Book 4
After this they marched against Antandrus, and took the town through the treachery of the inhabitants. And their design was to liberate both the other i. e. situated on the ἀκτὴ, or coast, of Asia opposite to Lesbos. Actaean towns, as they were called—which the Athenians held, though formerly the Mytilenaeans owned them—and, above all, Antandrus; having fortified which, (for there were great facilities for building ships there, as there was a supply of timber, with Ida close at hand,) and sallying from it, as they easily might, with resources of every other kind, they purposed to ravage Lesbos, which lay near, and to subdue the Aeolian towns on the mainland. Such were the preparations which they meant to make.
The Athenians in the same summer made an expedition against Cythera, with sixty ships, two thousand heavy-armed, and a few cavalry, taking with them also from amongst the allies the Milesians and some others; under the command of Nicias son of Niceratus, Nicostratus son of Diotreplles, and Autocles son of Tolmaeus.
This Cythera is an island lying off Laconia, opposite to Malea. The inhabitants are Laconians, of the class of the perioeci, and an officer called the Judge of Cythera went over to the place annually. They also sent over regularly a garrison of heavy-armed, and paid great attention to it.
For it was their landing-place for the merchantmen from Egypt and Libya; and at the same time privateers were less able to annoy Laconia from the sea, the only side on which it could be injured; for the whole of it runs out toward the Sicilian and Cretan seas.
The Athenians therefore, having made the land with their armament, with ten of their ships and two thousand heavy-armed of the Milesians, took the town on the coast called Scandea; while with the rest of their forces they landed on the side of the island looking towards Malea, and advanced against the lower town of Cythera, and at once found all the inhabitants encamped there.
A battle having been fought, the Cytherians stood their ground for some short time, and then turned and fled into the upper town; after which they came to an agreement with Nicias and his colleagues to throw themselves on the mercy of the Athenians, only stipulating that they should not be put to death.
Indeed there had been before certain proposals made by Nicias to some of the Cytherians, in consequence of which the terms of the capitulation were settled more quickly and favourably, both for their present and future interests: else the Athenians would have expelled the Cytherians, both on the ground of their being Lacedaemonians and of the island being so adjacent to Laconia.
After the capitulation, the Athenians, having got possession of Scandea, the town near the harbour, and appointed a garrison for Cythera, sailed to Asine, Helus, and most of the places on the sea; and making descents and passing the night on shore at such spots as were convenient, they continued ravaging the country about seven days.
The Lacedaemonians, seeing the Athenians in possession of Cythera, and expecting them to make descents of this kind on their territory, no where opposed them with their collected forces, but sent about garrisons through the country, consisting of such numbers of heavy-armed as were required at the different places. And in other respects they were very cautious, fearing lest some innovation should be made in their constitution, in consequence of the unexpected and severe blow which had befallen them in the island, and of the occupation of Pylus and Cythera, and of their being surrounded on all sides by a war that was rapid and defied all precautions. So that, contrary to their custom, they raised four hundred horse and some bowmen;
and now, if ever, they were decidedly more timid than usual in military matters, being engaged in a conflict opposed to the usual character of their forces, to be maintained at sea, and that against Athenians, by whom whatever they did not attempt was always regarded as a failure in their estimate of the success they should have.
At the same time the events of fortune, many of which had in a short space of time happened contrary to their expectation, caused them the greatest dismay; and they were afraid that some disaster like that in the island might again, some time or other, happen to them.
And for this reason they had less courage for fighting, and thought that whatever movement they made they should do wrong; because their minds had lost all assurance, owing to their former inexperience in misfortune.
Accordingly, while the Athenians were at that time ravaging their sea-coast, whatever might be the garrison in the neighbourhood. of which each descent was made, generally speaking they kept quiet, thinking themselves in each case too few to resist them, and from their present state of feeling. And one garrison which did offer resistance about Cotyrta and Aphrodisia, though it terrified by an attack the scattered crowd of light-armed, yet retreated again, on its charge being sustained by the heavy-armed; and some few men belonging to it were killed, and some arms were taken; and the Athenians raised a trophy, and. then sailed back to Cythera.
Thence they sailed round to the Limeran Epidaurus, and after laying waste some portion of the land, came to Thyrea, which forms a part of the Cynurian territory, as it is called, and is on the frontiers of Argos and Laconia. This district the Lacedaemonians, who owned it, gave to the Aeginetans, when expelled from their island, as a residence, for the service they had done them at the time of the earthquake and insurrection of the Helots, and because, though subject to Athens, they always stood on their side.
While then the Athenians were yet sailing towards them, the Aeginetans evacuated the fortifications on the sea which they had happened to be building, and retreated to the upper town, in which they lived, at the distance of about ten states from the sea.
And one of the garrisons in the country, which was also assisting them in the works, would not go with them within the wall, though the Aeginetans requested them; but thought it dangerous to be shut up within it; and so having retreated to the higher ground remained quiet, as they did not consider themselves a match for the enemy.
In the mean time the Athenians landed, and advanced straightway with all their forces, and took Thyrea. The town they burnt down, and plundered the property in it, and took the Aeginetans with them to Athens, excepting those that had fallen in battle, and the Lacedaemonian commander who was amongst them, Tantalus the son of Patrocles; for he was taken prisoner after being wounded.
They also took with them some few individuals from Cythera, whom they thought best to remove for security. These the Athenians determined to deposit in the islands; to order the rest of the Cytherians, while they retained their own country, to pay a tribute of four talents; to put to death all the Aeginetans that had been taken, for their former perpetual hostility; and to throw Tantalus into prison with the other Lacedaemonians taken in the island.
The same summer, the inhabitants of Camarina and Gela in Sicily first made an armistice with one another; and then all the rest of the Sicilians also assembled at Gela, with embassies from all the cities, and held a conference together on the subject of a reconciliation. And many other opinions were expressed on both sides of the question, while they stated their differences and urged their claims, as they severally thought themselves injured; and Hermocrates son of Hermon, a Syracusan, the man who had the greatest influence with them, addressed the following words to the assembly:
"It is not because I am of a city that is either the least powerful, or the most distressed by hostilities, that I shall address you, Sicilians, but in order publicly to state what appears to me the best policy for the whole of Sicily.
And now with regard to war, to prove that it is a disastrous thing, why need one particularize all the evil involved in it, and so make a long speech before those who are acquainted with it? For no one is either driven to engage in it through ignorance, deterred From it fear, should he think that e will gain any advantage; but it is the lot of the former to imagine the gains greater than the dangers; and the latter will lace the perils rather than put up with any present loss.
But if both should happen to be thus acting unseasonably, exhortations to peace would be useful And this would be most serviceable to us too at the present time, if we did but believe it.
For it was surely with a purpose of well securing our own several interests that we both went to war at first, and are endeavouring by means of conference to come to terms again with each other; and if each one should not succeed in going away with what is fair, we shall proceed to hostilities again.
"We should be convinced, however, that it is not for our own separate interests alone, if we are wise, that this congress will be held; but to consider whether we shall be able any longer to save the whole of Sicily, which, as I conceive, is the object of the machinations of the Athenians. And we should regard that people as much more compulsory mediators in such case than my words; who, possessing as they do the greatest power of all the Greeks, are watching our blunders, being here with a few ships; and under the legitimate name of alliance are speciously bringing to a profitable conclusion their natural hostility to us.
For if we go to war, and call them in to our aid, men who of their own accord turn their arms even upon such as do not call them in; and if we injure ourselves by means of our own resources, and at the same time pave the way for their dominion: it is probable that when they observe us worn out, they will come hereafter with a great force, and endeavour to bring all these states into subjection to them.
"And yet we ought, if we are wise, to aim at acquiring for our own respective countries what does not belong to them, rather than at diminishing what they already have, both in calling in allies and incurring fresh dangers; and to consider that faction is most ruinous to states, and particularly to Sicily, the inhabitants of which are all being plotted against, while we are at variance city with city.
Knowing this then, we ought to make peace, individual with individual, and state with state, and to make a common effort to save the whole of Sicily: and the thought should be entertained by no one, that though the Dorian part of us are enemies of the Athenians, the Chalcidian race is secured by its Ionian connexion.
For they are not attacking our nations, because they are different, and from their hatred of one of them; but from coveting the good things of Sicily, which we possess in common. And this they have now shown upon the invitation of the Chalcidian race:
for to those who had never yet assisted them on the ground of their alliance, they themselves with forwardness answered their claim, beyond the letter of the compact. And very excusable is it that the Athenians should practise this covetousness and forecasting;
and I blame not those who wish to reign, but those who are too ready to be subject. For human nature is always disposed to rule those that submit, but to guard against those that attack. And if any of us know this, but do not forecast as we ought, and if any one has come here without regarding it as his first care, that all should make a good arrangement for what is a general cause of alarm;
we are mistaken in our views. Most speedily then should we be rid of that alarm by making peace with each other:
for it is not from their own country that the Athenians set out against us, but from that of those who invited them here. And in this way war is not terminated by war, but our quarrels are ended without trouble by peace; and those who have been called in, having come with specious injustice, will go back with reasonable want of success.
"With regard to the Athenians then, so great is found to be the benefit of our taking good advice.
And with regard to peace, which is acknowledged by all to be a most excellent thing, how can it fail to be incumbent on us to conclude it amongst ourselves? Or do you think, that whatever good thing, or the contrary, any one has, quiet would not more effectually than war put a stop to the latter, and help to preserve the former; and that peace has not the less hazardous honours and splendours? with all other topics which one might discuss in many words, on such a subject as war. Considering then these things, you ought not to disregard what I say, but should rather provide each for your own safety in compliance with it.
And if any one think that he shall certainly gain some advantage, either by right or might, let him not be annoyed by failure through the unexpected result; knowing that many men ere now, both while pursuing with vengeance those who have wronged them, and hoping, in other instances, to win an advantage by greater power, in the one case, so far from avenging themselves, have not even saved themselves; and in the other, instead of gaining more, have happened also to lose what they had.
For vengeance is not necessarily successful, because a man is injured; nor is strength sure, because it is sanguine. But the incalculable nature of the future prevails to the greatest possible degree; and though the most. deceptive of all things, still proves the most useful: for because we are equally afraid, we are more cautious in attacking one another.
"And now, on account of our indefinite fear of this unknown future, and our immediate dread of the Athenians' presence, being alarmed on both these grounds, and thinking, with regard to any failure in our ideas of what we severally thought to achieve, that these obstacles are a sufficient bar to their fulfilment, let us send away from the country the enemy that is amongst us, and ourselves make peace for ever, if possible; but if not that, let us make a treaty for the longest term we can, and put off our private differences to a future period.
In a word, let us be convinced that by following my advice we shall each have a free city, from which we shall, as our own masters, make an equally good return to him who treats us either well or ill: but if, through not following it, we are subject to others, then, not to speak of avenging ourselves on any one, we necessarily become, even if most fortunate, friends to our greatest enemies, and at variance with those with whom we ought not to be so.
And for myself, although, as I said at the beginning of my speech, I represent a most powerful city, and am more likely to attack another than to defend myself, yet I think it right to provide against these these things, and to make concessions; and not so to injure my enemies as to incur greater damage myself; nor through a foolish animosity to think that I have absolute sway alike over my own plans and over fortune, which I cannot control;
but to give way, as far as is reasonable. And I call on you all, of your own free will, to act in the same manner as myself, and not to be compelled to do it by your enemies.