Book 4
Phocaean staters."The Phocaean stater was notorious for the badness of the gold (or rather electron); cf. Dem. xi. 36. It was worth about twenty-three silver drachmas. See Hultsch, Gr. und röm. Metrologie, 184. After this they made an expedition against Antandros and took the city through treachery on the part of the inhabitants. It was, in fact, their plan to free the rest of the cities known as the Actaean cities,ie. of the ἀκτή or promontory of the mainland north of Lesbos. These had been taken from Mytilene by paches (cf. 3.50.3). They are mentioned also C.I.A. i. 37. which had hitherto been in the possession of the Athenians, though inhabited by Mytilenaeans, and above all Antandros. Having strengthened this place, where there was every facility for building ships—timber being available on the spot and Ida being near at hand —as well as for providing other equipments of war, they could easily, making it the base of their operations, not only ravage Lesbos, which was near, but also master the Aeolic towns on the mainland. Such were the plans upon which they were preparing to embark.
During the same summer the Athenians with sixty ships, two thousand hoplites, and a small detachment of cavalry, taking with them also some Milesians and others of their allies, made an expedition against Cythera. In command of the expedition were Nicias son of Niceratus, Nicostratus son of Dieitrephes, and Autocles son of Tolmaeus.
Now Cythera is an island adjacent to Laconia, lying off Malea; its inhabitants are Lacedaemonians of the class of the Perioeci, and an official called the Bailiff of Cythera used to cross over thither once a year from Sparta; they also used regularly to send over a garrison of hoplites and paid much attention to the place.
For it served them as a port of call for merchant ships from Egypt and Libya, and, moreover, pirates would be less likely to annoy Laconia from the sea,ie. if Cythera were well guarded. on which side alone it could be harmed; for the whole coast runs out towards the Sicilian and the Cretan seas.Others take πᾶσα of the island, which forms as it were a bastion “running out into the Sicilian and Cretan seas.”
So then the Athenians, putting in at Cythera with their armament, consisting of ten ships and two thousand Milesian hoplites,An incredibly large number. In 8.25.2, where they are in their own land, the Milesians can oppose to the enemy only 800 hoplites. Nor would ten ships suffice for so many epibatae. Perhaps there is a confusion in the numerical sign, due to a copyist. took the city by the sea called ScandeiaThe heaven of Cythera, some ten stadia distant from that city.; then, with the rest of their forces landing on the part of the island which looks toward Malea, they advanced against the city of Cythera which is away from the sea,It seems necessary to adopt Stahl's conjecture ἀπὸ θαλάσσης, or deleted ἐπὶ θαλάσσῃ. “One division of the Athenian force landed at Scandeia, another, disembarking on the N.E coast, marched on the capital. The second force found the Cytherians prepared to meet them; in the battle which ensued the Cytherians were routed, and fled to the upper city, ie. the capital. This explanation is borne out by existing remains. See Frazer's Pausanias, iii. 385, 386; also Weil in Mittheil. d. Arch. Inst. in Athen. v. 224-243.” (Spratt.) where they found that all the inhabitants had immediately established themselves in camp.
A fight ensued, in which the Cytherians stood their ground for some little time, then turned and fled to the upper town, but afterwards capitulated to Nicias and his colleagues, agreeing to leave the question of their own fate, except as to a penalty of death, to the arbitration of the Athenians.
Some negotiations between Nicias and certain of the Cytherians had already taken place, and for this reason the settlement of the terms, both for the present and the future, was arranged more speedily and with better advantage to them;
for otherwise the Athenians would have expelled the inhabitants, since they were Lacedaemonians and the island lay in that position on the coast of Laconia. After the capitulation the Athenians took possession of Scandeia, the town at the harbour, and having taken precautions for guarding Cythera, then sailed to Asine, Helus, and most of the other towns on the seacoast; here they made raids or bivouacked at whatever place they found convenient, and ravaged the land for about seven days.
The Lacedaemonians, though they saw the Athenians in possession of Cythera and expected them to make such descents upon their own territory, nowhere massed their forces to oppose them, but sent garrisons here and there throughout the country, determining the number of hoplites by the strength needed at each point, and otherwise were very watchful, fearing lest some revolution should take place which would affect their constitution; for the calamity which had befallen them at the island of Sphacteria had been great and unexpected, Pylos and Cythera were occupied, and on all sides they were encompassed by a war which moved with a swiftness which defied precaution.
Consequently they organized, contrary to their custom, a force of four hundred cavalry and bowmen, and in military matters they now became more timid than at any time before they were involved in a naval struggle which was outside their own existing scheme of military organisation, and that too against Athenians, with whom an attempt foregone was always so much lost of what they had reckoned on accomplishing.cf. 1.70.7.
Besides, the reverses of fortune, which had befallen them unexpectedly in such numbers and in so short a time, caused very great consternation, and they were afraid that some time a calamity might again come upon them like that which had happened on the island;
and on this account they showed less spirit in their fighting, and whatever move they might make they thought would be a failure, because they had lost all self-confidence in consequence of having been hitherto unused to adversity.
Accordingly, while the Athenians were at that time ravaging their seaboard, they generally kept quiet when any descent was made upon any particular garrison, each thinking itself inferior in number and there being such depression. One garrison, however, which offered resistance in the region of Cotyrta and Aphrodisia, frightened the scattered crowd of light-armed troops by a charge, but when it encountered hoplites retreated again, a few of their men being killed and some of their arms taken; and the Athenians, after setting up a trophy, sailed back to Cythera.
From there they sailed to Epidaurus Limera, and after ravaging some part of the land came to Thyrea, which belongs to the district called Cynuria, on the border between the Argive and Laconian territories. This district the Lacedaemonians who occupied it had given to the expelled Aeginetans to dwell in, on account of the kind services shown themselves at the time of the earthquake and the uprising of the Helots, and because they had always sided with their policy, in spite of being subject to the Athenians.
While, then, the Athenians were still sailing up, the Aeginetans left the fort by the sea which they happened to be building and withdrew to the upper town, where they dwelt, at a distance of about ten stadia from the sea.
Now a detachment of the Lacedaemonian troops which were distributed in garrisons about the country was assisting the Aeginetans to build this fort. But they refused to enter the fort with them, as they requested, since it seemed to them dangerous to be cooped up in it; but retreating to high ground they kept quiet, thinking themselves no match for the enemy.
Meanwhile the Athenians landed, and advancing straightway with their whole force took Thyrea. They burned the city and pillaged what was in it; but they carried to Athens all the Aeginetans who did not perish in the action, together with their Lacedaemonian commander who was present, Tantalus son of Patrocles, who was wounded and taken prisoner.
They brought also a few men from Cythera, whom they thought best to remove for the sake of safety. These the Athenians determined to place for safekeeping on the islands, and to permit the rest of the Cytherians to occupy their own territory on payment of a tribute of four talents,£80, $3,840. but to put to death all the Aeginetans who had been captured, because of their former inveterate enmity, and to imprison Tantalus along with the other Lacedaemonians captured on the island of Sphacteria.
During the same summer, in Sicily, an armistice was first concluded between the Camarinaeans and Geloans; then representatives from all the other Sicilian cities came together in Gela and held a conference, to see whether they might not become reconciled. Many opinions were expressed for and against, the several envoys disputing and making demands according as they believed that their own rights were being prejudiced; and among the rest Hermocrates son of Hermon, the Syracusan, whose word proved to have the greatest weight with the others, spoke in the general interestOr, “before the meeting.” words to this effect:
"The city which I represent, Siceliots, is not the weakest, nor is it suffering most in the war; but I propose to speak in the general interest, declaring the opinion which seems to me the best for Sicily as a whole.
As for the miseries which war entails, why should one by expressly stating all that can be said make a long harangue in the presence of those who know? For no one is either forced to make war through ignorance of what it is, or deterred from making it by fear, if he thinks he will get some advantage from it. What really happens is this, that to one side the gains appear greater than the terrors, while the other deliberately prefers to undergo the dangers rather than submit to a temporary disadvantage;
but if it should turn out that these two lines of action are both inopportune, each for the side which adopts it, then some profit may come from exhortations which advise a compromise.
And so with us at the present time, if we could be persuaded of the wisdom of this course it would be to our great advantage; for each of us began the war in the first place because we desired to promote our private interests. So now let us endeavour by setting forth our conflicting claims to become reconciled with each other; and then, if we do not after all succeed in securing, each of us, what is fair and just before we part, we shall go to war again.
"And yet we should recognise the fact that the subject of our conference will not, if we are wise, be our private interests merely, but rather the question whether we shall still be able to save Sicily as a whole, for it is against it, in my judgment, that the Athenians are plotting; and we must consider that we have an argument far more cogent to bring us together on these matters than my words, namely, the Athenians, who possess a military power greater than that of any other Hellenic state and are now at hand with a few ships watching for our mistakes, and under the lawful name of alliance are speciously trying to turn to their own advantage our natural hostility to them.
For if we begin war and call them in—men who of their own accord are ready enough to intrude their forces even on those who do not ask for their intervention—and if we spend our own revenues in doing hurt to ourselves, and at the same time pave the way for their supremacy, we may well expect them, when they see that we are worn out, to come sometime with a larger armament and try to bring everything here under their sway.
"And yet, if we are prudent, we ought, each of us in behalf of his own state, to call in allies and incur dangers only when we are seeking to win what does not belong to us and not when we imperil what is already ours; and we should remember that faction is the chief cause of ruin to states and indeed to Sicily, seeing that we her inhabitants, although we are all being plotted against, are disunited, each city by itself.
Recognizing these facts, we must be reconciled with each other, citizen with citizen and state with state, and join in a common effort to save all Sicily. And let no one imagine that only the Dorians among us are enemies of the Athenians, while the Chalcidians, because of their kinship with the lonians, are safe.
For it is not through hatred of one of the two races into which we are divided that they will attack us, but because they covet the good things of Sicily which we possess in common. They have just made this clear by their response to the appeal which the people of Chalcidic stock made to them;cf. 3.86.3.
for to those who have never given them aid according to the terms of their alliance they of their own accord have fulfilled an ally's obligations with a zeal exceeding their compact. That the Athenians entertain these designs of aggrandisement is quite pardonable;
and I have no word of blame for those who wish to rule, but only for those who are too ready to submit; for it is an instinct of man's nature always to rule those who yield, but to guard against those who are ready to attack.
If any of us, knowing how matters really stand, fails to take proper precautions, or if anyone has come here not accounting it of paramount importance that we must all together deal wisely with the common peril, we are making a mistake. The speediest relief from this peril would be gained by our entering into an understanding with one another;
for the base from which the Athenians propose to move is not their own territory, but that of the people who asked them to intervene. And if we follow this course, war will not end in another war, but without trouble quarrels will end quietly in peace, and those who have been invited to intervene, having come with a fair pretext for injustice, will depart home with a fair plea for failure.
"So far, then, as the Athenians are concerned, this is the great advantage we win if we are well advised;
but as to the question of peace, which all men agree is a most desirable thing, why should we not make it here among ourselves? Or, think you, if one person now enjoys a blessing and another labours under adversity, it is not tranquillity far more than war that will put an end to the latter and perpetuate the former? And has not peace its honours and less hazardous splendours, and all the other advantages on which one might dilate as easily as on the horrors of war? Considering these things, you should not overlook my advice, but should rather look forward each to his own salvation thereby. And if any of you cherishes the confident belief that he can gain anything either by insisting on his rights or by an appeal to force, let him not, through the baffling of his hopes, suffer a grievous disappointment;
for he knows that many men ere now, whether pursuing with vengeance those who have wronged them, or in other cases, hoping to gain some advantage by the exercise of power, have, on the one hand, not only not avenged themselves but have not even come out whole, and, on the other hand, instead of gaining more, have sacrificed what was their own.
For revenge has no right to expect success just because a wrong has been done; nor is strength sure just because it is confident. But as regards the future, it is uncertainty that for the most part prevails,ie. “most of our plans are baffled by the uncertainty of the future.” and this uncertainty, utterly treacherous as it is, proves nevertheless to be also most salutary; for since both sides alike fear it, we proceed with a greater caution in attacking one another.
"So let us now, taking alarm on account of both these things—the vague fear of this hidden future and the immediate fear of the dread Athenian presence—and charging to these obstacles, as effectually blocking our way, any failure in the plans which any one of us had hoped to realize, let us dismiss from the country the enemy who is at our gates, and if possible let us make peace among ourselves for evermore; but if that may not be, let us conclude a truce for the longest practicable period, and put off our private differences to some other day.
In fine, let us feel assured that if my advice is followed we shall each keep our city free, and from it, since we shall be arbiters of our own destiny, we shall with equal valour ward off both him who comes to benefit and him who comes to harm. But if, on the other hand, my advice is rejected and we give heed to others, it will not be a question of our taking vengeance on anybody, but, even if we should be never so successful, we should perforce become friends to our bitterest foes and at variance with those with whom we should not be.
“As for me, as I said in the beginning, although I represent a most powerful city and am more ready for attacking another than for selfdefence, I deem it my duty, with these dangers in view, to make concessions, and not to harm my enemies in such a way as to receive more injury myself, or in foolish obstinacy to think that I am as absolutely master of Fortune, which I do not control, as of my own judgment; nay, so far as is reasonable I will give way.
And I require of the rest of you to follow my example and submit to this, not at the hands of the enemy, but of yourselves.