Book 5
Mel. And how then could it prove advantageous for us to serve, as it is for you to govern?
Ath. Because you would have the benefit of submitting before you suffered the last extremities; while we should be gainers by not destroying you.
Mel. But would you not accept our proposals, on condition of our remaining quiet, and being friends instead of enemies, but in alliance with neither side?
Ath. No; for your enmity is not so hurtful to us, as your friendship is to our subjects an evident proof of our weakness, but your hatred, of our power.
Mel. And do your subjects then take such a view of equity, as to put on the same footing those who are not at all connected with you, and those who, being in most cases your colonists, and in some cases having revolted from you, have been reduced to subjection?
Ath. Why, for an argument resting on justice they think that neither of us are at a loss; but that on the ground of their power they escape, and we, through fear, abstain from attacking them. So that, besides our ruling over more subjects, you would also through your subjection confer security upon us; especially by the fact that you who are islanders, and weaker too than some others, did not escape our dominion, who have the command of the sea.
Mel. And do you consider that there is no security in that other case? (For here again, as you have excluded us from appeals to justice, and urge us to yield to considerations of your advantage, we too must explain what is expedient for us, and so endeavour to persuade you, if the same happen to be for your interest also.) For how can you avoid making enemies of all that are at present neutral, when, on looking to the present case, they reckon that some time or other you will proceed against them also? And by that course what do you do, but aggrandize your present enemies, and bring those upon you against their will who would never else be likely to become hostile to you?
Ath. Why, we do not consider those who live any where on the mainland, and who in consequence of their liberty will long delay taking precautions against us, to be so formidable to us as those who are islanders any where without being under our rule, like you, and those who by the severity of our rule are now exasperated against us. For it is these who would most give way to recklessness, and bring both themselves and us into danger that was evident beforehand.
Mel. Surely then, if you run such a risk not to be deprived of your empire, and those who are already in subjection, to be released from it; for us who are still free it were great baseness and cowardice not to have recourse to every thing before we submit to it.
Ath. No; not at least if you take a sensible view of the case. For you are not on equal terms contending for honour, to avoid incurring disgrace; but you are rather deliberating for your preservation, to avoid resisting those who are far stronger than yourselves.
Mel. But we know that warlike measures sometimes come to more impartial results than might have been expected from the different numbers on each side. And in our case to yield is immediate despair; but by making an effort there is yet hope of our keeping ourselves up.
Ath. Hope, which is the solace of danger, when entertained by those who have abundant means, though it may injure, yet does not ruin them. But in the case of those who ἐς ἅπαν τὸ ὑπάρχον ἀναρριπτοῦσι.] Ducas and Göller take ἐς ἅπαν separately from τὸ ὑπάρχον, but Poppo agrees with Arnold in uniting them, and thinks with Bloomfield that κύκλον is properly understood with ἀναρριπτοῦσιν. He also approves of Scholefield's explanation of the following part the sentence: Neque destituit, quamdiu ab eâ cognitâ cavere poterit aliquis; sed tum demum, cùm periculo nullum rclinquitur remedium. I cannot, however, but think that a much more natural interpretation is that of Portus and Krüger, whom I have followed. Nor is the sense given by them to ἐλλέιπει so entirely destitute of authority as has been supposed; for the verb is used in exactly the same manner, Eur. El. 609, σὺ δ᾽, ἐκ βάθρων γὰρ πᾶς ἀνῄρησαι, φίλος οὐδ᾽ ἐλλέλοιπας ἐλπίδ᾽, ἴσθι μου κλύων. In the present passage we may perhaps understand ἀυτῷ after it, so that the preposition may have its proper force. Bekker, in his edit of 1832. proposes to read οὐκέτι λείπει. risk all they have on a throw, (for it is naturally an extravagant passion,) it is only found out at the time of their ruin, and leaves no room for guarding against it in future, when it is found out.
Do not you then, weak as you are, and hanging on one single turn of the scale, be desirous of this fate, nor of resembling the greater part of mankind, who, when they might have been saved by human means, after visible hopes have failed them in their distress, betake themselves to such as are invisible, namely, prophecy, and oracles, and all such things as bring men to ruin, together with the hopes resting upon them.
Mel. Difficult indeed even we, be well assured, consider it to contend against your power and fortune, unless we are able to do it on equal terms. However, we trust that in point of fortune we shall, by the favour of the gods, not be worsted, because we are standing up in a righteous cause against unjust opponents; and that our deficiency in power will be made up by our Lacedaemonian allies; who are under a necessity of succouring us, if for no other reason, yet on account of our connexion with them, and for very shame.
Ath. As regards then the favour of heaven, we trust that we too shall not fall short of it: since we are not requiring or doing any thing beyond the opinion of men, with respect to the gods, or their determination, with respect to themselves.
For of the gods we hold as a matter of opinion, and of men we know as a certainty, that, in obedience to an irresistible instinct, they always maintain dominion, wherever they are the stronger. And we neither enacted this law, nor were the first to carry it out when enacted; but having received it when already in force, and being about to leave it after us to be in force for ever, we only avail ourselves of it; knowing that both you and others, if raised to the same power, would do the same.
And so, with regard to the gods, we are with good reason fearless of defeat. But with regard to your opinion respecting the Lacedaemonians, according to which you trust, that from a sense of shame, forsooth, they will assist you; though we bless your simplicity, we do not admire your folly.
For with respect to themselves, and the institutions of their country, the Lacedaemonians do indeed to a very great extent practise virtue; but with respect to others, though we might descant at length on their conduct towards them, speaking most concisely we should declare, that of all the men we are acquainted with, most evident consider what is agreeable to be honourable, and what is exedient to be just. And yet such a view of things is not in favour of your present unreasonable hopes of safety.
Mel. But it is on this very ground that we now rely on their sense of interest, and believe that they will not be tray us Melians, who are their colonists, and so lose the confidence of those Greeks who wish them well, while they help those who are hostile to them.
Ath. Then you do not think that interest is connected with security, whereas justice and honour are practised with danger; a course on which the Lacedaemonians, generally speaking, least of all men venture.
Mel. Nay, but we are of opinion that they would even incur dangers for our sake, more than usual, and would regard them as less hazardous than ἐς ἄλλους.] Arnold thinks that perhaps παρακινδυνεῦσαι or παραβαλεῖν may be substituted for the kindred substantive κινδύνους, so as to avoid the harsh construction of κινδύνους ἐς ἀλλους, pericula propter alios suscepta, as Scholefield renders it. But there seems no necessity for any such change, if ἐς be taken in the more general sense of relation, which it frequently admits of. Compare 105. 1, τῆς ἀνθρωπείας τῶν μὲν ἐς τὸ θεῖον νομίσεως τῶν δ᾽ ἐς σφᾶς αὐτοὺς βουλήσεως.—The same sense must, I think, be attributed to the genitive τῆς γνώμης in the last clause of the chapter: though Poppo objects to it, and proposes to substitute either the dative or accusative. in the case of others; in as much as we he near the Peloponnese, for the execution of their measures; while in feeling we are, through our kindred with them, more to be trusted than another party would be.
Ath. Ay, but to men going to take part in a quarrel safety does not appear to consist in the good feeling of those who call them to their aid, but in the fact of their being far superior in power for action; and the Lacedaemonians look to this even more than the rest of the world. At any rate, through their mistrusting their own resources, it is only in concert with many allies that they attack those who are near to them; so that it is not likely they will cross over to an island, while we are masters of the sea.
Mel. But they would have others to send; and the Cretan sea is of wide extent, and to intercept a party in crossing it is more difficult for those who command it, than to escape is for those who wish to elude observation.
Besides, if they should be disappointed in this, they would proceed against your territory, and to the remainder of your allies, such as Brasidas did not reach: and you will have to exert yourselves, not so much for territory which does not belong to you, as for your own confederacy and country.
Ath. On this point you, as well as others, may learn by actual experience, and not remain ignorant, that from no single siege did the Athenians ever yet retreat through fear of others.
But it strikes us, that though you said you would consult for the safety of your country, you have in all this long discussion advanced nothing which men might trust to for thinking that they would be saved; but your strongest points depend on hope and futurity, while your present resources are too scanty, compared with those at present opposed to you, to give you a chance of escape. And so you afford proof of great folly in your views, if you do not even yet, after allowing us to retire, adopt some counsel more prudent than this.
For you surely will not betake yourselves to that shame, which in dangers that are disgraceful, because foreseen, destroys men more than any thing else. For in the case of many men, though they foresee all the time what they are running into, the thing which is called disgrace, by the influence of a seducing name, allures them on, enslaved as they are to the word, in fact to fall wilfully into irretrievable disasters, and to incur a shame more shameful as the attendant on folly than on fortune.
Against this then you, if you take good advice, will be on your guard; and will not consider it discreditable to submit to the most powerful state, when it offers you fair terms, namely, that you should become tributary allies, with the enjoyment of your own country; and when a choice of war or safety is given you, to avoid choosing through animosity what is worse for you. For whatever men do not yield to their equals, while they keep on good terms with their superiors, and are moderate to their inferiors, they would be most successful.
Consider then, even after we have retired; and reflect again and again, that it is for your country that you are consulting, The construction of this sentence, according to the common reading, is abandoned as desperate by all the editors. Göller and Bloomfield substitute ἴστε for ἔσται; but Poppo protests strongly against the change. With due deference to such authorities, I would venture to ask, whether the text, as it stands, may not be explained by supposing δουλεύεσθαι to be understood with ἔσται—the infinitive being suggested by the indicative at the end of the antecedent clause—and referring ἣν not to πατρίδος as has been done hitherto, but to βουλήν. ἐς μίαν would then stand without its substantive, as it does Horm. Il. 2. 379, though in a different sense. Or, if that be considered a difficulty, it would perhaps be nothing inconsistent with the frequently careless style of Thucydides to suppose a confusion of two expressions, so that both ἥν and μίαν should be left in concord with βουλήν The sense of the passage would certainly be more natural, and the construction easier, if ἧς could be substituted for ἥν: but as MSS. afford no authority for the change, and as it does not appear absolutely necessary, it might be considered rash to adopt it. which you can do but for one country, and for once, whether it prove successful or unsuccessful.
So the Athenians retired from the conference; and the Melians, having been left to themselves, as they still thought pretty nearly the same as they had maintained in the discussion, gave the following answer:
We neither think differently from what we did at first, Athenians, nor will we in a short space of time rob of its liberty a city which has now been inhabited seven hundred years; but trusting to the fortune which, by the favour of heaven, has hitherto preserved it, and to the help of man, especially of the Lacedaemonians, we will endeavour to save ourselves.
But we propose to you that we should be your friends, and the enemies of neither party; and that you should retire from our country after making such a treaty as may appear suitable for both sides.
Such then was the answer which the Melians gave. The Athenians, now departing from the conference, said: Well then you are the only men who by these counsels, as appears to us, consider what is future as more certain than what is seen, and regard what is out of sight as already occurring, because you wish it; and having staked and relied most on [ These words are, I think, implied by the omission of the article before the following nouns. such things as] Lacedaemonians, and fortune, and hopes, you will also be most disappointed.
So the Athenian ambassadors returned to their forces: and their generals, since the Melians did not listen at all to their proposals, immediately proceeded to apply themselves to war; and having divided the work between the different states, enclosed the Melians with lines on all sides.
Afterwards, the Athenians left a part of their own troops and the allies, to keep guard both by land and sea, and returned with the main body of the forces. Those who were left behind remained and besieged the place.
About the same time an Argive force invaded the Phliasian territory, and being intercepted by an ambuscade of the Phliasians and their allies, were cut off to the number of eighty.
And now the Athenians at Pylus took great spoils from the Lacedaemonians; in consequence of which the Lacedaemonians, though even then they did not renounce the treaty, and go to war with them, proclaimed that any of their people who pleased might plunder the Athenians.
Moreover, the Corinthians proceeded to hostilities with the Athenians for some private quarrels of their own;
but the rest of the Peloponnesians remained quiet. The Melians, too, attacked by night the part of the Athenian lines opposite the i.e. of the besieging force. See Bloomfield's note. market-place, and slew some of the men; and having carried in corn, and as many useful things as they could, returned and kept quiet; while the Athenians made better provision for the guard in future. And so the summer ended.
The following winter, the Lacedaemonians intended to march against the Argive territory, but returned on finding, when at the frontier, that the sacrifices for crossing it were not favourable. Owing to this intention on their part, the Argives, suspecting a certain party in their city, seized some of them, while others escaped them.