Book 3
For, on the one hand, they had as evidence in their favour that surely those who have an equal voice with themselves would never have taken part in their campaigns had not those whom they attacked been guilty of some wrong; and on the other hand, they also brought the united strength of the strongest states against the less powerful first, and leaving the former to the last they counted upon finding them weaker when all the rest had been removed from around them.
But if they had begun with us, while the whole body of allies were not only still strong in their own strength, but also had a leader to rally to, they would not have got the mastery so easily.
Besides, our navy caused them some fear, lest it should some day be augmented by being united either with yours or another's and thus become a menace to themselves.
To some extent also we owe our salvation to the court we paid to the Athenian people and to the political leaders of the day.
But we could not have expected to be able to survive for long, if we may judge by their conduct toward the other allies, unless this war had broken out.
"Was this then a friendship or a freedom to put faith in, where we violated our real feelings whenever we treated each other as friends? They courted us in time of war only because they were afraid of us, while we acted in the same manner toward them in time of peace; and good faith, which in most cases is made steadfast by good will, was in our case made secure by fear, and it was fear rather than friendship that held us both to the alliance; and whichever of us should soonest gain boldness through a feeling of security was bound to be the first to commit some act of transgression also.
If, therefore, anyone thinks that, just because they postponed the measures we dread, we do wrong in revolting first, without having waited on our side until we were (quite sure that any of our suspicions would come true, he is in error.
For if we were in a position to meet their plotting by counter-measures on equal terms with them, it was indeed incumbent upon us on our part to postpone likewise our offensive against them; but since the power of attack is always in their hands, the right of acting betimes in our own defence must necessarily be in ours.
"Such were the motives and reasons, Lacedaemonians and allies, which led us to revolt, and they are clear enough to convince all who hear them that we had good grounds for our action, and cogent enough to alarm us and impel us to seek some means of safety. This we long ago wished to do while you were still at peace, when we sent envoys to you suggesting that we should revolt, but were prevented from doing so because you would not receive us. But now, when the Boeotians invitedThis has not been definitely stated above, but it is implied in ch. ii 3, v. 4. us we responded promptly. It was our intention to make at once a double withdrawal—from the Hellenesie. from the Delian Confederacy. and thus aid in liberating them instead of joining the Athenians to do them wrong; and from the Athenians, and thus destroy them first instead of being ourselves destroyed by them afterwards.
Our revolt, however, has been made prematurely and without preparation; wherefore it is the more incumbent upon you to receive us as allies and quickly send us aid, in order that all men may see that you protect those whom you ought to protect and at the same time harm your enemies. And it is an opportunity such as never has been before.
For the Athenians have been ruined by pestilence as well as by heavy expenses. Part of their fleet is cruising about your coasts,cf. 3.7.2. part is arrayed against us; so that it is not likely that they have any ships to spare if you attack them this coming summer a second time, by sea as well as by land;
but they will either not resist you when you sail against them, or else they will have to withdraw their fleets both from our waters and from yours. And let no one think that he will be incurring a risk of his own for the country of another.
For though Lesbos seems to him to be a long way off, the help she will bring him will be close at hand. For the war will not be in Attica,ie. the war will not be decided in Attica. as some think, but in those countries from which Athens derives its support. The revenues of Athens come from her allies, and they will be still greater if they shall subdue us;
for not only will no one else revolt, but our resources will be added to hers, and we should be treated with greater rigourEspecially as regards the tribute which would be exacted. than those who have long been slaves.
But if you give us your hearty support, you will add to your league a state that has a large navy, a thing of which you still stand most in need, and you will find it easier to overthrow the Athenians by gradually drawing their allies away from them—for every one will be emboldened to come over to your side—and you will free yourselves of the reproach under which you have heretofore laboured, of refusingcf. 1.69.1, 5. to aid those who revolt from the Athenians. But if you openly play the part of liberators,cf. 2.8.4. the more certain will be your victory in the war.
“Reverencing, then, not only the hopes which the Hellenes place in you, but also that Olympian Zeus in whose temple we are even as suppliants, succour the Mytilenaeans by entering on this alliance; and do not abandon us when we are hazarding our lives in a risk all our own, but shall bring to all a general benefit if we succeed—and a still more general injury if through your refusal we shall fail.
Prove yourselves, therefore, men such as the Hellenes account you and our fears would have you be.”
Thus spoke the Mytilenaeans. The Lacedaemonians and their allies, after they had heard them, accepted their proposals, and received the Lesbians as allies. Those allies who were there present were directed to assemble with all speed at the Isthmus with two-thirdscf. 2.10.2. of their forces for the purpose of making the proposed invasion of Attica; and the Lacedaemonians themselves arrived first and proceeded to construct on the Isthmus hauling-machines with which to transfer the ships from Corinth to the sea on the Athenian side, in order to attack Athens both by sea and by land.
They set to work zealously at these things, but the rest of the allies collected slowly, since they were busy gathering in their harvest and were in no mood for campaigning.
Meanwhile the Athenians, perceiving that the enemy, in making their preparations, were acting upon a conviction of their own weakness, and wishing to show that they were mistaken in their judgment, and that without moving the fleet at Lesbos they could easily ward off the new force coming from the Peloponnesus, manned one hundred ships, the citizens,Of citizens usually only the θῆτες, who were light-armed troop on land, served in the fleet (6.43); but in critical times members of the three upper classes, whose refular duty was hoplite service, might be pressed into service in the fleet (viii xxiv 2).—except the knights and the highest class—embarking as well as the resident aliens. Then putting out to sea they displayed their strength along the coast of the Isthmus and made descents upon the Peloponnesus wherever they pleased.
As for the Lacedaemonians, when they saw how greatly they liad miscalculated, they concluded that the reports of the Lesbianscf. 3.13.3, 4. were untrue, and regarding the expedition as impracticable, since their allies had not yet arrived, and, besides, word had come to them that the thirtycf. 3.7.1. ships which were cruising around the Peloponnese were ravaging their own country districts, they went back home.
Later,cf. 3.25.1; 3.26.1. however, they prepared a fleet which was to be dispatched to Lesbos and sent orders to the allied states for forty ships, appointing Alcidas who was to sail as admiral of this fleet.
And when the Athenians saw that the enemy had withdrawn, they also returned home with their hundred ships.
At the time when these ships were at sea about the largest number the Athenians ever had at once were on active service, though there were as many or even more at the beginning of the war.
For one hundred ships were guarding Attica, Euboea and Salamis, and another hundred were cruising off the Peloponnesus, besides those at Potidaea and in other places, so that the number in service at the same time in a single summer was all told two hundred and fifty. It was this effort, together with Potidaea, that chiefly exhausted their resources of money.
For in the siege of Potidaea the hoplite received a wage of two drachmas a day, one for himself and one for his attendant;
and there were at first three thousand of these, and the number was not less than this throughout the siege, besides sixteen hundred who came with Phormio, but went away before the siege was over; and the sailors on the ships all drew the same pay as the soldiers. It was in this way, then, that their money was exhausted at first, and this was the largest number of ships manned by them.
While the Lacedaemonians were at the Isthmus, the Mytilenaeans and their auxiliariesForeign mercenaries; cf. 3.2.2. marched with their army against Methymna, which they supposed was being betrayed into their hands; and they assaulted the city, but when their attempt did not succeed as they had expected, they went off to Antissa, Pyrrha and Eresus, and after establishing their interests in these cities on a firmer basis and strengthening the walls, went home in haste.
As soon, however, as they had withdrawn, the Methymnaeans in their turn made an expedition against Antissa; but a sortie was made by the inhabitants of Antissa and the auxiliary troops in which the Methymnaeans were defeated and many of them slain, whereupon the rest withdrew in haste.
Now when the Athenians learned that the Mytilenaeans were masters of the country and that their own soldiers were not numerous enough to keep them within their walls, about the beginning of autumn they sent Paches son of Epicurus in command of a thousand Athenian hoplites, who also served as rowers.The fact of hoplites serving at the oars-evidently for economical reasons (cf. 3.19.1)—is especially emphasised. cf. 1.10.4; 6.91.4.
When they arrived at Mytilene, they encircled it with a single wall, in which forts were built at a number of strong positions.
Mytilene was thus at last completely cut off both by sea and land just as the winter set in.
Now the Athenians, finding themselves in need of additional funds for the siege, having then for the first time resorted to a property taxThe ἐσφορά was an extraordinary tax levied only in war time. See Boeckh, Public Economy, p. 612. upon themselves to the amount of two hundred talents, also sent to the allies twelve ships under the command of Lysicles and four others, to collect money from them.
He cruised about and collected money at various places; but on his way inland from Myus in Caria through the plain of the Meander, after he had reached the hill of Sandius, he was attacked by the Carians and the Anaeitans and slain, together with many of his army.
During the same winter the Plataeans, who were stillFor previous discussion of this siege, see ii. lxxi.-lxxviii. being besieged by the Peloponnesians and the Boeotians, began to be distressed by failure of their supply of food, and since there was no hope of aid from Athens nor any other means of safety in sight, they and the Athenians who were besieged with them planned to leave the city and climb over the enemy's walls, in the hope that they might be able to force a passage. The attempt was suggested to them by Theaenetus son of Tolmides, a soothsayer, and Eupompidas son of Daïmachus, who was one of the generals.
At first all were to take part, but afterwards half of them somehow lost heart, thinking the risk too great, and only about two hundred and twenty voluntarily persisted in making the sortie, which was carried out in the following way.
They made ladders equal in height to the enemy's wall, getting the measure by counting the layers of bricks at a point where the enemy's wall on the side facing Plataea happened not to have been plastered over. Many counted the layers at the same time, and while some were sure to make a mistake, the majority were likely to hit the true count, especially since they counted time and again, and, besides, were at no great distance, and the part of the wall they wished to see was easily visible.
The measurement of the ladders, then, they got at in this way, reckoning the measure from the thickness of the bricks.
The wall of the Peloponnesians was built in the following fashion. It had two encircling lines, the inner looking towards Plataea, the outer to guard against attack from the direction of Athens, and the two circuits were distant about sixteen feet from one another.
This interval of sixteen feet had in building been divided up into rooms assigned to the guards; and the whole structure was continuousie. the two περίβολοι were joined together by a roof., so as to appear to be a single thick wall furnished with battlements on both sides.