Book 4
The most distinguished of all, however, was Brasidas. For being captain of a trireme, and seeing that, in consequence of the difficulty of the position, the captains and steersmen, even where it did seem possible to land, shrunk back and were cautious of wrecking their vessels, he shouted out, and said, that it was not right to be chary of timbers, and put up with the enemy's having built a fort in their country; but he bade them shiver their vessels to force a landing, and told the allies not to shrink, in return for great benefits received, to sacrifice their ships for the Lacedaemonians on the present occasion, but to run them ashore, and land by any means, and secure both the men and the place.
In this way he urged on the rest, and having compelled his own steersman to run the ship ashore, he stepped on the gang-board, and was endeavouring to land when he was cut down by the Athenians, and fainted away after receiving many wounds. Having fallen into the ship's bows, his shield slipped from around his arm into the sea; and on its being thrown ashore, the Athenians picked it up, and afterwards used it for the trophy which they erected for this attack.
The rest were eager to land, but unable, both from the difficulty of the ground and from the Athenians standing firm and not giving way.
And such was the revolution of fortune, that Athenians fighting from land, and that a part of Laconia, were repelling Lacedaemonians when sailing against them; while Lacedaemonians were landing from ships, and on their own country, now hostile to them, to attack Athenians. [I call it a revolution of fortune,] for it formed at that time the main glory of the Lacedaemonians, that they were an inland people, and most powerful by land; and of the Athenians, that they were a maritime people, and had by far the most powerful navy.
Having then made their attacks during that day and part of the following, they ceased from them, and on the third sent some of their ships to Asine, to fetch timber for the construction of their engines; hoping that though the wall opposite the harbour was high, yet as the landing was most practicable there, they would take it by means of engines.
Meanwhile the Athenian ships from Zacynthus arrived, fifty in number; for they were reinforced by some of the guard-ships at Naupactus, and four Chians.
When they saw both the mainland and the island crowded with heavy-armed, and the ships in the harbour, and not sailing out of it; being at a loss where to get anchorage, they sailed at the time to the island of Prote, which is not far off, and is uninhabited, and there they passed the night. The next day they weighed anchor in readiness for an engagement in the open sea, should the enemy be disposed to put out to meet them there; if not, intending to sail in and attack them.
They, however, neither put out to meet them, nor had done what they had intended, viz. to bar the entrances; but remaining quiet on shore, were manning their ships, and preparing, in case of any one's sailing in, to engage in the harbour, which is of no small extent.
The Athenians, on perceiving this, advanced against them by each entrance; and finding most of their ships already afloat and drawn up to meet them, they attacked and put them to flight, and chasing them as well as the short distance permitted, disabled many, and took five, one of them with its crew; while the rest they charged after they had taken refuge under the land. Some too were battered while still being manned, before they got under weigh; while others they lashed to their own, and began to tow off empty, the crews having taken to flight.
The Lacedaemonians seeing this, and being exceedingly distressed at the disaster, because their men were being intercepted on the island, went to the rescue, and rushing into the sea with their arms, laid hold of the vessels, and began to pull them back again; every one thinking the business to be obstructed in that part in which he was not himself engaged.
Thus the uproar occasioned was great, and the very reverse of what was habitual to both parties with regard to ships: for the Lacedaemonians, in their eagerness and dismay, were absolutely engaged in a sea-fight, so to speak, from the land; and the Athenians, victorious as they were, and wishing to follow up their present success as far as possible, were engaged in a land-fight from their vessels.
After inflicting much labour and many wounds on each other, they separated;
and the Lacedaemonians saved their empty vessels, excepting those first taken. Both sides having returned to their encampment, the Athenians erected a trophy, gave back the slain, secured the wrecks, and immediately began to cruise round the island, and guarded it vigilantly, considering the men as intercepted; while the Peloponnesians on the mainland, who had by this time come with their contingents from all the cities, remained stationary at Pylus.
When tidings of what had taken place at Pylus reached Sparta, it was determined that, in so great a calamity, the authorities should go down to the camp, and Haack, Göller, and Dindorf retain the old reading,πρὸς τὸ χρῆμα, depending on ὁρῶντας, on inspection of the case. immediately decide on inspection what they thought best.
They, seeing that it was impossible to assist their men, and not wishing to run the risk of their perishing by starvation, or being overpowered and taken by superior numbers, determined to conclude with the Athenian generals, if they were willing, an armistice concerning matters at Pylus, and then send ambassadors to Athens on the subject of a convention, and to try to recover their men as quickly as possible.
The generals having acceded to their proposal, an armistice was concluded on the following terms: That the Lacedaemonians should bring to Pylus, and deliver up to the Athenians, the ships with which they had fought the battle, and all in Laconia that were vessels of war; and should make no attack on the fort, either by land or sea. That the Athenians should allow the Lacedaemonians on the mainland to send over to their men in the island a stipulated quantity of corn, ready-kneaded, viz. two Attic choenixes of barley-meal a man, with two cotylae of wine and a piece of flesh; and half that quantity for i. e. each of those who are called, ch. 8. 9, εἵλωτες οἱ περὶ αὐτούς. each attendant. That they should send in these rations under the eyes of the Athenians, and that no vessel should sail in by stealth. That the Athenians should keep guard over the island, nevertheless, so long as they did not land on it, and should abstain from attacking the forces of the Peloponnesians, either by land or by sea.
That if either party should break any of these terms, in any particular whatever, the armistice should at once be void. That it should be in force till the Lacedaemonian ambassadors returned from Athens, the Athenians conveying them thither in a trireme, and bring ing them back again. That on their arrival this armistice should be void, and the Athenians should deliver back the ships, in the same condition as they had received them.
The armistice was concluded on these terms; and accordingly the ships, amounting to about sixty, were given up, and the ambassadors despatched; who, on their arrival at Athens, spoke as follows:
"Athenians, the Lacedaemonians have sent us to effect, in behalf of our men in the island, whatever arrangement we may prove to be most advantageous for you, while at the same time it would be most creditable for us with regard to our misfortune, as far as present circumstances allow.
Nor will it be contrary to our habit that we shall address you at some length; but it is the fashion of our country, where few words are sufficient, not to use many; but to use more than ordinary, when there is occasion for proving by words a point of importance to us, and so effecting our purpose.
Receive then what we say, not in a hostile spirit, nor as though you were considered ignorant and were being instructed by us;
but rather regarding it as an admonition to take good advice, offered to men who are well informed. For it is in your power honourably to secure your present good fortune, keeping the advantages you have, and receiving an recession of honour and renown; and not to feel as men do that gain any advantage contrary to their habit; for through hope they are ever grasping for more, because they have unexpectedly enjoyed even their present good luck.
But those who have had most changes of fortune both ways, ought fairly to be most distrustful of prosperity. And this might reasonably be the case, both with your city, owing to its great experience, and with ourselves.
"You may learn this lesson by looking at our present misfortunes; for though enjoying the highest reputation of all the Greeks, we are now come [with this request] to you, though we were before accustomed to think that we had ourselves more power to grant what we have now come to sue for.
And yet we were not reduced to this either from decay of power, or from insolence on account of greater accession to it, but from failure in our plans, while reckoning on our ordinary resources;
a subject in which the same thing is alike incident to all. So that it is not right for you to suppose, that because of the present strength of your city and its accessions, fortune too will be always on your side.
They indeed are wise men who cautiously regard their good things as doubtful; (the same men would also deal with misfortunes more discreetly than others;) and who think that war does not conform itself to that measure on which men may wish to meddle with it, but will proceed as chances may lead them on. Such men, too, while they meet with fewest failures, because they are not elated by confiding in their military success, would be most inclined to bring the war to a conclusion during their prosperity.
And you, Athenians, have now an excellent opportunity of doing this with us; and of escaping hereafter, should you not be persuaded by us, and then meet with reverses, (which is very possible,) the imputation of having gained even your present advantages by mere chance; when you might have left behind you a character for power and wisdom exposed to no such hazard.
"Now the Lacedaemonians invite you to a treaty and conclusion of the war, offering you peace and alliance, and that there should subsist between us in other respects close friendship and intimacy with one another; while they ask back, in return, their men in the island; at the same time, thinking it better for both parties not to try the chances of war to the uttermost, whether they may escape by force through some accidental means of preservation, or be reduced to surrender, and be more severely dealt with.
And we think that great enmities would be most effectually reconciled, not if one party, acting in a revengeful spirit, and after gaining most advantages in the war, should bind the other down by compulsory oaths, and make an arrangement with him on unequal terms; but if, when he might do so, showing regard for fairness, and conquering him by a display of goodness, he should, beyond his expectations, be reconciled to him on moderate terms.
For his adversary being now bound, not to retaliate on him, as one who had been treated with violence, but to make him a return of goodness, is more disposed, for very shame, to abide by the terms of his agreement.
And men act thus towards their greatest enemies, more than towards those who have quarrelled with them in an ordinary degree: and they are naturally disposed with pleasure to give way in their turn to such as willingly yield to them; but against those that are overbearing, to hazard all, even against their better judgment.
To come to terms then were good for both of us now, if ever, before any irremediable disaster overtake us in the mean time; in which case we must for ever feel a private hatred of you, in addition to the public one; and you must lose the advantages to which we now invite you.
But whilst things are undecided, and whilst glory and friendship with us are offered to you, our own misfortune, on the other hand, being adjusted on moderate terms, before any disgrace befalls us, let us be reconciled, and both ourselves choose peace instead of war, and grant a respite from their miseries to the rest of the Greeks; who herein also will think you the chief agents. For they are harassed with war without knowing which of the two parties began it; but if a pacification be effected, on which you have now the greater power to decide, they will refer the obligation to you.
If you thus decide, you have an opportunity of becoming firm friends with the Lacedaemonians, at their own request, and by conferring a favour on them, rather than by treating them with violence.
And in this consider what great advantages are likely to be involved; for if we and you agree together, be assured that the rest of Greece, being inferior in power, will honour us in the highest degree.
The Lacedaemonians then spoke to this effect, thinking that the Athenians were before desirous of a truce, but debarred from it through their own opposition; and that if peace were offered, they would gladly accept it, and give back the men.
They, however, since they had the men in the island, thought the treaty was now ready for them, whenever they might wish to conclude it with them, and were grasping after further advantage.
They were especially urged to this by Cleon son of Cleaenetus, a demagogue at that time, and most influential with the populace; who persuaded them to answer, that the men in the island must first surrender their arms and themselves, and be conveyed to Athens; and that on their arrival, when the Lacedaemonians had restored Nisaea, Pegae, Troezen, and Achaia—which they had taken, not by war, but by virtue of the former arrangement, when the Athenians had conceded them under the pressure of calamities, and were at that time somewhat more in need of a truce —they should then recover their men, and conclude a treaty for as long a period as both sides might wish.
To this answer they made no reply, but desired them to choose commissioners to meet them, who should speak and hear on each point, and so calmly come to any arrangement to which they might persuade each other.