and would either be blockaded, if they remained, or if they attempted to sail along the coast, would abandon the rest of their armament, and would be dispirited, from having no certainty whether the cities would receive them or not. I therefore, for my part, am of opinion, that being deterred by this consideration, they would not so much as put out from Corcyra;
but would either, after deliberating and reconnoitring how many we are, and in what position, be driven on by the season of the year into winter; or, in consternation at the unexpected result, break up the expedition: especially since the most skilful of their generals, as I hear, is taking the command against his will, and would gladly seize an excuse to return, if any considerable resistance were seen on our part. We should be reported too, I am quite sure, Literally, on the side of more, or excess; like ἐπὶ τὸ μείζον, I. 10. 3 as being more than we really are:
and in accordance with what is told them are men's feelings also affected; and of those who are beforehand in attacking, or, at any rate, let those who are going to attack them see beforehand that they will defend themselves, they stand in greater fear, considering them equal to the danger And this would be the case now with the Athenians.
For they are coming against us with a belief that we shall offer no resistance; with good reason contemning us, because we did not join the Lacedaemonians in destroying them. But if they saw us acting with courage beyond their expectation, they would be more dismayed at that unlooked-for result, than at the power which we really possess.
Be persuaded, therefore to show this boldness, if possible; but if not, then, as quickly as possible, to get ready all other resources for the war; and to think, every one of you, that contempt for your assailants is best shown by bravery of deeds; but that, for the present, to consider those preparations most safe which are made with a feeling of fear, and to act as in a season of danger, would prove most to your advantage. For those men are both coming against us, and already, I know for certain, on their voyage, and all but here.
Such was the speech of Hermocrates. But the people of Syracuse were at great strife one with another; some maintaining that the Athenians would by no means come, and that what he said was not the truth; others asking what they could do, if they did come, which they would not suffer on a larger scale in return. Others, again, treated the matter with utter contempt, and turned it to ridicule; while there were but few who believed Hermocrates, and were afraid of what was coming.
Athenagoras, who was a leader of the people, and most influential with the multitude at the present time, then came forward to them and spoke as follows:
"With regard to the Athenians, whoever does not wish them to be so senseless, and to be reduced into subjection to us by coming here, is either a coward, or ill affected towards his country. But with regard to those who bring such tidings, and fill you with such excessive fear, I wonder at them, not for their audacity, but for their folly, if they imagine that they are not seen through.
For being afraid themselves, they wish to throw the whole city into consternation, in order that they may get their own terror thrown into the shade by the general alarm. And now this is the real value of these reports: they do not arise in a natural way, but are concocted by men who are always raising commotions here.
But you, if well advised, will not look at and estimate probabilities by the news which these persons bring, but by what men of talent and great experience, as I presume the Athenians are, would be likely to do.
For it is not probable that they, leaving the Peloponnesians behind them, and not having yet brought the war at home to a sure conclusion, should voluntarily come here for another no less arduous; since, in my opinion, they are quite contented that we, with so many and so great cities as we have, are not going against them.
"But, indeed, if they should come, as they are said to be coming, I consider Sicily more competent to bring the war to a termination than the Peloponnese, (inasmuch as it is better provided in all respects,) and our city by itself far stronger than the army which is now, as they say, coming against us, even though it came twice as large as it is. For I know that neither will any horses accompany them, or be provided for them here, except some few from the Segestans, nor heavy-armed equal in number to our own, coming, as they must have done, on board ship. For it is a great thing for even the ships themselves, lightly laden, to perform so long a voyage hither; and for all the other provisions required against such a city, (which will be no few,) to be furnished.
So far then am I from believing this, that I think if they came with another city as large as Syracuse in their possession, and living there on our borders carried on the war, they would hardly avoid utter ruin: much less then, surely, with the whole of Sicily hostile to them, (for it will league together;) and with an army established in the country from on board ship; and while they are not permitted by our cavalry to advance far from their wretched tents, and such poor equipments as they are compelled to put up with. In short, I do not think they would even effect a landing; so far superior do I consider our forces to be.
"But the Athenians, as I tell you, being aware of this, are engaged, I am well assured, in preserving their own possessions; and it is persons here that are making up these stories of what neither is, nor could ever be, the case.
And I am not now for the first time convinced of them, but have ever been so, that they wish to terrify your populace by such tales as these, and still more wicked ones, if not even by deeds; and so themselves to have the rule of the city. And in truth I am afraid, lest some time or other, by making many attempts, they should even succeed; while we are ill disposed, before we are in the act of suffering, to take precautionary measures against them, and after finding them out, to proceed against them.
And so by these means our city is seldom at rest, but is involved in many feuds and conflicts—not more frequently with its enemies than with itself—and sometimes in tyrannies and unprincipled cabals. But I will endeavour, if only you will follow my advice, to let none of these things occur in our time;
by convincing you who form the mass of the people, and by chastising those who plot such things; not only when convicted in the act, (for it is difficult so to catch them,) but also for what they have the wish, though not the power, to do. For we must avenge ourselves on our enemy, not only for what he does, but beforehand also, for his intention to do it; inasmuch as if we are not first in guarding against him, we shall be first in suffering. With regard to the oligarchs, on the other hand, I shall reprove them on some points, watch them on others, and warn them on others; for in this way I think I shall best deter them from their evil practices. And, indeed, what is it (a question which I have often asked) that ye really wish, ye young men?
Is it to enjoy power at once? But that is not lawful; and that law was so enacted in consequence of your incompetency, rather than with a wish to degrade you when competent for the task. Well then, is it to avoid being under the same laws with the people at large? And how then is it right for the same people not to be thought worthy of the same privileges?
"Some one will say, that a democracy is neither a sensible nor an equitable thing, but that those who have property are also most competent to rule best. But I say, in the first place, that 'democracy' is a name for all, but ' oligarchy' for only a part; and, in the second place, that though the rich are the best guardians of property, the intelligent would be the best counsellors, and the mass of the people the best judges after hearing measures discussed;
and that all these things, both severally and collectively, have their due share allotted to them in a democracy. An oligarchy, on the other hand, admits, indeed, the many to a share of dangers, but of advantages it not only enjoys the larger part, but even takes away and keeps the whole. And this is what the powerful and young among you desire—a thing impossible to attain in a great city.
Nay then at length, even now, I have attempted to translate this passage as it is found in the MSS., but must refer to the different editors for the emendations which they propose for what they all agree in thinking the corrupt part of it. O ye dullest of all men—(for of all the Greeks I know, are you either most senseless, if you are not sensible that you are coveting evil things; or most unprincipled, if you know it, and still dare to pursue them:)—nay then, I say, either acquire that knowledge, or change those principles, and so advance the interest of the city, which is the common interest of all. For consider, that those who are good among you will share that in an equal, or even greater degree, than the mass of the people in the city;
but that if you wish any thing else, you run a risk of being deprived of all. And have done with such reports as these, knowing that they are brought to those who are aware of, and will not tolerate, your designs. For this city, even if the Athenians are coming, will resist them in a manner worthy of itself; and we have generals who will look to these matters. And if none of the reports be true, (which is my opinion,) it will not lay a voluntary slavery on itself, by being panic-struck at your intelligence, and by choosing you as its rulers; but will look at the circumstances itself, and consider the words spoken by you as equivalent to deeds; and will not be deprived of its present liberty by listening to you, but will endeavour to preserve it by being cautious in its actions, and not allowing you to go unpunished.
To this effect spoke Athenagoras. One of the generals then rose up, and would no longer permit any one else to come forward, but himself spoke on the subject before them to the following effect:
It is neither prudent for any parties to utter calumnies against each other, nor for those who hear them to admit them; but rather to see, with regard to the intelligence brought to us, how we may prepare, both each man severally and the whole city together, to defend ourselves well against the invaders.
And even supposing it not to be required, there is no harm, at any rate, in the state being equipped with horses, and arms, and every thing else in which war rejoices.
And we ourselves will undertake to attend to and examine these things, and to send round to the cities, both for observation, and whatever else may appear to be expedient. To some of them, indeed, we have already attended; and whatever we discover, we will lay before you. After the general had said thus much, the Syracusans departed from the assembly.
Now the Athenians were by this time at Corcyra, themselves and all their allies. And in the first place, the generals reviewed the armament a second time, and made their dispositions, as they were to come to their moorings, and to form their camp; making three squadrons, and allotting one to each of their body, that they might not, by sailing in company, be at a loss for water, and ports, and provisions, on their touching any where; and that they might in other respects be more orderly and easy to control, by being put under a particular commander, according to the several squadrons.
They next sent forward three ships to Italy and Sicily, to ascertain which of the cities would receive them; with orders to come out again and meet them, that they might know this when they put in.
After this, the Athenians at length weighed anchor, and proceeded to cross over from Corcyra to Sicily, with the following force; viz.—a hundred and thirty-four triremes, in all, and two Rhodian fifty-oared galleys; (a hundred of these were Athenian vessels, sixty of which were fast sailers, the rest troop ships; the remainder of the fleet being composed of Chians, and the other allies;) of heavy-armed, in all, five thousand one hundred, (of which there were raised by the Athenians themselves fifteen hundred, and seven hundred θῆτες,] i. e. men included in the lowest of the four classes into which Solon divided the Athenian people, and which consisted of all whose land brought in less than two hundred medimni of corn yearly. See note 1, p. 167. Thetes serving as Epibatae on board the ships; the rest of those who joined the expedition being allies, some of them sent by their subjects, others by the Argives, to the number of five hundred, with two hundred and fifty Mantineans, who were also mercenaries;) of archers, in all, four hundred and eighty, (eighty of which were Cretans;) of Rhodian slingers, seven hundred; of light-armed Megareans, who were exiles, one hundred and twenty; and one horse transport, carrying thirty horses.
Such was the amount of the first armament which sailed over for the war. For these troops thirty ships of burden, laden with corn, carried provisions, with the bakers, stone-masons, carpenters, and all the tools for building fortifications; and also one hundred boats, which, together with the ships of burden, were pressed into the service; while many other boats and ships of burden followed the armament voluntarily, for purposes of commerce; all of which proceeded at that time to cross the Ionian Gulf from Corcyra.
When the whole armament had made the coast at the Iapygian foreland, and Tarentum, and as they severally could, they sailed along the coast of Italy, as the cities did not afford them a market, or the protection of their walls, but only water and anchorage, (and Tarentum and Locri not even these,) until they came to Rhegium, a promontory of Italy.
There they at once mustered, and pitched a camp outside the city, (as they would not receive them within the walls,) in the sacred enclosure of Diana, where they afforded them a market; and having drawn up their ships ashore, they remained quiet. They then entered into communication with the Rhegians, calling upon them, as Chalcidians, to assist the Leontines, who were Chalcidians also. They, however, said that they would join neither party, but whatever the rest of the Italiots should collectively determine, that they would do.
The Athenians then turned their attention to the state of things in Sicily, considering in what way they would best deal with them; and at the same time were waiting for the arrival from Segesta of the ships which had been sent on in advance; wishing to know respecting the money, whether there were such a sum as the messengers stated at Athens.