Book 6
Again, regarding the present condition of the Siceliots, they appear to me even still less likely to be formidable to us, if the Syracusans should have dominion over them; that supposition with which the Segestans especially try to frighten us.
For at present they might, perhaps, come hither as separate states, to oblige the Lacedaemonians; but in the other case, it is not likely that they should undertake the expedition, empire against empire: for in the same manner as they, in conjunction with the Lacedaemonians, had taken away ours, it is probable that they would have their own taken away by the same Peloponnesians, i. e. their wish to rescue the cities from the yoke of Syracrse, as they had done from that of Athens. and by the same principle.
And the Greeks in those parts would be most in awe of us, if we did not go there at all; and next to that, if after making a demonstration of our power we retired in a short time: but if we should meet with any reverses they would very quickly despise us, and attack us in concert with our enemies here. For we all know that what is farthest off is most admired, and what gives the least room for having its fame tested.
And this has at present been your case, Athenians, with reference to the Lacedaemonians and their allies; from having, contrary to your expectation, gained the advantage over them, (comparing your present position with the fears you at first entertained,) you have despised them, and are now desiring the conquest of Sicily.
You ought not, however, to be elated through the misfortunes of your adversaries, but then only to feel confident when you have mastered their spirits; nor should you think that the Lacedaemonians are doing ought but considering, in consequence of their disgrace, in what way they may even now, if possible, overthrow us, and bring their own discredit to a happy termination; especially as they have studied a reputation for bravery, as a thing of the greatest importance, and for the greatest length of time.
So that our great struggle will be, if we are wise, not for the Segestans in Sicily, men who are barbarians, but that we may vigorously guard against a state which is plotting against us Or, as Arnold renders it, in the way of oligarchy; i. e. threatening as, not with the loss of our conquests, but with a change of government. by the spread of oligarchical principles.
"We ought to remember, too, that we have but lately recovered a little from a great pestilence and war, so as to be somewhat recruited both in our property and persons; and that it is but fair for us to expend these here at home, on ourselves, and not on these exiles who are begging your aid; whose interest it is to utter specious falsehoods, and contending at their neighbours' risk, while they themselves only contribute words, either to show no proper gratitude if they succeed, or if in any instance they fail, to ruin their friends along with them.
And if there be any one who is pleased at being appointed to command, and therefore urges you to make the expedition, looking to his own interest alone, (especially as he is yet too young for office,) in order that while he is admired, for his horse-keeping, he may also receive from his appointment some benefit on the score of expense; do not, either, allow that man to exhibit his own individual splendour at the peril of the state; but consider that such men injure the public interests, while they squander their private possessions; and that this is a business of great importance, and not one for a young man to deliberate upon, and rashly to take in hand.
"I am alarmed, indeed, when I see such characters sitting here at present by the side of that same individual, in compliance with his bidding; and in return I bid the older men—whichever of them may have one of those characters sitting by him—not to be put down through shame, in order to avoid being thought a coward if he should not vote for going to war; nor, as their opponents themselves might feel, to be madly enamoured of what they do not possess; being convinced that in very few things do men succeed through desire, but in very many through forethought in behalf of their country, as exposing itself to the greatest danger it has ever done, to give their support to the opposite side, and vote that the Siceliots keep the same boundaries with respect to us as at present—boundaries with which no one can find fault—namely, the Ionian Sea, if one sail along shore; and the Sicilian, if one cross the open deep; and that while they enjoy their own possessions, they shall also settle their own quarrels:
and that we tell the Segestans in particular, that since they went to war with the Selinuntines in the first instance without consulting the Athenians, they may also make peace with them by themselves: and that we do not in future make alliance, as we have been accustomed, with men whom we shall assist when they are unfortunate, and when we ask assistance ourselves, shall not obtain it.
And do you, Prytanis, if you think it your duty to care for the state, and if you wish to show yourself a good citizen, put this to the vote, and take a second time the opinion of the Athenians; reflecting, if you feel afraid to move the question again, that the violation of the law would not, with so many abettors, involve any guilt; but that you would be acting as a physician to the state, when it had taken bad counsel; and that good government consists in this,—for a man to do his country as much good as possible, or, at least, to do it voluntarily no harm.
To this effect spoke Nicias. Of the Athenians, the greater part who came forward advised making the expedition, and not annulling what had been decreed; though there were some also who spoke against it.
But the man who most earnestly recommended the expedition was Alcibiades son of Clinias, who at once wished to thwart Nicias—both as being in other respects opposed to him in politics, and because he had alluded to him in a disparaging manner—and was most anxious to take the command, and hoped by that means to reduce Sicily and Carthage, and at the same time, in consequence of his success, to promote his own private interests in point of fame and wealth.
For, being held in high repute by the citizens, he indulged his inclinations on too large a scale for his existing means, with regard to keeping horses, and all other expenses. And this too was what afterwards mainly caused the destruction of the Athenian state.
For being alarmed at the extent of his disregard for the laws in his own person, with respect to his mode of life, and of his designs in the measures he severally undertook, in whatever business he might be engaged, the greater part of the people became his enemies on the belief of his aiming at tyranny; and though in his public capacity he conducted the war most ably, yet being severally offended at his habits in his private life, and committing the administration to others, after no long interval they brought their country to ruin.
However, at that time he came forward, and advised the Athenians as follows:
"It is both προσήκει μοι, 'on account of my wealth, birth, and magnificent expenditure;' ἄξιος ἅμα νομίζω εἶναι, 'on account of my personal worth and tried services.' —Arnold. befitting, Athenians, for me, more than others, to enjoy command, (for with this topic must I commence my speech,]since Cleon has attacked me upon it,) and at the same time, I deem myself worthy of it. For those things about which Or, to use a more colloquial expression, cried out against. I am so assailed with clamour, confer honour on my ancestors and myself, and benefit on my country at the same time.
For the Greeks considered our state to be greater than they had ever done, even beyond its actual power, through the splendour of my display as its deputy to the Olympic games; (whereas they hoped before that it had been exhausted by the war;) inasmuch as I entered seven chariots—a number which no private individual had ever yet entered—and gained the first prize, and was second and fourth, and provided every thing else in a style worthy of my victory. For according to the usual view of them, such things are a subject of honour; while, from the practice of them, an idea of power is also formed.
And again, whatever distinction I gain at home by my On the whole subject of the χορηγίαι, see Böckh Public Econ. of Athens, vol. ii. p. 207, Eng. Trans. exhibitions of choruses, or in any other way, it is naturally envied by my fellow—citizens, but for foreigners Arnold translates this,—and Bloomfield borrows his version,— this appears to be even strength: but the position of the καί seems to me to be incompatible with such a sense; reading, as they both ZZZ instead of αὐτή. this too has an appearance of power. And this is no useless folly, when a man benefits at his own costs, not himself only, but his country also. Nor is it unfair for one who prides himself on his own prosperity, to refuse to be on an equality with the mass;
since in the same way he who is unfortunate shares his calamities with no one else. But as we are not courted when in adversity, by the same rule let a man also submit to be slighted by the prosperous; or let him treat the unfortunate as on an equal footing, [when he is in prosperity,] and so claim the like treatment in return, [when he is himself in adversity].
I know, however, that men in such circumstances, and all who ever surpassed others in splendour of any kind, though disliked in their own life—time, most of all in their dealings with their equals, and then with the rest of the world also, have yet left to some of those who came after them a desire to claim connexion with them, even where there were no grounds for it; and a subject for glorying to the country they belonged to, not as for aliens, or offenders, but as for countrymen, who had achieved glorious things.
And in my case, who aim at such things, and am therefore in private assailed with clamour, consider, with regard to public affairs, whether I administer them in a manner inferior to any one else, or not. For having united the most powerful states of the Peloponnese, without any great danger or expense to you, I brought the Lacedaemonians to a single day's struggle for their all at Mantinea; in consequence of which, although they were victorious in the battle, they do not ever now feel any firm confidence in themselves.
"In this way, then, did my youth and preternatural folly, as it is thought, deal with the power of the Peloponnesians by means of suitable arguments; and For other modes of interpreting this sentence, see Poppo's note. gaining credit by my vehemence, obtained their assent. And now too be not afraid of it; but while I am still in the flower of it, and Nicias appears fortunate, avail yourselves fully of the services of each of us.
And with regard to the expedition to Sicily, change not your determination from an idea that it would be undertaken against a great power. For it is only with a mixed rabble that its cities are populous; and they easily admit changes in their government, and adopt new ones.
And for this reason no one is furnished, as though in behalf of his own country, either with arms for the person, or with ordinary τὰ ἐν τῇ χῶρᾳ ... κατασκευαῖς.] This would refer not only to public works for the defence of the country, such as forts, or the fortifications of the city itself, but to what we should call ordinary improvements, such as roads, bridges, etc., and perhaps ornamental buildings, whether temples or theatres. —Arnold. I cannot but think that in addition to these objects of expenditure, if not before them all, reference is made to the slaves, cattle, and implements, with which the land ought to be stocked, but was not, in consequence of the unsettled state of the country. As οὐδείς seems to refer to individuals, not to states, in the preceding clause, it would naturally refer to them in this also; as ἕκαστος also does in the following sentence. And with regard to this signification of κατασκευή, it is one which both the noun and the verb formed from it repeatedly convey in Xenophon's political and economical treatises; e.g. De Vectigalibus, IV. 11, ὅπως θαρσοῦνα ες μὲν ὅτι πλέιστους ἀνθρώπους ἐπὶ τὰ ἀργύρια ἄγωμεν, θαρσοῦντες δὲ κατασκευαζώμεθα ἐν αὐτοῖς. And again, 41, εἰ δὲ τινες αὖ φοβοῦνται, μὴ ματαία ἄν γένοιτο αὐτη ἡ κατασκευὴ, εἰ πόλεμος ὲγερθείη ... τί γὰρ δὴ εἰς πόλεμον κτῆμα χρησιμώτερον ἀνθρώπων. And in the same way, Thucydides himself uses the verb particularly with reference to slaves, as though they formed the chief stock in the country, in another speech which he puts into the mouth of Alcibiades; ch. 91. 7, οἷς τε γὰρ ἡ χώρα κατεσκεύασται, τὰ πολλὰ πρὸς ὑμᾶς, τὰ μὲν ληφθέντα τὰ δ᾽ αὐτόματα, ἥξει. I think therefore that in the present passage also by the expression τὰ ἐν τῇ χωρα νομίμοις κατασκευαῖς he means the different parts of an agricultural property, and more especially the slaves, which formed the most valuable and important part, while a country was in a peaceful and prosperous condition; but one so likely to be lost in a period of war and revolution, that the Siceliots, according to the view of their unsettled state which Alcibiades here gives, would have very little inducement to invest their money in them. resources, as regards the country; but whatever each one thinks that he can get from the people, either by persuading them through his oratory, or by factious measures, and will so find a home in another land, in case of his not being successful, with that he provides himself.
It is not likely, then, that a populace of such a character should either listen to any counsel with one heart, or apply themselves to action in common: but they would severally side with whatever was said to please them; especially if they are torn by factions, as we hear.
Again, with regard to heavy-armed troops, neither have the Siceliots so many as are boasted of, nor did the rest of the Greeks prove so numerous as they severally reckoned themselves; but Greece had very much misstated them, and was with difficulty equipped with them in sufficient numbers on the outbreak of this war.
The states in those parts, then, from what I learn by report, are of this character, and still more easy to deal with—for we shall have many barbarians, who from hatred of the Syracusans will join us in attacking them—and those here will not prove an obstacle, if you take a right view of the matter.
For our fathers had these very men, whom they say you would leave behind you in hostility when sailing there, and the Mede beside, as their enemies; and still they won their empire; though strong in nothing else but the superiority of their fleet.
And as things stand now, never yet were the Peloponnesians more hopeless with regard to us: and even if they are ever so confident, for invading our country indeed they are strong enough, even though we do not undertake the expedition; but with their naval force they cannot hurt us, [though we do undertake it;] for we have a fleet left behind that is a match for them.
On what reasonable argument, then, could we ourselves shrink from it; or on what plea addressed to our allies there could we refuse to succour them? For since we have entered into league with them, we ought to assist them, and not to object that they too have not assisted us. For we united them with us, not that they might come here to help us in their turn, but that by annoying our enemies there they might prevent their coming here to attack us.
And it is in this way that empire has been won, both by us and and by all others who have enjoyed it; I mean, by readily taking part with those barbarians or Greeks who from time to time called them to their aid; since if all should remain quiet, or Or, make distinctions of race in choosing, etc.; according to the reading φυλοκρινοῖεν, which Poppo, Göller, and Bloomfield adopt. nicely choose whom they ought to assist; we should make but slight additions to it, but should rather run a risk of losing even what it now is.
For men do not only defend themselves against a superior when he has attacked them, but also strike the first blow, to prevent his attacking them. And it is not possible for us to portion out exactly how far we wish to hold dominion; but since we are in our present position, we must form designs against some, and not give up others; because we should be, subjected to the rule of another party, if we did not ourselves rule over others.
Nor must you take the same view of quiet as the rest of the world, unless you will also receive fresh institutions assimilating to theirs. Considering, then, that we shall rather aggrandize our possessions here, if we go in quest of those there, let us make the expedition; that we may both prostrate the pride of the Peloponnesians, by being seen, regardless of present peace, to sail even against Sicily; and at the same time, by either ruling, as we most probably shall, over the whole of Greece, through being joined by those there, or at any rate by injuring the Syracusans, by which both ourselves and our allies will be benefited.
And as for security, whether for remaining there, in case of any success, or for returning, our fleet will provide us with it:
for by sea we shall be superior to all the Siceliots put together. And let not the non-interfering policy which Nicias recommends in his speeches, nor his setting the young against the old, divert you from your purpose; but acting in your usual order, just as our fathers, by consulting young with old, raised the state to its present height, do ye now too, in the same manner, endeavour to advance it; being convinced that youth and old age can do nothing without each other; but that the period of levity, and of mid-age, and of extreme preciseness, will have most power when joined together; and that the state, if it remain quiet, will be worn out on itself, like any thing else, and its skill in every thing grow dull; while by entering into contest it will continually gain fresh experience, and will find self—defence habitual to it, not in word, but rather in deed.
My decided opinion then is, that I think a state of no inactive character would most quickly be ruined by a change to inactivity; and that those men live most securely, who regulate their affairs in accordance with their existing habits and institutions, even though they may be of an inferior character, with the least variation.
To this effect spoke Alcibiades. When the Athenians had heard him and the Segestans and some Leontine exiles, who, coming forward, begged and entreated them to assist them, reminding them of their oaths, they were much more eager for the expedition than before.
So Nicias, perceiving that he could not now turn them from it by the same arguments as he had used before, but might perhaps change their purpose by the amount of armament, if he should command a numerous one to be prepared; he came forward again, and addressed them as follows:
"Since I see you, Athenians, altogether bent on making the expedition, may these things turn out as we wish: at the present time, however, I will declare to you what my opinion is.