Book 2
The Peloponnesians also sailed away immediately with the ships that were left, proceeding from Dyme and Patrae along the coast to Cyllene, the shipyard of the Eleans; and Cnemus likewise, coming from Leucas together with the ships from that quarterThe contingents from Leucas, Anactorium, and Ambracia, Thuc. 2.80.2, Thuc. 2.80.3. which were to have joined the Corinthian fleet, came to Cyllene after the battle at Stratus.
The Lacedaemonians now sent to the fleet Timocrates, Brasidas, and Lycophron as advisers to Cnemus, directing them to make better preparation for another sea-fight, and not to be driven off the sea by a few ships.
For the issue of the recent battle seemed to them utterly incomprehensible, especially since this was their first attempt at a sea-fight, and they could not believe that their fleet was so greatly inferior, but thought that there had been cowardice somewhere, failing to take into account the long experience of the Athenians as compared with their own brief practice. In a rage, then, they dispatched the advisers.
And these on their arrival, acting in conjunction with Cnemus, sent round a call to the allied cities for additional ships, and set about equipping those already at hand, with a view to a sea-fight.
And Phormio on his part sent messengers to Athens to give information of the enemy's preparations and to tell about the battle which they had won, urging them also to send to him speedily as many ships as possible, since there was always a prospect that a battle might be fought any day.
So they sent him twenty ships, but gave the commander in charge of them special orders to sail first to Crete. For Nicias, a Cretan of Gortys, who was a proxenusSee Thuc. 2.29.1, note. of theirs, persuaded them to sail against Cydonia, a hostile town, promising to bring it over to the Athenians; but he was really asking them to intervene to gratify the people of Polichne, who are neighbours of the Cydonians.
So the officer in charge took the ships, went to Crete, and helped the Polichnitans to ravage the lands of the Cydonians, and by reason of winds and stress of weather wasted not a little time.
Meantime, while the Athenians were detained in Crete, the Peloponnesians at Cyllene, equipped and ready for a battle, sailed along the coast to Panormus in Achaia, where the land-forces of the Peloponnesians had come to their support.
And Phormio also sailed along the coast to the Molycrian Rhium and anchored outside with the twenty ships with which he had fought before.
This Rhium was friendly to the Athenians, and opposite is the other Rhium, that in the Peloponnesus; and the distance between them is about seven stadia by sea, constituting the mouth of the Crisaean Gulf.
Accordingly the Peloponnesians, when they saw the Athenians come to anchor, likewise anchored with seventy-seven ships at the Achaian Rhium, which is not far from Panormus, where their land-forces were.
And for six or seven days they lay at anchor opposite one another, practising and preparing for battle, the one side resolved not to sail outside the two Rhia into the open water, fearing a recurrence of their disaster, the other not to sail into the straits, thinking that fighting in a narrow space was in the enemy's favour.
At last Cnemus and Brasidas and the other Peloponnesian commanders, wishing to bring on the engagement soon, before reinforcements came from Athens, first called their soldiers together, and seeing that most of them were frightened on account of their previous defeat and not eager for battle, encouraged them and spoke as follows:
"The recent sea-fight, Peloponnesians, if possibly it has caused any man among you to be afraid of the one before us, affords no just grounds for your alarm.
For our preparation was deficient, as you know, and the object of our voyage was not so much to fight at sea as operations on land; and it happened, furthermore, that not a few of the chances of war were against us, and doubtless also our inexperience had something to do with our failure in the first sea-fight.
It was not then our cowardice that brought about defeat, nor is it right that the spirit, which force cannot conquer, but which has in it something defiant, should be dulled and blunted by the outcome of mere chance; rather you ought to reflect that although men may suffer reverse in their fortunes, yet in their spirit brave men are rightly considered always brave, and when courage is present no inexperience can properly be urged as an excuse for being cowards under any circumstances. And, after all, your inexperience is more than counterbalanced by your superiority in daring;
and though the enemy's skill, which you particularly dread, will indeed, so long as bravery goes with it, have the presence of mind in the moment of danger to put into effect the lessons it has learned, yet without valour no amount of proficiency avails against such dangers. For fear drives presence of mind away, and skill without intrepidity is of no avail.
Therefore, against their greater experience set your greater daring, and against the fear caused by your defeat set the accident of your being at the moment unprepared.
You have the advantage, both in number of ships and in fighting close to the land, which is friendly to us, and you are supported by hoplites; and victory is generally on the side of those who are the more numerous and better prepared.
There is accordingly not a single reason that we can find why we should fail; and as to our earlier mistakes, the very fact that they were made will teach us a lesson.
Be of good courage, then, and let each man, both helmsman and sailor, follow our lead as best he can, not leaving the post to which he may be assigned.
We shall prepare for the attack at least as well as your former commanders, and shall give no one an excuse to act like a coward; but if anyone should be inclined that way, he shall be punished with the penalty he deserves, while the brave shall be honoured with rewards such as befit their valour."
With such words the Peloponnesian commanders encouraged their men. But Phormio, being himself also uneasy about the apprehension felt by his troops, and observing that they were gathering in knots amongst themselves in alarm at the superior number of the enemy's ships, wished to call them together in order to hearten them and make an exhortation to suit the present emergency.
For in the past he had always told them, by way of bracing their minds, that there was no number of ships, however great, whose attack men such as they could not withstand; and his sailors had long since held among themselves the conviction that they, being Athenians, must never give ground before any number of Peloponnesian ships.
But at this time, seeing that they were dispirited by what they saw before their eyes, and wishing to remind them of their old-time confidence, he called them together and spoke as follows:
"Observing that you have become alarmed, soldiers, at the numbers of the enemy, I have called you together, because I do not want you to be in dread of imaginary dangers.
For, in the first place, it is just because these men have been beaten before, and do not even themselves believe that they are a match for us, that they have provided themselves with this large and disproportionate number of ships; then, too, as regards their courage,— the thing on which they chiefly rely when they come against us, as if it were their peculiar province to be brave,—the only reasonable ground they have for confidence is that their experience in fighting on land has generally brought them success, and so they think this will achieve the same result for them at sea as well.
But in all reason the advantage to-day will rather be ours, if they on their side have it on land: for in valour assuredly they are nowise superior, but we are both more confident just as in any way we have more experience.
Besides, since the Lacedaemonians lead their allies for their own glory, the majority of them have to be dragged into battle against their will, for otherwise they would never, after their decisive defeat, have attempted to fight a second time at sea.
Hence you need not fear their daring. On the contrary, you inspire in them a dread far greater and better justified, both because you have already defeated them and because they think that you would not be facing them at all unless you expected to achieve a result commensurate with the very great odds.
For most men, when, like our present opponents, they are equal to their foes, rely more upon their strength when they advance to the attack thLn upon their resolution; whereas those who dare oppose them with greatly inferior numbers, and at the same time without being compelled to do so. must possess in a high degree the quality of unwavering resolution. Taking all these things into consideration, our enemies have come to fear us more on account of what is amazing in our conduct than they would if our preparations were less out of proportion to their own.
Furthermore many an army has before now been overthrown by smaller numbers through its own want of experience, and sone too through a deficiency of daring, and at this moment we can be charged with neither.
As for the contest, I will not risk it in the gulf if I can help it, nor will I sail into the gulf. For I am aware that a confined space is not an advantage to a fleet of a few ships which are better sailers and have experienced crews, when it is opposed to a large nulnber of ships which are badly managed. For one cannot charge properly upon an enemy ship to ram her side, through not having a clear view of her a long way off, nor can one retire at need when hard pressed; and there is no chance for such manoeuvres as breaking through the line or whirling around to rain, though these are precisely the proper tactics of fast sailing ships, but the sea-fight would have to be turned into a land-battle, and in that case it is the larger fleet that wins.
For these matters, however, I shall make provision to the best of my ability. As for you, keep good order, stay near your ships, give heed sharply to the word of command, especially since the two fleets are at watch so near one another; and when it comes to action, regard discipline and silence, which are generally advantageous in warfare, but especially so at sea, as all important, and ward off the enemy yonder in a manner worthy of your past exploits.
The contest is a momentous one for you—whether you are to shatter the hopes which the Peloponnesians have in their fleet, or to bring closer home to the Athenians their fear about the sea.
Once more I remind you that you have beaten most of themIn the first sea-fight, the Peloponnesians had forty-seven ships (Thuc. 2.83.3) against Phormio's twenty (Thuc. 2.83.1); in the second battle the Peloponnesians had seventy-seven ships (Thuc. 2.86.4). Since the Peloponnesians lost twelve ships in the first battle (Thuc. 2.84.4), the expression “most of them” is not quite exact here. already; and when men have once suffered defeat, their spirit is never the same as before if they are called upon to face the same dangers."
Such were the words with which Phormio also encouraged his men. And the Peloponnesians, when the Athenians did not sail into the gulf and the narrows to meet them, wished to draw them in against their will; so they put out to sea at dawn, and, after lining up their ships four deep,Or, as some take it, in a column four abreast. sailed along their own shore towards the inner part of the gulf, in the same order as they had lain at anchor,Only now the four ships which had lain at anchor one behind the other sailed, after the turn to the right, abreast. their right wing leading the way.Or, retaining ἐπὶ instead of παρὰ, after lining up their ships four deep against their own shore (i.e. with it at their backs), sailed toward the inner part of the gulf ....
Upon their right wing they had placed their twenty best sailing ships, in order that, if Phormio got the impression that their objective was Naupactus and should, following the coast, sail in that direction to its aid, the Athenians might not be able to escape their attack by sailing outside their wing, but might be enveloped by these ships.
Now he did just what they expected him to do; when he saw them put to sea, fearing for the safety of the place, which was unprotected, he reluctantly and in haste embarked his crews and sailed along the coast, the Messenian army moving along the shore to support him.
And when the Peloponnesians saw that they were skirting the coast in single file and were already inside the gulf and close. to shore, which was just what they most desired, at one signal they suddenly veered about, bore down with ships in line as fast as each could upon the Athenians, hoping to cut off all their ships.