Book 3
For at the same time they used us as evidence that such as had equal votes with themselves, at any rate, would not join them in their enterprises against their will; [and therefore not at all,] unless those they attacked were in the wrong: and by the same system they also led the stronger states with them against the weaker ones first, and by leaving the more powerful until the last they were sure to find them less so, when all the rest had been stripped away from them.
But if they had begun with us, while all of them still had their power, and a centre round which to take their stand, they would not have subdued them so easily.
Our fleet, too, caused them a degree of fear, lest by uniting together, and joining either you or any other power, it might some time bring them into danger.
And again, to a certain extent we preserved ourselves by paying court to their commons, and to those who from time to time took the lead of them.
We did not, however, expect to be long able to do so, if this war had not broken out; looking to the examples they had given in their dealings with the rest.
"What then was that alliance of ours, or that freedom to be relied on, in which we received each other contrary to our real sentiments; and they, through fear, courted us in war, while we did the same to them in peace? And whereas in the case of others it is kindness that most secures faith, in our case it was fear that gave this assurance; and we were constrained to be allies by terror more than by affection; and to whichever party security should first give confidence, that party was sure to be the first also to violate the treaty in some way or other.
If therefore we are thought by any one to be wrong in first revolting, because they deferred the evils we dreaded, while we did not wait in return to see whether any of them would be inflicted, he does not view the case aright.
For if we were able on equal terms with them to return their plots against us, and their delay in the execution of them, what reason was there, that being, [according to this view of the case,] on an equal footing, we should [really] be at their mercy? But as it was always in their power to make the attempt, it ought to be in ours to guard against it beforehand.
"It was on such grounds and with such reasons, Lacedaemonians and allies, that we revolted; sufficiently clear ones for those who hear them to judge that we acted rightly; and sufficiently strong ones to alarm us, and make us betake ourselves to some means of safety: which indeed we wished to do long ago, when we sent to you, while the peace yet lasted, on the subject of our revolting, but were prevented by your not receiving us into alliance. But now, when the Boeotians invited us, we immediately listened to their proposals; and thought that we should withdraw ourselves in a twofold manner; front the Greeks, so as not to join in injuring them in company with the Athenians, but to join in giving them liberty;
and from the Athenians, so as not to be ruined by them ourselves after the rest, but to be beforehand in acting [against them In other words, the fact of their being always at the mercy of the Athenians proved the falsity of the hypothesis of their being on equal terms with them, and therefore the reasonableness of their anticipating the attack which night at any time be made upon them, instead of waiting till it had actually been made. Such I think is the meaning of this very difficult passage. Our revolt, however, has taken place prematurely, and without due preparations; for which reason also it is the more incumbent on you to receive us as allies, and send us succour speedily;
that you may be seen both assisting those whom you ought, and at the same time hurting your enemies. And there is an opportunity for doing that, such as there never was before; for the Athenians have been wasted both by disease and pecuniary expenditure; and their ships are either cruising round your coasts, or stationed against us;
so that it is not likely they should have any to spare, if in the course of this summer you should invade them a second time both by sea and land; but they will either offer no resistance to your naval attack, or withdraw their forces from both our shores.
And let no one deem that he would thus be incurring peril to himself in defence of another man's country. For whoever thinks Lesbos far off, will find it close at hand for assisting him. For it is not in Attica that the war will be decided, as men imagine, but in that quarter from which Attica derives its succours.
Now their revenue is drawn from their allies; and it will be still greater, if they subdue us; for no one else will revolt, and our resources will be added to theirs; and we should be treated worse than those who were enslaved before [they revolted].
But if you will give us hearty assistance, you will both add to your league a state that has a large navy, of which you especially stand in need, and will the more easily overthrow the Athenians, by depriving them of their allies, (for every one will then join you more boldly,) and will escape the charge you have incurred of not assisting those who revolt. If, however, you show yourselves as liberators, you will find your advantage in the war more certain.
From respect then for the hopes of the Greeks reposed in you, and for that Olympian Jupiter in whose temple we stand Literally, like as suppliants in the character of suppliants, assist the Mytilenaeans by becoming their allies;
and do not abandon us [to destruction], standing as we do the brunt of the danger in our own persons, while we shall confer on all a general benefit from our success, and a still more general detriment, if we are ruined through your not being prevailed on to help us Show yourselves then to be such men as the Greeks esteem you, and as our fear would have you to be.
To this effect spoke the Mytilenaeans. When the Lacedaemonians and the confederates had heard them, they admitted the force of their arguments, and received the Lesbians into alliance. And with regard to the invasion of Attica, they told the confederates who were present to go with all speed to the isthmus with two thirds of their forces, to put it into execution, and were themselves the first to arrive there, and proceeded to get ready at the isthmus machines for hauling their ships with a view to transporting them from Corinth to the sea on the side of Athens, and making an attack both by sea and land at the same time.
They, then, were heartily engaged in those operations; but the rest of the confederates were slow in assembling, as they were occupied in gathering in their harvest, and sick of making expeditions.
The Athenians were aware that they were making these preparations from a conviction of their weakness; and wishing to show that it was not a correct opinion, but that they were able, without moving the squadron stationed against Lesbos, at the same time to repel with ease that which was coming against them from the Peloponnese, they manned a hundred ships, going on board themselves, (with the exception of the knights and the These were the citizens whose lands brought them in yearly 500 medimni (equal to about 94 English quarters) of corn, wine, or oil; and they formed the highest of the four classes into which Solon divided the Athenian people. The knights formed the second class, their qualification being 300 medimni; and were so called from being obliged to serve in war on horseback. pentacosio-medimni,) and their resident aliens; and having put out to the isthmus, they made both a display [of their power], and descents on whatever parts of the Peloponnese they pleased.
When the Lacedaemonians saw things so contrary to their expectation, they thought that what had been told them by the Lesbians was not true; and considering themselves in a strait, as their allies at the same time had not joined them, and the thirty Athenian ships cruising round the Peloponnese were reported to be ravaging the land near their city, they returned home.
Afterwards, however, they prepared a fleet to send to Lesbos, and gave orders to the different states for ships to the number of forty, and appointed Alcidas, I am far from certain what is the exact force of this clause, but think it may possibly refer to the fact of Alcidas having been fixed upon to command this expedition before the office of high-admiral was conferred upon him; and that his subsequent appointment to that office is also referred to, c. 26. 1, τὰς ... ναῦς ἀπέστειλαν ἄρχοντα Ἀλκίδαν, ὅς ἦν αὐτοῖς ναύαρχος, προστάξαντες: in which case προστάξαντες would be far from being superfluous, as it has generally been supposed. If, however, this interpretation be thought fanciful, the ἔμελλεν must simply mean that he was to conduct the expedition in his capacity as admiral. who was to conduct the expedition, their high-admiral.
The Athenians, too, returned with their hundred ships, when they saw that the Lacedaemonians had done so.
The object of this chapter, as Arnold observes, "is merely to bring in what Thucydides had forgotten to mention in its proper place, namely, the greatest naval force, and the greatest war expenditure, which Athens had ever been able to employ and support; just as he had mentioned, II. 31. 3, the greatest stand army which she had ever sent cut on one service. At the time that this squadron was at sea, they had about the largest number of ships they had ever possessed at once, Literally, effective, in fine condition; with handsomeness, as Bloomfield renders it; whose interpretation of the passage I prefer to either Göller's or Poppo's. in effective and fine condition : (though they had as many, or even more, at the beginning of the war.)
For a hundred kept guard round Attica, Euboea, and Salamis, while another hundred were cruising about the Peloponnese, besides those at Potidaea and in other places; so that altogether there were two hundred and fifty [in service] in the course of that one summer. And it was this, in conjunction with Potidaea, that most exhausted their revenues.
For at Potidaea the number of heavy-armed that kept guard at two drachmas a day,
(for each man received one for himself and another for his servant,) was at first three thousand; and not fewer than these remained there to the end of the siege, besides one thousand six hundred with Phormio, who went away before it was concluded while all the ships, too, received the same pay. In this way then was their money heedlessly lavished at first; and such was the largest number of ships manned by them.
At the same time that the Lacedaemonians were in the neighbourhood of the isthmus, the Mytilenaeans marched by land, both themselves and their auxiliaries, against Methymna, in hope of its being betrayed to them. After assaulting the city, when they did not succeed as they had expected to do, they withdrew to Antissa, Pyrrha, and Eresus, and having rendered the condition of those towns more secure. and strengthened the fortifications, they returned home.
When they had retired, the Methymnaeans marched against Antissa; and being defeated by the inhabitants and their auxiliaries in a sortie that was made, many of them were slain, and the remainder retreated as quickly as possible.
The Athenians, on receiving this intelligence of the Mytilenaeans' commanding the country, and their own troops not being sufficient to keep them in check, sent, about the beginning of autumn, Paches son of Epicurus as commander, with a thousand heavy-armed of their own;
who having themselves rowed their ships, arrived at Mytilene, and enclosed it all round with a single wall; forts being built on some of the strongest points of it.
Thus the place was vigorously blockaded on both sides, by land and by sea; and the commencement of winter was near at hand.
The Athenians, being in want of money for the siege, although they had among themselves for the first time raised a contribution of two hundred talents, despatched to their allies also twelve ships to levy subsidies, and Lysicles with five others in command of them.
Accordingly he levied them in various places, cruising about; and having gone up the country from Myus in Caria, across the plain of the Maeander, as far as the hill of Sandius, he was both slain himself and many of the army besides, in an attack made by the Carians and the people of Anaea.
The same winter the Plataeans, (for they were still besieged by the Peloponnesians and Boeotians,) when distressed by the failure of their provisions, and when there was no hope of aid from Attica, and no other means of safety presented itself, both themselves and the Athenians who were besieged with them formed a design, in which they were at first unanimous, for all to sally forth and pass the walls of the enemy, if they could force their way over them; the attempt having been suggested to them by Theaenetus son of Tolmidas, a soothsayer, and Eupomidas son of Daïmachus, who was also one of their generals.
Subsequently half of them shrank from it, thinking it a great risk; but about two hundred and twenty voluntarily persevered in the attempt, [which they effected] in the following manner.
They made ladders to suit the height of the enemy's wall, measuring by the layers of bricks, where the wall looking toward them happened to be imperfectly whitewashed. Now many counted the layers at the same time; and though some would naturally miss the correct calculation, the majority would attain it; especially as they counted them many times over, and were also at no great distance, but the wall was easily observed by them as far as they wished.
In this way they ascertained the proper length of the ladders, guessing the measure from the thickness of the bricks.
Now the wall of the Peloponnesians was of the following construction. It consisted of two lines round the place, one against the Plataeans, and another in case any one should attack them on the outside from Athens; and the lines were about sixteen feet apart.
In this interval then of the sixteen feet there were quarters built, and partitioned out amongst the soldiers that were on guard; and these were continuous, so that it appeared but one thick wall, with battlements on each side.